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THEOLOGY AND TRADITION[1]

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It must be confessed that many a candidate for the Christian ministry nowadays enters upon his course of professional study with misgiving. He is quite clear as to his own purpose, to serve God in his day and generation most directly and effectively by showing Him forth in word and deed. But he has a vague feeling that the curriculum of the theological seminary has nothing very definite to contribute to the preparation for this life-work. A glance at the announcement shows him that it concerns itself largely with the distant past—the writings of the Old and New Testaments, the vicissitudes and controversies of the Church, the theological problems set by dead religious thinkers. While he is eager to rush into the thick of the fray, he is bidden to stay and devote some of his most precious years to a laborious survey of ancient ground. Would it not be better to leave tradition and the traditional disciplines on one side, and give his time and attention at once to the consideration of the present needs of society and of the men and women who compose it? to learn what there is to do, and how to do it?

[1]An address delivered at the opening of Andover Theological Seminary and the Harvard Divinity School, September 23, 1913.

There is even a more serious difficulty. He feels himself separated by seemingly impassable barriers from the methods of study and the attitude of mind which he associates with theology. His life at college has already involved him in a certain degree of contradiction between his intellectual equipment on the one hand and his religious tenets on the other. He has received the mental—that is, the scientific—training of the day. He may not know much science, but he does know something of scientific method, and is completely in sympathy with the scientific spirit. All his college studies were sections of the one great domain of truth; and, in a general way, his knowledge of encyclopedics enabled him to assign to each subject its correlated place in the whole scheme of knowledge. In that scheme there appeared to be no room for even the minimum of elementary theology that he acquired in childhood, which he has accordingly carried along in a separate pocket on the outside. So far as it went, he could not assimilate it to the rest of his thought. Fortunately, it did not go very far. But he has no desire for more of the same thing to harass his spirit. The best his instructors can do for him now is to relieve him of the burden entirely. This they show no signs of doing. So he takes up his tasks with a sense of resignation tempered with anxiety for the survival of his intellectual ingenuousness.

For, do what he will, he cannot suppress a certain mental sympathy with the attitude of those outside critics, sufficiently numerous in modern times even in institutions of learning, who are frankly hostile to all theology and theologians, and whose understanding of the subject may be summed up in some such way as this:

Theology is nothing but tradition, and for the most part hollow tradition. It does indeed pretend to be a science, a discipline setting forth in comprehensible terms a systematized body of facts. Yet it differs

markedly from every science worthy of the name in that its chief appeal is to the testimony and authority of the past. In none of the sciences, to be sure, does wisdom claim to be born with the present generation—many men who are dead and gone have contributed to the existing stores; most of our knowledge is inherited; every science has its body of tradition; the sudden loss of all the books in the world would be an irreparable disaster in every field, and work incalculable harm to our civilization. But the sciences, while they welcome the contributions of the past, do not bow down before them. They appropriate, as a master appropriates the labors of a servant. They accept or reject the conclusions of former days, absorb into their own modern systems whatever they think fit, and march on to fresh trials of truth, which in their turn will be submitted to the judgment of posterity. It is always the present that sits in judgment over the past, never the past that imposes its judgment on the present. In the domain of theology this relation appears to be reversed. The past is the master; the present is the slave, even the worshipper. Tradition is not there a mere convenience, a book of record, a tool, a saving of useless labor; it is the vital principle, the foundation of the whole structure, the authority compelling assent. The truth is such and such because it has been said by men of old time. That these men of old time are esteemed prophets and apostles is not to the point; for where outside of tradition will you find prophet or apostle? In short, science has its traditions, but tradition unalloyed with nobler metal is to be found only in theology.

Moreover, theology bears on its face the evidence of its purely traditional, unscientific character. Truth is one, and science is one. There is not an astronomy according to the French and an astronomy according to the Germans, one European psychology and another

American. But precisely because theology is tradition and not science, there are as many theologies as there are distinct or divergent traditions. For, as we all know, mankind was for many thousands of years separated into distinct races and peoples, having little or no contact with each other. The leaders of each race were naturally confronted with much the same questions regarding the major problems of life and the origin of the ancient racial institutions. As they invariably made shift to answer, each people secured its proper body of tradition. This essentially mythological material was purged out of the sciences of Occidental countries long ago, but it took refuge in religion, and still persists in theology. The adherents of the respective traditions have cherished their several delusions, each increasingly at cross purposes with all the rest. So each community has its "sacred science," its theology. Many peoples; many traditions; many theologies. In later times, more than one of these has attempted to ally itself with the genuine science of mankind, but such attempts have proved abortive, as they were bound to do. There is an arrogance inherent in theology which science cannot abide. For, when theologians admit the unity of truth, it is only to identify the latter with their peculiar *a priori* system, while they vitiate their claim by profound ignorance of other systems, sometimes even by the conviction that to listen to rival claims is a grievous sin. How can it be otherwise? Truth is one and cannot fear itself; falsehoods are many and necessarily fear each other.

Besides being traditional and characteristically plural, theology is, like most uncontrolled tradition, fatally misguided. It professes to transmit truths which we could not ourselves by any possibility discover. These truths were at no time free to any one who chose to seek them. The arbitrarily favored few, even among the people of the remote past, alone had them; they told their fel-

lows; these told their sons, and so on. We of today may lose the precious truth, we may corrupt it; we may neither add to it nor improve it. Yet surely the very fact that we cannot by any possibility discover it should be sufficient to show that it was beyond the power of any former generation to discover. Nowadays men realize their limitations too well to make affirmations on certain subjects; whereas in former times they were less cautious, and they may have been less honest. Anyhow, they knew nothing of the method of ordered thinking; they emitted sentiments, and frequent repetition resulted in the sentiments being finally accepted for pregnant truth even by the originators themselves. In the prevailing dearth of knowledge, spurious information was greedily seized and was jealously transmitted to posterity. The very impossibility of verifying it contrived to render it more and more precious as time went by, till finally men were willing to die for it. It was magnificent, but it was not truth. Such convictions are utterly worthless, though acquired in perfect good faith, and though they come down to us clothed in the imposing language of a by-gone age and freighted with the prestige of the centuries of their vogue.

For the rest, it will already have been noticed that theology actually occupies a field which, but for it, would be left largely vacant. Scientific people, therefore, are disinclined to disturb theology, so long as theology does not attempt to disturb scientific people. In fact, the chief reason why the two camps do not more often come into open collision in modern times is that theology begins at the wrong end of things; it and science have not yet seriously come together, and probably never will. So that if only theology would surrender its claim to constitute a science and be content with the rank of a poem, all might continue well indefinitely. For, instead of starting with the aspect of things in the imme-

diate proximity of the observer and pushing out thence laboriously in the direction of the infinite circumference, which admittedly can never be reached, theology presumes to begin at the unseen circumference, which it foreshortens dreadfully, and straightway makes for the centre with a bound: *In the beginning* (which never was) *God* (of whom one cannot possibly have knowledge) *created* (an act which cannot be conceived by the modern mind) *the heaven* (which demonstrably does not exist) *and the earth* (the only actuality in the whole pronouncement). To be sure, theology is not the only sinner in this respect. Its emancipated sister philosophy also begins at the wrong end. But then no one pretends that the lucubrations of philosophy have any practical relation to human life. Theology does draw practical conclusions and make substantial demands. Herein lies its transgression.

Such is theology according to the critic, whose conception represents a curious but by no means rare blend of the opinions of misguided foe and equally misguided friend.

Not all of this denunciation is subscribed to by our candidate for the ministry, it is needless to say. But some of its implications (the contribution of the misguided friend) he has not learned to discard, and the rest he perhaps cannot easily refute.

Is theological truth necessarily traditional? Is it impossible to harmonize the religious with the intellectual life? Can we not break away from tradition?

The difficulty lies in the formulation of the question. The student of theology may not cut loose from tradition with impunity, and for this simple reason: that *theology is the study of religion, and religion*—not theology—*is distinctly a traditionary thing.* Theology and religion are correlatives; the one in the domain of science, the other in concrete life and experience. Religion is essen-

tially traditional, and is not a science. Theology is a science, and can never be traditional without ceasing to be theology. This distinction, this analytical antithesis, which is not always exhibited in the table of contents of either religion or theology, is of the utmost importance. The failure to apprehend it clearly is responsible for most of the hostility of the outsider and much of the distress of the insider.

These institutions of learning are dedicated to the study of religion. There is nothing imaginary about their subject; there is nothing mysterious about their method. Religion, coextensive with the sphere of men's interests and the range of their imagination, has always existed in the world, since men first ceased to be animals and became men, and it exists today, an undeniable, an overwhelming fact. Its sentiments, its practices, its beliefs, have profoundly affected the history of the whole human race. At the present time, if we correctly estimate its scope and pervasiveness, we must admit that it exerts an incalculable influence in the affairs of men, although, owing in large measure to the sort of misapprehension we have just depicted, it is often disclaimed where it is actually entertained. For every hypocrite who professes religious sentiments that he does not possess, there are a hundred men who possess religious sentiments which they do not profess.

These sentiments, practices, and beliefs it is the business of theology to assemble, interpret, account for, reconcile, appraise, and (when proper) to commend. In good part they may themselves be the consequences of the theologizing of former ages, but contemporary theology is not responsible for them. Its task is to look them squarely in the face, as the other sciences do any set of facts in the world about us, and declare itself justly and truthfully concerning them in the language of the contemporary understanding.

Theoretically, there is nothing to prevent a thoroughly irreligious man, an atheist, or a depraved man, if you please, from making an excellent theologian. Actually, he would be as little likely to succeed as would a critic of music who had no music in his soul. But it is conceivable that such a man should be a first-rate theorist on certain aspects of the subject.

In all these respects, the study of religion, theology, does not at all differ from any other branch of learning pursued in the university. The study has its ultimate aim, to be sure—to promote and enhance the benefits which men derive from religion; but a corresponding aim may be accredited to every other science of consequence. We have confidence in the beneficent power of the uncovering of the truth concerning our subject. We need not be constantly, or even mainly, occupied in promoting our aim directly and immediately. We may study the principles and history of bridge-building, and conclude which and which methods have proved most useful, and we may determine why—the mathematics, the physics, the economics, the aesthetics, the ethics of bridge-building. But we need not build the bridges of humanity; we may leave them to be built when and where there is occasion, and when there is no time for study.

Now this sort of study of a department of human life and activity cannot be exhausted and its results stereotyped once for all. It cannot disregard the appearance of new material or the adoption of a new angle of view. The political, social, and intellectual life of our own civilization is ever on the move, affecting religion almost at every step; theology must be constantly enlarging its borders and adjusting its theory to meet the altered aspect and relations of religion. On the other hand, there is the accession of new material from the past or present institutions of other peoples, with whom our

intercourse is of comparatively recent origin. These cannot be excluded on any dogmatic principle. Our theory must be wide enough to embrace and harmonize all the facts, whether they relate to savages in the primitive state or to Oriental sages whose civilization and religion were venerable when ours were in their infancy. We are not justified in assuming that they have nothing of value for us.

A "traditional theology," one based upon an assemblage of facts or upon the application of a method other than those of the present day, is a contradiction in terms. Theologies have been cherished long after they have ceased to make intelligible the matter of religion; but when so cherished, they have proved their abdication of the function of theology by themselves becoming the greatest stumbling-block in the way of the understanding, and indirectly of religion. Then they have passed out of the domain of science into that of religious sentiment, and have themselves been transformed into matter for theological study and interpretation. For religious sentiment has a way of crystallizing around utterances which have once rendered signal service to the cause. To address my understanding, as I am at present constituted, that is what I have the right to ask of theology. Of course, I may not demand omniscience. It is no disgrace, but rather the ear-mark of thoroughness and candor, not to profess to know and understand everything. Like all other sciences, theology cannot pursue one tack very long without running up against a stone wall. In that case it will describe the stone wall as a stone wall. There will be no hocus-pocus about it. The study of religion, like the study of any other subject, is based upon the assumption that the human intelligence, in its natural state, may be applied to its understanding; and upon the further assumption that, as in every other department of life, so too in the

domain of religion, power is multiplied by the application of trained intelligence, however limited.

Needless to say that when we affirm that theology, as a science, must be one, though the religions which it studies are many and various traditions, we do not imply that all traditions are equally important or concern us all to the same degree. A man may be an historian, employing the scientific historian's method, reckoning at every step with the principle that all history is one and its true results in perfect harmony with each other. Yet he may consciously and deliberately limit himself to the investigation of the history, let us say, of the British Empire. He will be more likely to be interested in this if he be a British subject, and more likely to bring to his study patience, industry, and zeal, if he be an ardent British patriot, proud of British achievements and loyal to British institutions. But his history will not sacrifice truth to patriotism. Indeed, the more firm his faith in his country's integrity, the more eager he will be to let all the facts speak for themselves. So with theology. The scholar may consciously apply himself to the special study of Christianity as that section of the subject which has paramount interest for him. And the best theology of Christianity —I purposely avoid the expression "Christian theology"—will be that of the Christian man, if only because he alone can estimate the force and value of the Christian tradition at the present time.

But while it is true that the intelligence must be brought to bear upon the sentiments, practices, and beliefs of religion, it is equally true that the intelligence cannot take their place. In due time, theory may affect the facts, but meanwhile the theory must be based upon the facts. The actual content of religion, which the theologian does not create but finds, is the subject of his study.

Now what I wish to emphasize particularly at this time is that this actual content of religion is, to a very great degree, continuous and abiding. Changes here are relatively rare and invariably fractional. For the most part, they consist of additions to an existing stock, although subtractions and even substantial losses are not unknown. Religion is essentially an inheritance—if you please, a *great tradition.*

We must not let ourselves be frightened by this word "tradition." The most valuable, the most indispensable, the most undying things humanity possesses are traditions, incapable of being produced in a day, or a year, or a century, but requiring countless ages of human history to evolve. A few things, like the steam-engine and the electric battery and dynamite, are new. The things that are honorable, the things that are just, the things that are pure and lovely and of good report, are at least older than the apostle Paul; and, for us men, their age is of their essence. We may continue to think on them without disloyalty to the progressive spirit of the times.

A concrete illustration may help us to a better understanding of the matter. Imagine the world suddenly deprived of human language. It would be reduced to a state of pitiable impotence and emptiness; all society, all institutions, all law, all knowledge, all art, in time even all character, would be swept away. We should be animals once more, without the saving grace of animal instinct. Yet human speech is very distinctly a tradition, and nothing but a tradition. Men do not say to each other, "Go to, let us construct us a language." Nor are they born with it. They cannot originate it each for himself. It is handed down from one generation to another. The very faculty of employing the vocal organs in speech is dependent upon the hearing of other men's speech in the learner's infancy. Lan-

guage is an organism carried by the living spirit of the race, while the successive generations come and go. It changes constantly, to be sure; but the changes are infinitesimal when compared with the lexical volume of the whole and its persistent syntactical cast. Moreover, being only a tradition, it pleads guilty to the indictment brought against religion: it differs always, sometimes *in toto*, among people of different races; although contact between race and race results in the borrowing of words and the ideas which they represent. Sometimes, in exceptional circumstances, it results in the wholesale adoption of a foreign tradition. Language likewise exhibits strange irregularities and eccentricities. And the early stages of its history, particularly those which precede the age of written documents, are exceedingly difficult to trace. Altogether, it is a very complex organism, or rather, a discordant aggregation of organisms, which have only this in common, that they employ in the main the same organs of the body, follow more or less the same lines of growth and development, and correspond in some measure to one and the same conceptual background. Some languages are rich, others poor; some advanced, others backward. Some introduce us to the most lofty and ennobling thought and to poetic creations of wondrous beauty; others have been employed only for the grossest and most elementary purposes.

Nor is it an accident that language is traditional. It is inconceivable that it should be anything else. There literally is not time enough in a lifetime to produce it. After having yourself enjoyed the blessings of traditional language for half a lifetime, but not before, you may very partially invent an artificial language (like Volapük or Esperanto) on paper. But you will never get people that are quite sane to speak it, or even insane people to think in it.

The illustration need not be pressed. It serves well enough to demonstrate the proposition that tradition is by no means synonymous with fiction or worthlessness; that, on the contrary, it may be characteristic of the most valued and indispensable possessions of mankind.

Now religion is just such a world-wide tradition or congeries of traditions as language. It is an inheritance, which derives its power and importance from the fact that it is coextensive with the cultural history of the race, a sort of age-long correlative to our needs and faculties.

So far as mere volume is concerned, we are apt to exaggerate the proportion of new material to old even in what are known as the historic religions. No religion can be traced to its beginnings; least of all those "founded," as we say, by a great religious leader in historic times. Religious leaders have never, unless they were impostors or demented, conceived of themselves as "founding" a new religion. "I came not to destroy but to fulfil," said the greatest of them. In any case, to call a religion historic is to admit that its career began long ago, and that it owes something to its duration.

Christianity is no exception to this characterization of religion as tradition. It is an inheritance, whose power over our lives derives directly from the fact that it comes down to us hallowed with the associations of generations of religious experience; that it represents the emotions, the gropings and yearnings, the sufferings and the triumphs, of many times two thousand years.

It is hardly necessary to point out that, when we say religion is an inheritance, we are far from implying that it is something we receive in purely passive fashion, as into a receptacle, and pass on unaltered. A physical inheritance that fails to yield income loses, in so far forth,

the character of an inheritance. The same is true of an ideal inheritance. There must be profit while it is in our hands or there will be loss; though here too, fortunately for most of us, unearned increment is not unknown.

Finally, if religion in general or Christianity in particular is a great tradition, we cannot pretend to grasp or understand it adequately if we limit our survey to its present manifestation in human life; any more than the study of language and literature can be begun, continued, and ended in the market place. The life of the soul cannot be studied in space, but only in time; and time has but one dimension. It is the greater part of the actual task of theology to study and to rationalize the history and the historic products of religion. It must, for example, identify its prophets and teachers, not so much by name, as by correct delineation of their personality and correct determination of their historical situation, and so wrest from them the secret of their power. It must substitute the principle of sympathetic understanding for that of authority, and so render more fruitful the example of the great men of the past. It must thoroughly humanize the prophet, the apostle, the saint, the reformer—(may we not say?) the Lord Jesus himself. For only as they are humanized can we really be persuaded to emulate their lives and service. No one that has read the Epistles of Saint Paul doubts that he was an apostle; but the colossal labors of recent years have not yet succeeded in making him thoroughly intelligible as a man. No one that has read the Gospels doubts that Jesus of Nazareth was divine; the difficulty still remains to think of him as human. So with Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel; as yet Old Testament studies have done little more than magnify the problems which they present. Theology cannot stop till it has completely humanized these generators and moulders of our faith.

When this has been achieved by patient study of the complex intellectual and moral setting in which they lived and labored, we shall know better what constitutes an inspired man of God, and what it is that we are to reproduce in our lives and characters. Nor can we doubt that themselves would be the first to welcome the achievement. "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends, for all things that I have heard from my Father I have made known unto you." This is a prophecy of the time to come.

WHAT IS THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION?

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In the October number of this *Review* for 1912 there appeared, as many readers will doubtless remember, a striking article by Professor Benjamin B. Warfield of Princeton Theological Seminary, under the caption "Christless Christianity." This is his rather clever designation for the religion of those who hold that belief in the historicity of Jesus, however valuable to the Christian, is nevertheless not absolutely indispensable to Christian faith. The article shows a wide acquaintance with the recent literature of the subject, is written in a spirited and forcible manner, and altogether makes an appreciable contribution, as it seems to me, to the clearing up of this interesting question.

As making for this devoutly-to-be-wished consummation, however, what we have chiefly to thank Professor Warfield for is the way in which, having chosen his presuppositions, he carries them through to their logical conclusion, and states the result with all the candor that could be desired. He plays the game; he is never "off side." And when he intimates that, in his judgment, the exponents of this "Christless Christianity"—among whom the present writer finds himself included—are not Christians at all, there is no just ground for complaint; it is all in the game. It is a case where, in strict logic, everything depends upon how Christianity is defined.

Dr. Warfield's definition of Christianity and the conclusions which he derives therefrom will be best stated

in his own language, which I quote as follows from the recent article to which reference has been made:

"There surely ought to be little difficulty in determining what Christianity is. . . . Unquestionably, Christianity is a redemptive religion having as its fundamental presupposition the fact of sin, felt both as guilt and pollution, and offering as its central good, from which all other goods proceed, salvation from sin through an historical expiation wrought by the God-man Jesus Christ. The essence of Christianity has always been to its adherents the sinner's experience of reconciliation with God through the propitiatory sacrifice of Jesus Christ."

"He is a Christian, in the sense of the founders of the Christian religion and in the sense of its whole historical manifestation as a world-phenomenon, who, conscious of his sin, turns in faith to Jesus Christ as the propitiation for his sins, through whose blood and righteousness he may be made acceptable to God and be received into the number of those who are admitted to communion with him."

"Christianity as a world-movement is the body of those who have been redeemed from their sins by the blood of Jesus Christ dying for them on the cross."

"A Christianity without redemption—redemption in the blood of Jesus as a sacrifice for sin—is nothing less than a contradiction in terms. Precisely what Christianity means is redemption in the blood of Jesus. No one need wonder therefore that, when redemption is no longer sought and found in Jesus, men should begin to ask whether there remains any real necessity for Jesus. We may fairly contend that the germ of Christless Christianity is present wherever a proper doctrine of redemption has fallen away, or even has only been permitted to pass out of sight."

"From the Christian point of view it may very properly be said (though this is very far from all that needs to be said) that those who are advising us that Christianity can get along very well without Christ, are very much like men sitting by a brookside and reasoning that since we have the brook we do not need the spring from which it flows, and may readily admit the doubt whether there is a spring. If even this criticism does not seem valid to our Christless Christians, that can only be because they no longer occupy the Christian point of view."

"The point which needs particular pressing lies indeed just here —that in separating themselves from Jesus as the source and ground

and content of their faith, they sever themselves from Christianity and proclaim themselves of another religion."

Now by those who cling to the older orthodox, evangelical supernaturalism these statements will be accepted as a matter of course. Once the above definition of Christianity is adopted, understanding the term "redemption" in the narrow sense in which it is intended, there is no escape from the conclusion which the Princeton theologian draws. We would reserve the right to remark upon the simile of the brook and the spring in a later connection, but we would unhesitatingly grant that, from the point of view of Professor Warfield's definition, the opinion that belief in the historicity of Jesus is not indispensable to Christian faith is essentially unchristian, and that those who hold it should no longer be regarded as Christians. Speaking for himself, the present writer would say that, *with Christianity so defined*, he would have to confess not only that he is not, but that he does not see how he ever could be, a Christian. He would take the liberty, however, of expressing his own opinion, not indeed that his opponent is not a Christian, but that his opponent's theory of redemption is not only not essential to Christianity, because contrary to reason, but moreover essentially unchristian, because opposed to the principles of sound morality.

Precisely here then is the question demanding consideration: is the given definition of Christianity a fair one, or is it virtually a dogmatic begging of the whole question under dispute? Agreeing with my opponent so far as to regard Christianity, for our present purposes, as a religion—for it would be possible to view it not only as a religion which has had important consequences for morality, but also as a morality which has had important consequences for religion—I must undertake to raise once more the much-debated question: just what, essentially, is the Christian religion?

If we would avoid, as far as possible, dogmatic question-begging, our first inquiry must be methodological. Just how is the essence of the Christian religion, or, for that matter, the essence of any historical *quantum* to be determined? In general, either one of two methods is employed by those who claim not to be influenced by any practical interests in their solution of the problem. These methods are the method of comparative religion and the method of church history, or, as they might be called, the external and the internal method, respectively. The method of comparative religion is to treat Christianity as a species of the genus religion, and to define it in logical fashion, therefore, in terms of the qualities it shares with all religions, limited by those which are peculiar to itself alone. Now while such a definition would fulfil the requirements of formal logic, it might nevertheless yield a very inadequate working conception of the real nature of the Christian religion. The reason for this is that there are elements in Christianity which are neither common to all religions nor yet peculiar to itself alone, and it might very well be that some of these should turn out to be, as judged by practical standards, quite indispensable features of the religion in question. Still, it must be admitted that we cannot be said to have included all that is essential in any religion that is really best until we have mentioned something which is to be found in itself alone; and so this characteristic method of comparative religion, while inadequate by itself, may serve to test and supplement a definition arrived at in some other way.

But while the common fault of comparative religionists is to view the essence of Christianity too abstractly, the besetting temptation of the church historian is to repudiate the idea of essence and to present only a confused conglomeration of particulars. The variety of religious beliefs, practices, and experiences, the mutual

conflict and contradiction even, within what in the course of history has been called Christianity, is already, of course, sufficiently notorious. Still, it is difficult to take quite seriously those who contend that the only essence of Christianity is the totality of the phenomena that have been called Christian. *Theoretically*, this is what one would have to say from the standpoint of scientific history, which is supposed to be the absolutely disinterested investigation of the causal relations of the phenomena of human life and action. But even the most scientific historian must limit himself; he cannot make a scientific study of all phenomena, and as a matter of fact all historians in their own thinking do make a selection in accordance with the purpose and interest underlying their thought. The idea of a history in which phenomena are selected and their causal relations traced without regard to any practical interests and purposes, is a regulative idea of an end to be discreetly approached within definite limits, as the mariner approaches the fixed stars, never to be actually reached. The scientific historian, to be sure, often declaims against the concept of essence; but this is really because, when he finds the term "essence" used, it commonly reflects other interests than his own—practical interests which interfere, as it seems to him, with strictly impartial historical inquiry. But such interference is by no means necessary. All that is required for scientific history is that practical interests be kept from leading to an arbitrary selection of the causes by which the previously selected phenomena are to be explained. The selection of effects, like the original selection of the phenomena to be studied, not only may be controlled by practical human interests; it must be so controlled, if the history is to be interesting to practical human beings. Any history that is to be more than a mere indiscriminate chronicle of causally connected events, any history that is to select from the

events of the past what is of interest for any purpose in the present, must recognize some distinction between the essential and the non-essential elements of the total accessible phenomenon. Harnack, selecting from historic Christianity what he took to be essential for the religious life of the modern man, was truer to the idea of essence than Loisy in his attempt to avoid any such selection.

But in the present instance there is not even the supposed scientific-historical reason for identifying the essence with the totality of phenomena. The discussion is avowedly on the basis of present-day religious interest, and we must mean by Christianity what it is for that interest. Unless we can feel that all that has ever been called Christian is equally good and important for the true religious interest of today, a selection will be made in spite of ourselves, and ought to be made. Professor Warfield's definition is, on the face of it, the result of such a selection. The only question, therefore, is as to how—under the guidance of what principles—the selection is to be made.

If no universally valid normative principles can be found, then the whole search after essence will issue in unrelieved subjectivity. There will be as many different essences as there are different purposes underlying interest in the reality under consideration. There will be no essence but the "nominal essence," which in any particular case is simply whatever, for the purpose of the individual, it may seem necessary to select from the total phenomenon.

But we cannot readily resign ourselves to this conclusion as our ultimate position; for while we cannot disavow the practical nature of our interest in the inquiry, we are equally aware that what we seek is a universally valid or real essence, not what is of perhaps but transient interest to some particular individual.

Nor need we go far afield to find at least the beginning of a solution of our problem. If a selection for a purpose is to be made, if the essence is necessarily *what is essential for a purpose,* two normative principles are at once suggested. In the first place, the essence must be in the total actuality; and in the second place the controlling purpose must be the right purpose in the given situation, the purpose to realize what, under the circumstances, is the true ideal. In short, *the essence is whatever is both present in the actual and demanded by the ideal.* To guarantee that what is taken as essential is the real essence, what is taken as the ideal must be the true ideal. The formula will require modification, of course, in any case where, in view of the purpose concerned, the reality is essentially bad. In such a case the essence is that in the actual, the elimination or avoidance of which is demanded by the ideal. In the present instance, however, we are concerned with the essence of the Christian religion in the good or constructive sense, and, whatever else it may be, it must be that in the totality of the religious phenomena of Christianity which is a necessary factor in the realization of the true ideal for humanity, and of the true ideal for human religion in particular. The determination of the essence of the Christian religion has then as its prerequisites a descriptive and a normative task. It requires that one know on the one hand the varied phenomena of the Christian religion, and on the other hand the nature of ideal religion.

But there is one special condition which it is important to emphasize in connection with the essence of any reality. It must be able to maintain itself after it has been selected and separated from all that is non-essential, for an essence that did not exist would not have the required factor of actuality; it would not be a real essence. If there are in any reality elements which it is

essential to have eliminated, and if the reality is such that, when the elimination has taken place, what is left loses all vitality and power of self-maintenance, that reality has no good essence; it is essentially bad, for, so long as it endures, the bad will remain in it. If on the other hand there is a reality, some element of which is demanded for the realization of the true ideal, and such that that selected element retains its vitality after the elimination of objectionable elements, the reality in question is essentially good. Or, coming closer to our particular subject of interest, it may be that in the total phenomenon of some historic religion there are both that which it is essential to retain and that which it is essential to eliminate in the interests of ideal religion. In this case, it will have both a good and a bad essence, it being assumed that what is good can retain its vitality after the bad has been eliminated, or, in other words, that the religion in question is essentially good. If, however, there are in any religion both that which it is essential to eliminate, as, for example, superstition, and that which it might seem essential to retain, as, for example, its moral dynamic, and yet the moral dynamic cannot be retained after the superstition has been overcome, then that religion can only be said to be essentially bad; judged by sufficiently critical standards, it has no good essence; the good is not vital in dissociation from the bad. In addition then to being the highest common factor of the actual and the ideal, *the essence must be vital enough to persist in separation from all that must be eliminated.* In the case of religion the conditions of this vitality will be best discovered by historical and psychological investigation.

Let us now summarize the results of our methodological discussion. We seem to have arrived at four or five normative principles. (1) The essence must be found in the actual. Thus far is the would-be scientific his-

torian correct. (2) The essence is a necessary part in, or factor toward, the true ideal. What this true ideal is, must be determined by a critical philosophy of values. (3) The question as to what is essential has not been sufficiently tested until objectionable elements, such as irrational ideas, have been eliminated. (4) When this elimination has been made, what remains must be vital enough to endure in new and unobjectionable relations, if it is to be regarded as the real essence of the reality in question. (5) The essence of the best member of any group must contain something not found in the essence of any other member of that group. This concession to the comparative religionist is made, as likely to be practically helpful in working out the application of our methodological principles, although logically it adds nothing to the other four principles.

The essence of the actual then is that element in the actual whose continued existence is demanded by the true ideal, and which can retain its actuality and vitality after the elimination of all objectionable elements from the actual at the demand of that same ideal. We must now apply this definition of essence in the attempt to discover the essence of the Christian religion. In making this attempt we shall use the biological approach to the question; first taking religion as a special development of the actual life-process, and then Christianity as a special development of religion.

Life in general, and human life above all, may be regarded as a process or activity directed, consciously or unconsciously, toward the realization of certain ends or values. From time to time crises occur in which obstacles are met, which obstruct the realization of those ends and threaten to destroy experienced values. In this critical situation a new activity is called for, a new adjustment to the environment. Commonly this takes the form of a search for and discovery of some element in the

environment which can be depended upon as a means of deliverance from the obstacle, and an adjustment to this instrumentality, a use of it, in the way necessary to secure the desired deliverance. Then with the removal of the obstacle life goes on as before, save that now there is a new value appreciated, the value of that which has been a means of deliverance in the time of crisis. In the higher forms of life, and after crises that have been acute, there tends to be an appreciative contemplation of that which originally was of interest simply as means; it may even be recognized as a new value, experience of which is regarded as one of the ends of the activities of life. And then, as a result, primarily, of deliverance from the crisis, and, secondarily, of the new attention to that through which deliverance was obtained, there may arise new thoughts, new feelings, and new modes of action.

Now the question as to what kind of life-process religion is, is centrally the question as to the kind of deliverance or "salvation" experienced; but for the full understanding of the nature of the religious life-process the stages previous to and following this experienced deliverance must be taken into account. The values originally appreciated, or ends pursued religiously, may be, and in the history of religion have been, as various as the values and ends of human action; they may be grossly physical and purely selfish, or supremely spiritual and beautifully altruistic. A crisis is not religious, however, unless the obstacle is such as is not, or seems not to be, readily removable by one's own power, or through the natural means or human agencies within the reach of the individual. But when the natural and the human fail, there is called forth the feeling of absolute dependence. So long, however, as this is simply a realization of crisis, it is not yet distinctly religious. Characteristic religion begins where there is exercised, for deliverance from the obstacle, a definite active dependence upon some real

or fancied supernatural and superhuman power in the environment. According as this supernatural and superhuman factor is conceived, the adjustment thereto will be directed. When the desired deliverance ensues, it must be either because of the objective correctness of the adjustment, or because of a chance coincidence. In either case credit will be temporarily given to the religious object, the superhuman and supernatural Power, as interpreted in the thought by which the adjustment was guided. The deliverance, or "salvation," will be interpreted as a "miracle," i.e. as a "revelation" of the presence and activity of the supernatural, superhuman reality. There will be aroused, consequently, feelings of awe and appreciation of the higher Power by which one has been befriended. This is the attitude and experience of worship, attaining in its more highly specialized developments the distinctly mystical state. The state of dependence, with the consequent deliverance, is practical religion; the state of appreciation is mystical religion. The combined experience of deliverance and of appreciation of the supernatural, superhuman object by means of which it has been accomplished, may lead to new thoughts (beliefs, creed) about the religious object; new emotions with their expressions, at first spontaneous but later conventionalized (forms of worship, ritual); and new ways of acting under the influence of the religious consciousness (religious morality, obedience to the law of God).

If now we are to determine the specific nature of essential Christianity, we must have in mind not only the phenomena of the history of Christianity, but also a clear idea of the nature of ideal religion. Now one of the characteristics of ideal religion is rationality. By this term we do not mean the quality of being guided by "pure" or non-empirical reason; on the contrary, we would maintain that there can be no guarantee of

rationality in thought which has not been moulded upon reality as it is known through experience. Rational religion, as we mean it, is religion founded upon reality, religion criticised and modified until fully verified in the light of human experience.

Ideal religion then must be rational in the empirical sense; in other words, it must be scientific. But it must also be in harmony with all valid human ideals. It would not be ideal religion if it were unfavorable to any true ideal. But aside from religion itself, there is one element in the spiritual ideal that is uniquely important, not only as being an ultimate end, but also because its presence is necessary for the highest possible development of the other elements in the ideal. This element is morality. We can say, therefore, that if experience gives us warrant for assuming that there can be a radically moral religion, not only would it serve one of the most important, or the most important, of human ideals; in serving morality it would serve all true human ideals at once. Ideal religion, therefore, whatever else it may be, must at least be moral. This will mean that while the supernatural, superhuman Power depended upon for deliverance must be thought of as favorable to valid human ideals in general, the moral ideal must be included, and the deliverance accomplished through religious dependence must be, whatever else it may be, a moral deliverance.

We are now ready for the question as to the essence of the Christian religion. Unless the Christian religion is essentially bad, as it would be for instance if the irrational elements could not be eliminated without its vitality being destroyed, it must be in essence whatever in actual phenomenal Christianity is necessary for the realization of the true ideal of human spiritual life in general and of human religion in particular. Turning now to historical Christianity, we find, along with other

features more or less intimately and permanently associated therewith, a deeply vital moral quality. The ends or values for the preservation and increase of which the religious relationship is invoked, are fundamentally moral. The situation in the face of which the feeling of absolute dependence arises is the crisis caused by sin, in one's self or in others, as an obstacle to the realization of the true ideal for the individual and for society. The supernatural, superhuman Power which is taken as the object of religious faith is conceived as favorable to the removal of sin and to the realization of true moral values. The adjustment to that Power is a moral adjustment. It is an adjustment too by means of which moral values are meant to be and can be promoted beyond what is possible without it. The mystical contemplation of the religious object is, according to the principles of this religion, to be controlled by what is demanded by one's moral duty to one's fellow-men. Finally, no expression of religion is countenanced which is at variance with the most conscientiously determined moral ideals. This pervasive moral element then, being common to actual Christianity and to ideal religion, must be viewed, tentatively at least, as belonging to the essence of the Christian religion. Christianity is the religion whose "miracle" or "revelation" consists in the experience of *moral* "salvation," or "redemption." If it be objected that a moral element is to be found in other historic religions also, the reply is that this does not invalidate what has been said as to Christianity being essentially the religion of moral redemption. The most essential thing in any religion may conceivably be the sort of moral deliverance experienced by its votaries through dependence upon a superhuman reality. If however we would distinguish the essential quality of the Christian religion from other religions more sharply, we can perhaps find no more accurate modifying term

than the word "Christlike." Christianity is the religion of deliverance from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike attitude toward a Christlike superhuman reality. This distinction would serve, we think, to mark off the essence of Christianity definitely from the essence of any other moral religion.

It may be remarked, in passing, that it would not be quite accurate to say that Christianity is, as Professor Warfield's "Christless Christians" are supposed to hold, "only a particular way of conceiving God, with the emotional and volitional accompaniments and consequences" thereof; it is centrally a kind of religious experience, of deliverance from a crisis, together with the way of conceiving God and the religious attitude which make that experience possible. There must be an essentially Christian belief, i.e. the belief necessary to mediate the essentially Christian experience; one must believe that the Christlike God is, and have sufficient knowledge of the right religious adjustment to be able to co-operate with God's work of moral salvation.

There is good ground to suppose then, we take it, that redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality and ultimately to a Christlike fellowship with God, accomplished in the life of man by the activity of the Christlike God in response to a Christlike dependence and filial attitude on the part of the individual, is the essence of the Christian religion. It is that in actual Christianity which it seems undoubtedly necessary to retain, in order that ideal religion, and thereby an ideal human spiritual development, may be realized. But there is one condition which must be fulfilled before this supposition as to the essence of Christianity can be regarded as sufficiently verified. The elements selected from phenomenal Christianity for survival must be able to survive after the elimination of whatever is contrary to ideal religion. Can the vitality of Christianity as

a religion of moral salvation be maintained after the irrational features of historic Christianity have been removed? If not, then Christianity is essentially irrational, and therefore essentially bad. And what we are here especially concerned to maintain is that, if moral salvation is not possible through a religion which refuses to be guided by the particular idea of redemption insisted upon by Doctor Warfield, then the Christian religion is essentially bad; its supposed good essence is not vital when separated from all irrationality; it has no really good essence. Or, to express our opinion differently, if essential Christianity is what Doctor Warfield says it is, it is essentially bad, for the simple reason that it is essentially irrational. We would maintain however that his statement of the essence of Christianity is incorrect, and that the Christian religion is essentially good, that it has a real essence which is good, a good essence which will still prove to be vital when this and all other irrational elements have been eliminated from its theology.

There are many Christians today who fear for the life of Christianity whenever there is talk of any such radical and drastic operation upon the body of traditional Christian doctrine as this elimination of all irrationality. We would contend, however, that the operation must be performed some time, if the life of Christianity is to be saved. "The old that ages, he must let go who would hold fast the old that ages not." What we are interested in is the retention in full vitality of the spiritual dynamic of the Christian religion, in separation from the many irrationalities inherited from a less critical and scientific age. We would retain the spiritual dynamic of Christian supernaturalism, with its belief in a special, and in some sense miraculous, revelation. We would retain what we believe Professor Warfield is really most interested in conserving, viz. the undimin-

ished vitality of Christian evangelicalism, with its message of the historic mediation of the saving grace of God to the individual man. Moreover, we would retain the vital essence of Christian orthodoxy, with its view of the one divine Being, God the Father Almighty, revealing himself for the salvation of the world in Jesus Christ, his Son, and as the Holy Spirit operating in the lives of men for their regeneration and spiritual perfection. But it is too late in the history of human progress to seek to conserve *in toto* the old supernaturalism, the old evangelicalism, and the old orthodoxy. If then the result of the elimination of the irrational features of the older Christianity should be to make it in some sense, as our critic seems to fear, a new religion, we can answer with confidence that, unless Christianity should turn out to be essentially bad, our method expressly provides that this new religion shall still be essentially Christian. It will be a union of the essence of Christian supernaturalism, of Christian evangelicalism, and of Christian orthodoxy; a combination which must make our threatened "new religion" nothing less than a new Christianity.

First, then, let us try to make clear what we mean by *the essence of Christian supernaturalism.* Briefly stated, what we mean is religious experience guided by the belief that there have been, and still are, certain events of human history and experience which, as compared with other events, are of special significance, objectively as well as subjectively, as revealing the purposive activity of the supernatural, superhuman Being which is the object of religious dependence and worship; and that, other things being equal, the more closely events approximate in character the spiritual triumphs which, we have good reason to believe, were achieved by the historic Jesus through his cultivation of the religious life, the more centrally they are the result of the

direct activity of God and reveal his character and purpose. To give up miracle in this sense would be to give up revelation in the sense in which it has significance for modern practical religion.

It will be readily understood that we are not here defending the notion of that magical supernaturalism which would contradict our scientific knowledge of nature. On the contrary we would maintain that what Professor Warfield commends as the appeal "from a naturalistically biassed to an unbiassed historical criticism" is really the appeal from the presuppositions of the scientifically informed to the prejudices of the scientifically ignorant, or else to a more or less obscurantist, and therefore perverse, "will to believe." It is not logically essential to Christian faith that one should believe that human parthenogenesis, or the reanimation of dead bodies, or any such events as the miraculous multiplication of loaves and fishes, or the stopping of a storm, or the killing of a fig-tree with a word, ever really happened; but it is logically essential to the Christian, for the verification of his faith, that he be able to point to empirical, and therefore historical, evidence of the operation, within human experience, of a supernatural and superhuman Power. We can be religious in the Christian sense without the former beliefs, but not without the latter. Moreover, while it is difficult to see how the person of critical disposition and scientific training could ever be sufficiently certain of the truth of narratives of events of the former sort to be able to build a positive religious life upon them, even the scientific and the critical are not excluded from becoming practically certain that Jesus of Nazareth was a real person, whose spiritual triumphs were due in no small part to the essential rightness of his religious attitude, i.e. that there was an objective response to his dependence upon a superhuman and supernatural

assisting Power. But even if one could not be practically assured of this in the case of the historical Jesus—and this has been our central contention—we could find other empirical evidence sufficient for practical certainty as to the fact and the further possibility of spiritual miracle in the sense defined above. We can find this evidence, if in no other way, by ourselves reproducing as faithfully as possible the essential features of the religious attitude ascribed to Jesus by early Christian tradition.

It may be remarked in this connection that Professor Warfield's analysis of what he calls "Christless Christianity" can be shown to be quite wide of the mark, when he says, "Always there lie at the basis of the reasoning the twin assumptions of the old rationalism: the assumption of the adequacy of pure reason to produce out of its own inalienable endowments the whole body of religious truth which it is necessary or possible for reasonable men to embrace, and the assumption of the inadequacy of history to lay a foundation of fact sufficiently assured to supply a firm foundation on which the religious convictions and aspirations of reasonable men may rest." Without undertaking to speak for more than himself, the present writer, as one of those criticised, would simply call attention in the first place to how distinctly empirical and non-rationalistic is the basis of faith, as he views it; and, in the second place, to the fact that, feeling practically certain of the historicity of Jesus, he does not hesitate to appeal to the religious experience of that supreme member of our race as giving empirical support of quite unique importance to the essentials of Christian faith. But just because the demonstration of the truth of Christianity is fundamentally empirical rather than "rational," it becomes highly desirable to supplement the proofs that have served in the past. We must have Christian evidences

that cannot be reasonably called in question by the historical critics. The discovery of a rational demonstration is "once for all," in a sense that is not true of empirical proof. Empirical facts are not all equally accessible. Generally speaking, those belonging to the past are less accessible than those belonging to the present, and those belonging to the immediate experience of others are less accessible than those of one's own immediate experience. For these reasons repetition in the present and in our own immediate experience is called for. And inasmuch as repetition in present experience does really supplement those deficiencies of historical evidence which arise from the fact that it belongs to the past, the appeal to any one event of the past could only be indispensable in case sufficient empirical evidence in the present could not possibly be secured. But to say that the religious experience possible for the Christian today will never amount to verification of Christian faith, is to assume a position essentially sceptical rather than Christian.

But there must be included in the essence of the Christian religion not only the essence of Christian supernaturalism; *the essence of Christian evangelicalism* must also be conserved. Expressed briefly, this is the seeking of salvation—defined ultimately as Christlikeness of spiritual life—through a Christlike religious dependence upon and fellowship with a Christlike divine Being, "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ."

In its older form this Christian evangelicalism was associated with many irrational elements. God was thought of as having been made propitious by an artificial and external transaction other than the becoming righteous of the one who had sinned; the legal punishment was thought of as having been transferred by the divine Judge from the sinner to the sin-bearer,

a transaction involving the irrational notion of a transfer of guilt from the sinner to the substitute by an arbitrary fiat of the Almighty. God was thought of as being satisfied with the righteousness of the suffering substitute arbitrarily credited to the unrighteous. Redemption was thus regarded, not as a human experience, but as a wholly transcendent transaction. Now these irrational elements cannot be essential to Christianity, unless we have been mistaken in supposing that Christianity is essentially good. The guilt of sin is non-transferable, and so is the merit of righteousness. Any God who acted as if guilt and merit were transferable would be a God seriously deficient in moral discernment.

That these elements in the older interpretation of the Christian evangel are irrational is not all; they are distinctly antagonistic to the essentially Christian view of God. It is nothing short of humiliating to find it necessary to point out that the God of the Christian is an honest God, who will by no means clear the guilty; but it is this very element, this confused and sub-Christian notion of substitutionary punishment on the one hand and substitutionary justification on the other, to which Professor Warfield still clings, along with many others, in the mistaken idea that it is nothing less than the quintessence of the Christian religion. What Professor Warfield has stated to be the essence of the Christian religion has indeed been associated with historic Christianity; but being irrational, it cannot be of the essence of Christianity. Indeed holding, as it does in effect, that God's transactions for the salvation of man are not rigidly moral, it must be pronounced essentially unchristian.

We have been quite willing to admit that if Professor Warfield should prove to be correct in his definition of the essence of Christianity, he would also be correct in

his insistence upon belief in the historicity of Jesus as logically indispensable to Christian religious faith. But what we are concerned to point out is that whenever belief in the historicity of Jesus has been logically indispensable to Christian faith, it has been because of the irrationality of certain presuppositions in the minds of the believers. With the early Jewish Christians it was the irrationality of their apocalyptic eschatology and Messianism; with the early Greek Church it was the irrationality of their magical notion of the making of human substance immortal; with mediaevalism, to which apparently our opponent still adheres, it was the irrationality of an arbitrary externalism in ethics and jurisprudence. If however we have progressed far enough toward the universalizing of Christianity to have eliminated these irrationalities of Jewish apocalypticism, of pagan magic, and of mediaeval externalism, we can retain the essence of Christian evangelicalism, without having, as Christians, to commit ourselves beforehand to any one outcome of the historical criticism of the New Testament rather than another, as being logically indispensable to our faith.

It should be understood, of course, that what we have meant all along by the term, "Christian faith," has been Christian faith *in God*. There is, to be sure, a Christian faith in Jesus. What we know of him with practical certainty through history gives us the greatest confidence in his character and in the fundamental correctness of his religious attitude. We believe, indeed, that his religious adjustment and experience were such that we can trust him as our best religious guide in all human history. When we become his disciples in religion, we are led into fellowship with our divine Father. We truly express our trust in him, and our appreciation of his value for our religious life, by speaking of him as the historic mediator of our salvation; he is the revealer of God to us and our

saviour. Moreover, as we shall emphasize in another connection, we believe that the divine will and activity had such unhindered course through his life that his very person may be appropriately and truly described as divine; he was *the* divine man. Now to this Christian faith *in Jesus*, belief in the historicity of Jesus is, of course, logically indispensable. It is possible moreover and convenient, to set forth the essence of the Christian religion in terms of the Christian faith in Jesus; *convenient*, but, as we would still insist, not absolutely *necessary*. This may perhaps be more evident after we have indicated what we take to be the essential features of Christian evangelicalism.

It is essential to the Christian evangelical point of view that the Christian moral law of unselfish love be recognized as valid and binding upon every individual. This devotion to the spiritual deliverance and unification of mankind, which with practical certainty we may take as having been best exemplified in the moral example of the historic Jesus, is not the Christian gospel; rather is it the Christian law, but it is that without which no gospel is truly Christian. The righteous will of the God of the Christian can be satisfied with nothing short of the reproduction in the individual of a Christlike moral devotion. But the essence of the Christian gospel is not to be found in the moral example of Jesus taken by itself; it is to be found rather in the religious example of Jesus as giving the key to his moral achievement. The Christian evangel is the gospel of the power of God manifesting itself in a Christlike morality on condition of the cultivation of a life of Christlike religious devotion. It is the gospel of the universal possibility of redemption as a human religious experience, through following the religious example of Jesus, taking the attitude of sonship toward the "God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ." If it be objected that this adopting of what we

are practically certain was the religious attitude of Jesus is neither possible nor appropriate in the case of one whose life has been full of sin, the reply is that the sinner's first step toward the Christlike religious attitude is the step of repentance and trust which marks his reconciliation with the Father. Since it is the divine power which is manifested in the Christlike moral life in response to the Christlike religious adjustment, the Christlike is divine, and the divine Christlike; and therefore the holy and righteous God is to be thought of, even by the sinner, as eminently approachable, in that he is also the God of Christlike mercy and love. The essence of the Christian gospel, then, is that God is full of love and grace; so that the repentant sinner has simply to come trustfully to God, to be reconciled to the Christlike heavenly Father. Then if he abides in a Christlike religious attitude of dependence and surrender, he will be enabled to progress triumphantly in the living of a Christlike moral life of unselfish service to humanity.

In thus formulating the essential elements of Christian evangelicalism we have not forgotten that so long as there fails to be associated with our religious teaching a strongly vital, regenerating, spiritual dynamic, our message can scarcely be called, in the full sense of the word, evangelical doctrine. There was nothing more essential in the older evangelicalism than its power of converting individuals to a Christian moral and religious life. It was a rainbow of hope, over against the dark clouds of fear. Neither the hope nor the fear, to be sure, was completely rational; traditional eschatological notions, exaggerated for effect, played too prominent a part in the whole "plan of salvation." But the evil of sin and its consequences, while it may be misrepresented, can never be exaggerated; and the insistent emphasis upon the imperative necessity of redemption, of regeneration, which characterized the older evangelicalism, must be

retained, albeit in rational form, if the newer Christianity is to be fully evangelical. There is a hell of possible human experience to be saved from; but salvation, redemption, other than regeneration and what can be defined in terms of human experience, there is and can be none. To *experience* salvation, however, we must follow the moral example of Jesus; and to follow the moral example of Jesus sufficiently to be saved, we must follow the religious example of Jesus. But in view of our sin, as we have seen, before we can do this, we must come in repentance to God, and trustfully depend upon him for forgiveness. Then do we experience reconciliation, at-one-ment with God, and to experience this is regeneration.

It ought to be clear that, from this point of view, while belief in the historicity of Jesus may be *psychologically* indispensable, temporarily at least, to the steadfast evangelical faith of many individuals, it cannot be shown to be logically indispensable to the retaining of the essence of Christian evangelicalism. With much of what Troeltsch says in this connection we can heartily agree, for what he has in mind for the most part is the psychological necessity of this belief. We should be very far from agreeing however that if, for good and sufficiently critical reasons, the historicity of Jesus had to be given up, the death-knell of Christian religious faith would be sounded. This is not the voice of Christian faith, but of unchristian distrust and fear. The values of essential Christianity are too great and too deeply appreciated by the experienced Christian ever to be given up universally unless it should become logically necessary. It is through defect of rationality that anything not logically necessary comes to be, for individuals and temporarily, absolutely necessary, psychologically, as a means to a necessary end. Wherefore, an essentially Christian evangelical faith being logically possible without the presupposition

of the historicity of Jesus, we can never show any reason, unless it be the intellectual deficiency of individuals, why Christian faith without absolute dependence upon belief in the historicity of Jesus should not become a universal psychological possibility. As logical necessities tend to become psychological necessities, as man develops in rationality, so what is not logically indispensable tends to become not psychologically indispensable. On the one hand metaphysics, which is logically necessary to the theology of Christian faith, is still in the case of many individuals by no means necessary psychologically; and yet, with the progress of rationality, it tends to become so. To the early Christian Church, on the other hand, the speedy visible return of Christ seemed indispensable; and to expect it *was* psychologically indispensable, perhaps. Indeed, according to their reasoning, it came to appear logically indispensable to their faith also. But as we now see in the light of later history, it was not really logically necessary to their faith, and was psychologically necessary only by reason of their misconceptions. The same thing may be said of the psychological and logical necessity of belief in the historicity of Jesus for the sustenance of the faith of the Christian. If belief in the historicity of Jesus should continue to be humanly indispensable—and *this* is something which I, for one, have no heart to deny—it will be because humanity cannot consent to give up that matchless personality, not as a means to Christian faith or to anything else, but simply as an end, a value conserved and cherished from ultimate and supralogical motives.

But finally in retaining, as belonging to the essence of the Christian religion, the essentials of Christian supernaturalism and evangelicalism, we are virtually bound to include also *the essence of Christian orthodoxy*. Now from the time of the first formulation of the Trini-

tarian and Christological dogmas, these statements have been regarded—and not without reason—as being the expression of the very quintessence of Christian orthodoxy. Nevertheless, it has for some time now been distinctly recognized by critical historians of Christian thought, and for a much longer time indistinctly felt, that these ancient dogmas also embody much that is very far from essential to Christian faith. It is our remaining task to seek to specify just what is the real essence of Christian orthodoxy, and in the light of our result to raise once more the question as to whether, for the sake of Christian orthodoxy in this modern sense, belief in the historicity of Jesus is indispensable.

One of the insights which is becoming increasingly clear as the result of the application of comparative and historical methods to the study of the early history of Christianity, is that this religion of ours was, in its origination, a fusion and further development, under the influence of the experience and thought of great religious personalities, of two great religions—Jewish ethical monotheism and the mystical-philosophical religion which had grown up among the Greeks. The Christianity which conquered the Greek civilization of the period was undoubtedly the result of the most important and far-reaching synthesis of the practical and mystical elements of religion that had taken place within human history, and the chief intellectual expression of this synthesis is to be found in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Christological dogma is to be understood partly as corollary, partly as complement, and partly as exposition of this Trinitarian dogma which preceded it.

Practical religion, as it develops, soon comes to demand a personal God. In the light of experience and reflection, this practical religion becomes less and less magical and more and more moral. Its God comes to

be thought of as thoroughly moral, first as the righteous Judge, then as the perfect heavenly Father. Mystical religion, however, tends to think of the ultimate religious reality as the All-One, the impersonal or super-personal Absolute. The God of practical religion is transcendent; the God of mystical religion is immanent, especially in the mystical experience itself. Here then was an apparent contradiction between the postulates of the moral, practical faith of Judaism and the intuitions of the metaphysical, mystical religion of Hellenism. Christianity, coming out of Judaism, and going forth into the Hellenic world, felt called upon and also able to retain the values of both points of view, and to reconcile the seemingly contradictory theologies.

The outcome was the Christian dogma of the Trinity. In this dogma there is the characteristically mystical affirmation of the super-personal divine substance, manifested in the deeper religious experiences of the finite individual, who becomes thereby partaker of the divine nature and endowed with eternal life. At the same time there is the affirmation of the almighty and fatherly personal God demanded by practical religion. The particular form which this synthesis took was chiefly due to the facts of Christian religious experience, interpreted with constant reference to the chief figure of Jewish-Christian tradition, Jesus the crucified and exalted Messiah.

Assuming the Christian tradition, Greek mystical religion by itself would have interpreted Jesus as a person in whom was manifested in remarkable fulness the inner presence of that same super-personal divine Being which is also inwardly presented in all mystical experience, and whose rational expression is indeed "the light which lighteth every man." It would have had the doctrine of one super-personal Absolute, manifested historically in Christ, the divine Man, the incarnation of the

Logos, and also manifested continuously in Christian experience, whether this last were expressed in terms of the "Holy Spirit," or not. To the moral, practical religion of the mere Jewish disciple of Jesus, however, the Master was simply a man, uniquely honored as the representative of the one personal God, the heavenly Father, and sending forth, by virtue of his death and resurrection and unique relation to the Father, his holy spirit, or invisible presence, for the assistance of his disciples. Attempting however to combine the Hellenic and Judaic points of view, the early Christian theologians devised the impressive but self-contradictory doctrine of the Trinity, with its one and only one supreme super-personal God, or divine substance, and its three supreme, eternally equal divine persons. Roughly speaking, trinitarian Christianity undertook to solve the problem of the conservation of the values of both mystical and moral religion by means of the simple process of addition. For the plain man, apart from the subtleties of Greek metaphysics, the upshot was the affirmation at once of monotheism and tritheism, the acceptance of which had to be enforced with the threat of eternal punishment for all unbelievers.

If we are to determine what is really essential in Christian orthodoxy, we must learn to appreciate the doctrine of the Trinity, not so much for what it accomplished as for what it attempted, viz. the retention, in one religious view, of the values of moral, practical religion on the one hand and of mystical, philosophical religion on the other. The essence of Christian orthodoxy is whatever element or factor of its theology is required for the realization of the ideal combination of moral with mystical religion, each at its best. The irrationalities of historic Trinitarianism must be removed, but its vital essence must be retained. Historic Unitarianism gained comparative rationality, but at the

expense of religious vitality. It did not keep all that was essential in Christian orthodoxy. It retained, in somewhat rationalized form, the originally Jewish ethical monotheism of Christianity, without an adequate mystical appreciation of the divine reality present in the historic Jesus and in the religious experience of the Christian. On the other hand there is in process of development today a form of mystical religion whose weakness is that it does not see how to retain, along with its mystical appreciation of the divine in the human, the practical values of dependence upon a moral, personal God. As distinguished from both historic Unitarianism and contemporary mysticism, the new Christianity for which the world is waiting, essential Christianity in rational, scientific form, will retain all that is valuable in both the moral and the mystical element. It will, we believe, because it must and ought, and therefore surely can. It will not give up the unity and personality of God. Neither will it abandon the faith that the divine Spirit is present and at work in the spiritual experience of the Christian. And granted the historicity of Jesus, it will not give up the divinity of that matchless human person.

It ought to be apparent by this time what our reply will be to Professor Warfield's remark that his "Christless Christians" are "like men sitting by a brookside and reasoning that since we have the brook we do not need the spring from which it flows, and may readily admit the doubt whether there is a spring." He has misstated the analogy. Rather is it that we know from experience and observation the value of the water in the brook of present-day vital Christianity, and it has this value whoever may have been the historical person or persons in and through whom it first made its appearance. Whether the "spring" was a group of Syrian mystics, or, as we have no doubt it was, Jesus of Nazareth,

the creative source of this water of life is none other than the very being and activity of God. It is interesting to note that we have here a modern version of the old *filioque* controversy which split the ancient Catholic Church. At the same time we have, in the position taken above, the key to the solution of the problem. The Christian religious experience, or the operation of the Holy Spirit, proceeds, metaphysically speaking, from God the Father alone, as the Greek Church contended. But if, accepting the results of scientific New Testament criticism, we hold to the essential historicity of Jesus, we must maintain that this Christian religious experience or operation of the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also, historically speaking, from the Son. So is the contention of Western Christendom, in its essence, at length vindicated.

Thus will the new Christianity retain in rational form and, we may believe, without necessitating any loss of vitality, the essence of Christian orthodox theology as well as of Christian supernaturalism and Christian evangelicalism. And one of its marks will be that, without insisting that belief in the historicity of Jesus is indispensable for Christian faith, it will nevertheless attain to a scientifically tested practical certainty with reference to the essential historicity of Jesus, and will thus be able to enjoy all the advantages that come from knowing that the religion proposed for our acceptance is the religion which Jesus lived, and the religion which has always found its highest individual revelation of God in the spiritual life of Jesus, the Christ. It will *not* be a Christless Christianity.

What then, essentially, is the Christian religion? What is it in actual, historic Christianity that is necessary for the realization of ideal religion, and that can retain its vitality after the elimination of all irrational and other objectionable features from its traditional

form? Christianity is in essence the religion of discipleship to Jesus; the religion of faith in Christ as the divine Saviour of humanity; the faith that finds God in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself. Or, differently stated, Christianity is the religion of the experience of Christlike divine grace; the religion whose universally accessible miracle is the experience of redemption from unchristlikeness to a Christlike morality, through a Christlike religious dependence upon and fellowship with the Christlike Heavenly Father. Or, again, Christianity is the religion of the regeneration and sanctification of the individual and of society through the indwelling presence and creative activity of God, the Heavenly Father—the Holy Spirit, whose presence and power in the life of Jesus of Nazareth made him the divine Redeemer, the Son and Christ of God.

RELIGION IN SOME CONTEMPORARY POETS

WARREN S. ARCHIBALD

PITTSFIELD, MASS.

William Vaughn Moody, The Masque of Judgment, 1900; Poems, 1901; The Fire Bringer, 1904.

Frederic Lawrence Knowles, On Life's Stairway, 1901; Love Triumphant, 1904.

Josephine Preston Peabody (Mrs. Lionel Marks), The Wayfarers, 1898; Fortune and Men's Eyes, 1900; Marlowe, 1901; The Singing Leaves, 1903; The Book of the Little Past, 1908; The Piper, 1910; The Singing Man, 1911.

Stephen Phillips, Christ in Hades and Other Poems, 1896; Poems, 1898; Paolo and Francesca, 1900; Herod, 1901; Ulysses, 1902; Sin of David, 1904; New Poems, 1907; Nero, 1906; New Inferno, 1911.

Alfred Noyes, The Flower of Old Japan, 1903; Poems, 1904; Golden Hynde and Other Poems, 1908; Drake, 1909; Tales of the Mermaid Tavern, 1913.

Rudyard Kipling, Collected Verse, Doubleday, Page ed.; Departmental Ditties and Ballads and Barrack Room Ballads; Poems scattered through prose.

With eager expectations and with wistful yearning men have always turned to the poets as to watchmen of the night. The great poets see beyond the sunset and the stars, and read the writing of the wind upon the darkness. They are our prophets. God has whispered his secrets to them. And what they hear in the silence of the eternal, they proclaim in the streets of men. The poets are the pioneers of the spirit. They wander in desolate places; they are voices crying in the wilderness; and by the rivers of Babylon they see visions. The poets, at their best, have been leaders in religion.

So for these reasons many people ask today, Who are the new poets, and what message do they bring? And some especially will seek to know what aspects of religion constitute their message, what vision of the eternal shines in their large symbols and prophetic words. This is a reasonable inquiry, because English poetry from the

days of Chaucer and Langland to Tennyson and Browning has been distinctly religious. Indeed, it is impressive to observe that our greatest poets have arisen when the English people were mightily concerned with some great religious movement. Chaucer was the contemporary of Wyclif. Shakespeare was the poet of the large humanity which gave a glory to the Renaissance. Milton was the organ voice of Puritan England. Wordsworth was the messenger of that new love for man and nature which in the history of letters is called the Romantic movement. As Stopford Brooke observes: "The poets of England ever since Cowper have been more and more theological, till we reach such men as Tennyson and Browning, whose poetry is overcrowded with theology."

Since this has been so distinctly the high argument of our English poets, we may reasonably inquire how our younger contemporary poets are maintaining this tradition. This provokes two questions: What do we mean by religion? and Who are our younger contemporary poets? By religion, I do not mean precise statements on dogma or polity, creed or church. We do not look for epics on original sin, or lyrics on the historic episcopacy. The poets, when they are obedient to the heavenly vision, will go to the fountains of the religious life. And so we find that the great traditional themes of English poetry in this respect have been God, Man, and Nature; God's love for man, man's need for God, and the guidance of the inner Light; God's vision of man through Christ, and man's vision of God through Christ.

And who are some of our younger contemporary poets? If we wrote down the names of all the choir, we should have a very long list. In America we have, for example, Ridgely Torrance, Edwin Arlington Robinson, Percy Mackaye, Josephine Preston Peabody. In England, to name only a few, we have Alfred Noyes, Rudyard

Kipling, Stephen Phillips, and William Butler Yeats. To speak of all these, not to mention others, would be the task of an anthology rather than of the brief essay. I shall therefore select several who have been most conspicuous in the affection and admiration they have received from those of our youth who are readers and lovers of poetry. I shall speak of William Vaughn Moody, Frederic Lawrence Knowles, Josephine Preston Peabody, Rudyard Kipling, Stephen Phillips, and Alfred Noyes. I present these simply as being those of our younger contemporaries who have most influenced the young people I have known.

William Vaughn Moody has so recently left us and was so highly esteemed by those who read his poetry that in a true sense it can be said that he is one who lives. He had published before his death a volume of poems and two lyric dramas. When one attempts to summarize the religious aspects in the fine work of this poet, the word most suggestive is, I think, "prophetic." He is a prophet of the ideal. He is a poet who feels consecrated to a high calling—the proclamation in classic language of eternal ideals. This is clearly seen in what many readers will consider his finest poem, one which was hailed by Richard Watson Gilder as the grandest ode in America since Lowell's *Commemoration Ode*—the poem entitled *An Ode Written in a Time of Hesitation*. The text is St. Gaudens's famous bas-relief of Robert Gould Shaw and his men on Boston Common, and the subject of the poem is the national character during the Spanish War. He refuses to disbelieve in the ideal character of the Republic.

> "The proud republic hath not stooped to cheat
> And scramble in the market-place of war."

He has the irony of the prophet Isaiah in his arraignment of unworthy politicians.

> "Our fluent men of place and consequence
> Fumble and fill their mouths with hollow phrase,
> Or for the end-all of deep arguments
> Intone their dull commercial liturgies."

This ode is a noble plea for the righteousness which exalteth a nation. It is not shrill or high-pitched or wild in thought, but firm in phrase, stern in demands for righteousness, and nobly eloquent. Like much of his work, it is Miltonic in style; and this is natural, for he was a student and editor of Milton. It is a prophetic utterance of our larger hope as a country.

All his poetry has this prophetic character. The *Daguerrotype* is a beautiful recognition of the spiritual character of motherhood. *Gloucester Moors* is a vision of the world's woe and the world's need; it is a prophetic psalm, and echoes the old cry, "How long, O Lord, how long!" In some of his poems, like the *Brute* and *Jetsam*, he is a prophet of the Apocalypse, dealing with strange, unearthly symbols and veiling his vision with obscure beauty.

This prophetic sense of the eternal moving through time and space is given a larger form in *The Fire Bringer*. It is the ancient story of Prometheus. And from this classic text he draws the great lesson of that sacrificial love which brings to "stone men" and "earth women" the fire of heaven and the light of day, the blessed rain and the natural darkness. In this play we find beautiful descriptions of the light shining in darkness, and the darkness comprehending the light. There is a terrible glory in the commanding miracle of the morning and the ancient magic of the night. Prometheus is the prophetic soul who feels the eternal spirit moving in his heart, and who can therefore never rest until the heavenly visitant becomes flesh and dwells among all men.

Much of this drama and of all his work is cloudy and obscure. He is also, perhaps, too academic for the great congregations. But at his best he is a poet who felt the presence of the eternal in the world of mortals, and who expressed this ultimate dream in a grand style, in phrasing which was classic and Scriptural in its origins and likeness.

Of another poet from whom many expected a good harvest in song and who now lives only in his verse, we may speak here. Frederic Lawrence Knowles left only two volumes of poetry. But these gave such large promise that he is worthy of honorable mention among our younger contemporaries of influence. In his poetry we see a fine religious feeling. He is the poet of what Emerson called "Love, which is the essence of God." There is nothing sentimental, weak, or shallow in his vision of love. The love of which he sings is both Lord and King, robed with the majesty of many suns and with the light of all the stars. He is the poet of that love which is the soul of Christianity. The title of his second and last volume, *Love Triumphant*, indicates the character of his work. And he is a preacher also in his methods, for he follows the homiletical tradition of a text. The texts of his poems in this last volume are Emerson's words, "Love which is the essence of God"; a couplet from Whittier,

> "Love scarce is love that never knows
> The sweetness of forgiving";

and the line from Shakespeare, "I do love my country's good." His creed is brief: "I know no sin except the lack of love."

Behind all outward shows and symbols in our Christian religion he sees the essential life of love. Churches, sects, creeds, and rituals, these are the visible and transient glories of our time. Over all is the love of God.

"Yet the east is red with dawn
Like a cross where One hath bled!
And upon that splendor drawn—
Gentle eyes, and arms outspread—
See that figure stretched above!
As God lives! its name is Love."

He is a singer of a brave love, for he sings on Calvary's slope. He is the singer of magnanimous love, for he sings of that forgiving love which prays God to forgive those who know not what they do. He is the singer of the love that gives.

Theologically, it is most interesting to observe that he is a poet of the immanence of God. This aspect of the Divine nature pervades all his work. It shadows even the lines where the word does not appear. And again and again he sings with passionate joy of the indwelling spirit of God. He knows the presence of God in ancient days and in holy lands. He knows that presence also in these our city streets and country lanes.

"From Horeb's bush the Presence spoke
To earlier faiths and simpler folk;
But now each bush that sweeps our fence
Flames with the awful Immanence.

. . . . . .

But now to us each elm and pine
Is vibrant with the Voice Divine;
Not only from but in the bough
Our larger creed beholds him now.

To the true faith, bark, sap, and stem
Are wonderful as Bethlehem;
Nor hill, nor brook, nor field, nor herd
But mangers the Incarnate Word."

And so the Christ of whom he sings is the Christ of today. In our cities he sees the Master. In our homes he sees the Holy Child. In our lives he finds the roads

to Jerusalem and Golgotha. In the quivering hearts of men broods the divine spirit.

And his verse is crowned not only with such large themes as the Divine love and the immanence of God, but it is given here and there in devout tribute and beautiful phrase to very definite Christian themes. He writes of Easter, Christmas, and on such suggestive lines as "Out of the depths," "Above every name," "And he healed them." There is a touch of the religious poets of the seventeenth century in these short lines:

"It takes two for a kiss,
Only one for a sigh;
Twain by twain we marry,
One by one we die.
Joy has its partnerships,
Grief weeps alone;
Cana had many guests,
Gethsemane had none."

And many, having heard, will find it difficult to forget these lines on Golgotha.

"Our crosses are hewn from different trees
But we all must have our Calvaries;
We may climb the height from a different side,
But we all go up to be crucified.
As we scale the steep, another may share
The dreadful load that our shoulders bear;
But the costliest sorrow is all our own,
For on the summit we bleed alone."

This poet is indeed a poet of the Christian year and Christian thought.

So with delight we find this poet of the Divine love, the immanence of God, and Christian thought, bringing this clear and fine vision of the eternal into the service of his country. He has a noble exaltation in his prayer:

"O goddess, arctic-crowned and tropic-shod,
And belted with great waters, hear our cry—
More honest never reached the ear of God—
We'll serve thee, laud thee, love thee till we die."

In his *Patriot's Hymn* he sees both the glory and the peril of our land. And he speaks without any clap-trap of the rugged and huge democracy in the United States.

"Oft-times, Democracy, thou seem'st to me
Not what the poets paint—a virgin fair
With soft limbs, and pale cheeks of purity
Framed in the splendid noonday of her hair;

Nay, but some Western Titan, bare of breast,
Huge-legged, low-browed, and bearded as of old,
A man of mountain muscle, and a chest
Whose lungs indifferent drink the heat, the cold."

His longest and most pondered work is the ode on New England, a filial tribute to her godly men and women, her throbbing cities and her quiet farms, her austere moods of winter, and her glorious days in June.

All his work is expressed with clearness and simplicity. In spirit and in words he is thoroughly of New England. His verse has the simplicity and beauty of the white meeting-house. A wholesome, good, effectual purpose is the prevailing character of his work. His lines are sinewy in strength and athletic in movement. Through his poetry comes the light of God, uncolored and untouched, just as the sunlight comes through the plain window glass of the New England meeting-house. He is a poet of the Divine love, the Divine Spirit, of his dear and blessed country; a poet of Christian faith and courage, knowing no failure except the failure to dare, knowing no sin except the lack of love, who out of the depths can lift his prayer to God, and on the heights can pray for those who fail.

With Josephine Preston Peabody we come to one who has gained high recognition on both sides of the Atlantic, and whose name, no doubt, would appear in every serious estimate of American literature. She has had for a dozen years a wide circle of friends who have known her as a lyric poet of a refined art, and as a dramatic poet of unusual promise. This promise was exceptionally fulfilled in her poetic drama, *The Piper*, which won the Stratford prize in England and immediately brought her name before a larger public.

Perhaps it is just to say that the religious aspect most conspicuous in her poetry is that second great commandment, the love of man for man. She sings of little children, of tender mothers, of very noble fathers, of lovers singing in the candlelight. She is one who has compassion on the multitude, on all who without a shepherd look up and are not fed.

Scattered all through her books, in many lyric poems, in her play, *The Piper*, in the *Book of the Little Past*, we find endearing visions of childhood. And this suggests that one of the finest contributions of the Victorian period and of our time to the more abundant life of our literature has been the artistic expression and spiritual discernment of the child. It has been, in one sense, the century of little children, and it is named in literature with the name of a great mother. It has been the age of children's schools and hospitals and playgrounds. The children have had their painters and their poets. Stevenson, for example, has been one of their poet-laureates. And Josephine Preston Peabody has written with the same grace and winsome humor and blithe and bonny spirit. Beyond all other mortals, the children are such stuff as dreams are made of, and to their airy imaginations this poet has given a local habitation and a name. The poem called *The Busy Child* will illustrate this quality in her work.

"I have so many things to do,
I don't know when I shall get through.

To-day I had to watch the rain
Come sliding down the window-pane.

And I was humming all the time,
Around my head, a kind of rhyme;

And blowing softly on the glass
To see the dimness come and pass.

I made a picture, with my breath
Rubbed out to show the underneath.

I built a city on the floor;
And then I went and was a War.

And I escaped from square to square
That's greenest on the carpet there.

Until at last I came to Us.
But it was very dangerous;

Because if I had stepped outside,
I made believe I should have died!

And now I have the boat to mend,
And all our supper to pretend.

I am so busy, every day,
I haven't any time to play."

This love for children and this knowledge of the little past are given a larger expression in her well-known play, *The Piper*. Back of all the life in this drama is the figure of Christ, to whom she has given the child's name of the "Lonely Man." Hamelin is the city of greed where the people whine:

"Five mouths around the table;
And a poor harvest, and now comes one more!
God chastens us."

Hamelin is the city of selfishness, and regards the child simply as

"Some one to work for me when I am old,
Some one to follow me into my grave,
Some one—for me."

And Hamelin is punished for its greed, selfishness, and injustice by the loss of the children. The Piper and Veronika are the lovers of the children. The Piper cries:

"I love thy child. Trust me, I love them all.
They are the brightest miracle I know.
Wherever I go, I search the eyes of men
To find such clearness, and it is not there.
Lies, greed, cruelty, and the dreadful dark!
And all that makes Him sad these thousand years,
And keeps His forehead bleeding."

The Lonely Man subdues the passionate resentment of the Piper, and the children are restored. The last word in the play is significant: "the Lonely Man." And so a preacher might say that this exquisite and noble poem is written on the ancient word, "Suffer the little children to come unto me"; for when the spirit that was in Jesus is in the hearts of men, they do indeed suffer the little children to enter their homes, and they in their turn enter into an understanding of little children.

Not only of the children but also of men and women who bear the burden and heat of the day is she the radiant singer. Her drama *Marlowe*, fashioned in the likeness of an Elizabethan play and filled with the men who bore a large part in those spacious days, belongs to the poetry of humanity. The religious issue is the tragedy of Marlowe. Condemned as an atheist by the orthodoxy of his time, he seeks God in his own way. He gropes through darkness for the Light. He is the bold thinker, the adventurous poet, who has searched and never found his God in power, in fame, and in high places. At last he learns that peace is the great boon and this

is given not as the world giveth. His last words and the last lines in the play are:

> MARLOWE: "O God! God! God!"
> HOST: "Did ye hear the oath?"
> GABRIEL: "I heard the cry."

There in poignant phrase you have the summary; those who did not know the man heard only an oath, and those who knew him best heard a cry for God.

This compassionate understanding of her fellow men is the subject of her last book, *The Singing Man*. The majority of the poems in this book refer to present social conditions. Her poet's heart has understanding of the wrongs of men and knowledge of the old woe of the world. She herself says in a foreword in her last book:

> "We make our songs as we must from fragments of the joy and sorrow of living. What life itself must be we cannot know till all men share the chance to know. Until the day of some more equal portion, there is no human brightness unhaunted by this black shadow—the thought of those unnumbered who pay all the heavier cost of living without knowledge that there is any joy of living. No song could face such blackness but for the will to share and for hope of the day of sharing. Upon that hope and that mindfulness the poems in this book are linked together."

And attention should be called to the fact that the mortal of whom she writes is the *singing* man. He is the man who ought to be able to pass through even the darkness of life with a new song on his lips.

On the whole, her lyric poetry is kindred to the best in our English literature, and her dramatic poetry traces much of its inspiration and artistic quality to the lofty lines and passionate intent of the Elizabethan plays. Her religion is concerned mainly with the love of man for man. It is a religion of faith, hope, and charity. She knows the darkness, but she always sees the gleam. The city smoke becomes glorious in the sunset, and "one grey

dove" by magic of the light becomes a "flock of golden and silver wings."

When we attempt to summarize the religious aspects of these three American poets, we find them grouped into three great expressions of the religious spirit. The religion in the poetry of William Vaughn Moody is that of the prophets. He is concerned with the eternal. He writes of judgment and creation. He speaks as one who has come from Sinai or the New Jerusalem. Like Milton, whom he knew so well and to whose ample and resounding lines he looked as to a master, he sings of vast designs, great arguments, eternal Providence. And to him was given genius to conceive the amplitude of figure and solemnity of music, harmonious with his adventurous thought. In Frederic Lawrence Knowles we find the religion of Saint John and Saint Francis. He sees the immanence of God. The word is life, and has come to dwell with him, and he has seen the glory and left it shining in his verse. He is the poet of divine love, and with Franciscan piety he calls Pain his brother and Sorrow his sister, and holds there is no sin except the lack of love. In Josephine Preston Peabody we feel the atmosphere of the gospel stories. In her poetry we find the lilies of the field, the birds of the air, the angels singing in the night, the little children, the poor, the sick, the broken-hearted, and those who sing no more. And over all the darkness is the light, and in the midst of men is one who is able to put a new song into their hearts.

II.

In England there is one poet who has had, it is probably safe to say, more influence over our youth than any other contemporary poet. Rudyard Kipling has had an extraordinary career. During the last few years he has suffered an eclipse in fame, and he certainly has

not continued the fine quality of his best creative work. He has also suffered from an extreme attack of popularity. It seems only yesterday that Charles Eliot Norton was introducing him to America with high and generous praise, and everybody was reading Rudyard Kipling. And now it is rather the fashion to speak of his "brass-band tunes." But when the balance is struck between undue exaltation and unfair depreciation, a goodly account will be left to the credit of English literature.

His work is so well known and its characteristics have been so frequently and effectively remarked that it will be unnecessary to dwell at length upon the religious aspects of his poetry. It is fair to say that the religion in the poetry of Mr. Kipling is the religion of the Old Testament. In this fact will be found the source of his weakness and of his strength. For the religion of the Old Testament, although vigorous, virile, reverent of the law, is for the larger part tribal and racial. The glory in the religion of the Old Testament is concreteness, force, personality, obedience to the covenant; and these are the glories in the religion of Mr. Kipling.

Perhaps the deepest note was struck in the famous *Recessional Hymn;* for in these lines we hear the deep note reverberant in the Psalms. "Have mercy on Thy people, Lord." This is the same piety as in the 51st Psalm: "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to Thy loving kindness." Kindred to this thought of absolute dependence on God is the thought of communion with the Eternal. Man has many helps and companions in his approach to the Father. But at last and in the highest places he must walk alone. All alone he enters the deepest communion with the Eternal. All alone Abram communes beneath the stars with Jehovah. All alone Jacob wrestles with the angel. In solitude Elijah hears the voice. Christ kneels alone in Geth-

semane. The path between man and God is wide enough for one and only one. This thought of communion, one of the deep notes in religion, we find many times in Kipling's poetry. In a poem which appeared as early as 1888, and which begins, "Lo, I have wrought in common clay," we have simple and forcible expression of this feeling. His conception of God is the Lord of Hosts, Judge of the Nations, Jehovah of the Thunders, Lord God of Battles. It is the God of Moses, of Joshua, and of Gideon.

> "Ere yet we loose the legions,
> Ere yet we draw the blade,
> Jehovah of the Thunders,
> Lord God of Battles, aid."

There is nothing of the Absolute and the Abstract in this religion. And it is curious that so little of the philosophy of India, with its vast, cloudy symbols of the ultimate, ever got into the religion of Mr. Kipling. His poetry remains impenetrably Anglo-Saxon and Hebraic. His religion is the faith of Beowulf and Gideon.

Very little of traditional philosophy or theology is found directly expressed in his verse. Perhaps the nearest approach to it is found in *McAndrew's Hymn*, where in the words of the old Scotch engineer he seems to show a fondness for Calvinism.

> "From coupler-flange to spindle-guide I see Thy hand, O God;
> Predestination in the stride o' yon connecting-rod."

When we turn from his ideas of God to his doctrine of man, we find ourselves again in the Old Testament. His men who sing the *Hymn before Action* are made from the same clay as Joshua and Gideon. Their psalms are battle-psalms, and in the lines we hear the clash of swords and the rush of warriors. Naturally, such a religion is emphatically masculine. Even his little

children speak like officers of the regiment; and even his gods in that prose-poem, *The Children of the Zodiac*, are distinctly human.

But the best in his doctrine of men is the capacity of his heroes to exercise the will to refrain. His noblest men are always doing the work for the work's sake, for the approval of God and not for the praise of men. They are willing to endure hardships, to be forgotten, or to see other men receive the reward for their work. All they desire is to do their best and receive "Well done!" from God. There are inspiring values in his young subalterns, bridge-builders, famine-officials, soldiers, and sailors, quietly and faithfully doing their work as in the presence of the "Great Overseer."

> "By my own work before the night,
> Great Overseer, I make my prayer.
>
> If there be good in that I wrought,
> Thy hand compelled it, Master, Thine;
> Where I have failed to meet Thy thought,
> I know, through Thee, the blame is mine.
>
> One stone the more swings to her place
> In that dread Temple of Thy Worth.
> It is enough that through Thy grace
> I saw naught common on Thy earth."

Last of all, we may look at Mr. Kipling's idea of the future. His heaven is also vigorous and virile. You cannot enter that estate unless you have done something. His idea of hell is no less virile and vigorous. For you cannot enter that abode unless you have done something worthy of damnation. His poem, *Tomlinson*, is the story of a man who was not able to enter either of these strenuous places because he had not done anything, either good or bad. His finest description of his heaven is found in the Envoi to *The Seven Seas* and in *The Last Chantey*.

His religion then is the religion of the Old Testament. It is concrete, vivid, and personal. His God is the Judge, the King, the Lord of Battles. His men, at their best, are those who toil and fight as those who must give account to Jehovah. His heaven and hell are what Mathew Arnold called the German critics—vigorous and rigorous.

In the poetry of Stephen Phillips we enter quite a different atmosphere; for we move from ballads and battle-psalms into the drama and the lyric. This poet is a skilful story-teller. He takes the old familiar tale and rewrites it with new beauty and in lyric lines. He tells the old story of Ulysses or David with simplicity and often with unforgettable lines. As every preacher knows, the narrative is a powerful weapon; so much so that people are often in danger of remembering the illustration and not the thought. Through narratives then and as the expositor, this poet reaches his congregation. *Paolo and Francesca* is, I think, the best. This haunting tragedy from Dante is told with delicacy and skilful power. You feel the great temptation and you feel no less the great sin. He succeeds in making you realize the impelling love, the shadow of wrong, and the approaching woe. This is also evident and emphatic in *The Sin of David*. This is really a sermon in an English setting, founded on the Old Testament story, and having for its text, "Forgive us our debts as we forgive our debtors." In *Ulysses* we have a beautiful and strong idealization of the love between husband and wife.

> "Yet we are bound more close than by a charm;
> By fireside plans and counsel in the dawn,
> Like gardeners have we watched a growing child."

> "Thou knowest the long years I have not quailed,
> True to a vision, steadfast to a dream,
> Indissolubly married to remembrance."

In all these dramas he does not point the moral, but leaves the lesson to the narrative itself.

Still another quality of religious value his verse possesses. This is the ability to make the unseen things appear as the imperishable realities of life. This ability does not rise to great power, and seems to spring more from the heart of the story than from the heart of the poet. But if he could increase this talent of expressing the life of the spirit, he would be a great poet. You feel very strongly in *Paolo and Francesca* a sense of Will behind our will, a Purpose overruling our desires. In all his plays you are haunted by the presence of the unseen fate and destiny.

In his poems as well as in his dramas he is at his best in narrative. He does not seem to have the vigor of effectual convictions. He is, after all, a teller of old tales, in lines of grace and beauty.

The disappointment which has attended the work of both these English poets—for one is too strenuous and the other is not strenuous enough—finds a compensation in the work of Alfred Noyes. He is a young man, just over thirty, and already he has become conspicuous in achievement and reward. He has even been hailed as "the young Tennyson." When we read his verse from the point of view of religion, we find ourselves richly rewarded. For here is a poet who, while keeping all the vigor of the Old Testament, rises into the tenderness of the New. He is a Christian poet. He has written an epic on Protestantism. He is a herald of peace. He is a lover of little children. I am inclined to think that his poetry is more prophetic of the poetry of this century than the work of any other of our younger poets.

His most ambitious work is the epic poem, *Drake*. This had the unusual distinction of running for a year as a serial in one of the English magazines. The poem rings with the glory of Elizabethan days. All the magic

phrases are present in his lines: "pieces of eight—gentleman-adventurers—the Spanish main—poops—pavisades—escutcheons—Gloriana's Knight." It is distinctly an epic of Protestant England and her victorious struggle with Rome and Spain.

The glory of the Protestant movement is most conspicuous in the historical setting of the poem. For on the one hand you have Elizabeth, Drake, and England; and on the other hand Philip, Spain, and Rome. And the poem rings with battle. Drake is the Lion of England, Gloriana's Knight, the sword and shield of Protestantism, the Dragon of the Apocalypse, the dread antagonist of Rome. He laughs at priestcraft and great galleons and magic waters sloping to the west. His fearless and adventurous voyage brings the great debate to open combat on the seas.

"Day by day there came as on the wings
Of startled winds from o'er the Spanish Main
Strange echoes as of sacked and clamorous ports,
And battered gates of fabulous golden cities;
A murmur out of the sunsets of Peru,
A sea-bird's wail from Lima. While no less
The wrathful menace gathered up its might
All round our little isle; till now the King,
Philip of Spain, half-secretly decreed
The building of huge docks, from which to launch
A fleet invincible, that should sweep the seas
Of all the world, throttle with one broad grasp
All Protestant Rebellion, having established
His red foot in the Netherlands, then to hurl
His whole world-empire at this little isle,
England, our Mother, home, and hope, and love,
And bend her neck beneath his yoke. For now
No half-surrender sought he. At his back
Robed with the scarlet of a thousand martyrs,
Admonishing him stood Rome, and in her hand,
Grasping the cross of Christ by its great hilt,
She pointed it like a dagger at the throat
Of England."

This attack is confronted with a militant Protestantism, which prays to God before it goes to battle. And in the great sea-fight with the Armada they are strong because they are surrounded by the host of God.

> "Ten thousand times ten thousand! What are these
> That are arrayed in yellow robes and sweep
> Between your prayers and God, like phantom seas
> Prophesying over your masts? Could Rome not keep
> The Keys?"

The battle, moreover, is considered as more than a duel between England and Spain. It is a struggle between Light and Darkness. And when the victory is won, the epic closes with a prayer:

> "'Not unto us,'
> Cried Drake, 'not unto us, but unto Him
> Who made the sea, belongs our England now!
> Pray God that heart and mind and soul we prove
> Worthy among the nations of this hour
> And this great victory, whose ocean-fame
> Shall wash the world with thunder till that day
> When there is no more sea, and the strong cliffs
> Pass like a smoke, and the last peal of it
> Sounds thro' the trumpet.'"

It is also worth while to remark that we find in the poem the very spirit in religion for which the Protestant churches have bravely contended. They have insisted upon a free approach of man to God. They have nobly stood for the truth that in the highest communion man is alone with God. So we find Drake at a critical period in his voyage going out into solitary places to be alone with God. His prayer is the Christian prayer, "Show me Thy ways, O God, teach me Thy paths! I am in the dark. Lighten my darkness!" And his experience is that of the Christian:

> "And there by some strange instinct, oh he felt
> God's answers there, as if he grasped a hand."

And all the troubles and joys of his life lift him into that eternal life which is in and through and over all the temporal sway of circumstances. So in this English epic we have both the fact and spirit of that movement which made England both Protestant and modern.

One great religious value which is prominent just now in our public life is given a noble and frequent expression in his poems—the question of peace. These poems are not meek and mild. This poet is a trumpeter for peace, and his trumpet gives forth no uncertain sounds. *Lucifer's Feast* is a savage sarcasm on war. *In Time of War* is a realistic picture of the ghastly horrors of the battlefield. *To England in 1907* is a prayer that she might speak for peace. *The Dawn of Peace* is a ringing proclamation of the reality. He urges England to hasten the coming of that day when all the kingdoms shall be the kingdom of God, and we shall have one banner and "one emperor whose name is love."

> "Ah, God speed that grander morrow,
> When the world's divinest sorrow
> Shall show how love stands knocking at the
> World's unopened door!"

Like our American poet, Josephine Preston Peabody, he is a lover of little children. One volume, *The Flower of Old Japan*, is a vision of the world as seen through the eyes of children. It is, as he says in his preface, more than a collection of fairy tales. It is "an attempt to follow the careless and happy feet of childhood back into the kingdom of those dreams which are the sole reality worth living and dying for, . . . for which mankind has endured so many triumphant martyrdoms that even amidst the rush and roar of modern materialism they cannot be quite forgotten." His religion is one in which men are constrained to be as little children in order to enter the kingdom of God.

In this young English poet we find the expression of our Christianity which unites the vigor of the Old with the tenderness of the New Testament. It is a religion of courage, manliness, and freedom, of tenderness, peace, and love. It has reality, and that is something the poetry of Stephen Phillips has lacked. It has the apprehension of the Divine love, and the peace of Christ, and the heart of childhood; and these are qualities which have not been conspicuous in the poetry of Rudyard Kipling.

And now having spoken in detail of the religious qualities in the work of these English and American poets, it will be fitting to regard them in the light of a larger significance. What is their relation to the sovereign ideals of our time? Are they a part of the great spiritual movements which are sweeping through this period? They have this larger value. They are indissolubly a part of the idealism which will give this period its distinction. For students of serious thought are well aware that in this the first part of the twentieth century we are under the influence of two great spiritual movements.

The first is the social or humanitarian movement. In these poets, in our most prophetic leaders, we have a passionate expression of this new vision in humanity. We have with us a chivalric defence of the weak against the strong. We feel keenly the burden of poverty. We hate with perfect hatred the dominion of vice and the government of sin. It is this ideal which already has commanded the century to write reform bills, to abolish a most ancient slavery, to break the old wrongs with a rod of iron and to dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel. Man's vast concern for man, the love of his neighbor, the commandment of brotherhood, the care for children, the beauty of the home, the fraternity of nations—this social ideal is unquestionably a great force to-day.

Unquestionably also it has received an undue emphasis. The social problem has frequently and arrogantly excluded all others, and modern humanitarianism has often descended into futile sentimentality. It is the distinction of these poets whom we have considered to have given a noble utterance to this idealism, without the extravagance and decadence too often foremost in some other moderns. For this great ideal is in serious danger of paganism. Many of its advocates urge on us the conviction that this world is man's abiding home; and to persuade man that this earth is his home is supremely the effort of paganism. Christianity is exactly the opposite—God's supreme effort to make men realize that this earth is not their home. Here we are pilgrims and sojourners as all our fathers were. This world, says Christianity, is a way to the eternal. Jesus called himself the Way; his religion was called the Way; his disciples were those who walked this Way. One of the earliest church manuals, the *Didache*, was a guide-book for this Way. Make this Way glorious, make the crooked straight and the rough places plain, but never forget it is a road leading to a city which hath foundations. This is the classic experience of humanity. This is the Christian ideal. This is the restraint so necessary in the expression of the modern social ideal. This is the fine tradition which gives these poets a large significance.

The second ideal is the anti-intellectual—romanticism. In its negative aspect it is a protest against the scholasticism of science, a rebellion against the dogmatism of the intellectuals. In its positive aspect it places the emphasis on the world of feeling, on the priority of the inward life, on the authority of the inward light. For example, those who follow this ideal welcome the assistance of Bergson in breaking down the dogmatism of science and in placing the emphasis on the "vital im-

pulse." They welcome the assistance of Eucken in his attacks on materialism and his defence of spiritual reality.

This movement at its best has the spirit of Platonism and of Christian mysticism. Its theology is kindred to that of Schleiermacher, the great leader in the romanticism of the last century, in its valuation of feeling.

And this ideal, like the social movement, is receiving too frequently at present a wild emphasis. In poetry, for example, we have the undesirable extremes in the "barbarisms" of Masefield, in some of the "lollipops" of Yeats and Synge, and the unreasoning enthusiasm which in London has greeted the Bengali poet, Tagore. Even of Bergson it may be said, "*Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*" For the Christian ideal cannot agree with the teaching which places the emphasis altogether on the life of the many. We emphasize the life of the one. Neither does the Christian ideal agree with the teaching that the things to be studied are the things that flow. These indeed require serious attention. But the things we study above all are the things that cannot be shaken. So there is in this modern anti-intellectual movement much of the excess which in the poet has always attended romanticism.

With this extravagance, either in the social or the anti-intellectual movement, the poets we have considered are not concerned. They have chosen the better part. They have given the classic expression to these ideals. In Knowles we see the emphasis on the Divine immanence, the very heart of the anti-intellectual movement. In Moody we see the emphasis on the Divine sovereignty, which must ever serve as a supreme restraint to that movement. In Kipling we see a robust and virile appreciation of that world of man, his ships and machines, his soldiers and sailors, his land and sea, that actual world in which the social ideal lives and moves and has its being. In Josephine Preston Peabody we see that

sensitive knowledge of the injustice, the woe of the world, which is the prophetic cry of our humanitarianism. And yet she walks in reason where other moderns stray, for, however gross the darkness, the inhabitant thereof is the singing man. However deep the pit, man can be lifted up and a new song placed upon his lips. In her lines also we read a woman's skilled interpretation of the inward life, especially of the inward life of childhood. And the heart of the child is the entrance to the Kingdom. In Noyes also we find this emphasis on the inward life, expressed in beauty and melody and with a wholesome love for reality. And in his verse also we see what the social movement must learn and acknowledge as its true utterance—a reformation of man only through the help of God. The Armadas of unrighteousness are scattered not altogether by our puny vessels. At the last, they are driven by the winds of God on the ultimate Hebrides.

These are the characteristics of the religion predominant in our time and in these poets. It is a religion of men who labor, if need be, in solitary places and in far-off lands. It is a religion in which the child, the home, and the love which is the greatest of all have a large place. It is a religion in which God's peace is no religious romance, but an overwhelming reality in the parliaments of man. It is a religion of freedom and liberty, insistently assuring man that on the path to the eternal he has in the highest stages no guide but the Divine light. It is a religion which maintains a high ideal for man and for the spirit in man. It is a religion which holds both the Divine sovereignty and the Divine immanence; for the more we find the Divine spirit within us, the more assured we are that the same spirit guides the world.

THE FITNESS OF THE ENVIRONMENT

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When Darwin first turned the search-light of his genius upon the world of Nature, and under its illumination men were compelled to replace their static views of organic creation by a dynamic representation that made the history of life a connected and, in great part, progressive process from the beginning, attention was mainly concentrated on the fitness of the organism to its environment. The fact of such fitness had long been obvious in differing degrees, but the problem of its causation as a factor in survival was then for the first time philosophically treated in the doctrine of Natural Selection. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that through all the earlier discussions that ranged round these topics the point of view was more or less one-sided. The fitness of the organism to its environment was stressed and stressed again; the question of the fitness of the environment to the organism was seldom raised, or even realized. In some cases, along with views advancedly transmutational, a conception of the environment was maintained that was almost static. The organism, isolated from its environment, was ransacked for its history in the laboratory or made the subject of experiment in order to elucidate its behavior. The conception of the organism and its environment as vitally and reciprocally connected, as a single system undergoing change, had not yet been reached. This does not mean that certain broad features of mutual adaptation and compensation between environment and organism were not appreciated, and even some-

times doctored into dubious demonstrations of divinity. The writer has some recollection of an apologetic lecture delivered seventeen years ago by a man of justly international reputation, although on other grounds, who detailed the composition of the atmosphere as then known, and argued for the existence of God in that it was not "sticky," and that, while animals were all the time breathing out carbonic acid gas and taking in oxygen, plants were engaged in the reverse process. With greater breadth of detail and a more admirable logic, attention had been directed even earlier in some of the famous Bridgewater Treatises, concerned as a series with "the Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God, as manifested in the Creation," to the remarkable and in some instances unique properties of water, air, and the ether in their relation to the maintenance of life. Yet the conception of fitness was usually that of an externally arranged environment, prepared in complete detachment from that which was, just as extraneously, later introduced to inhabit it. There was little thought of a close and mutually determined development of organic and inorganic after a stage in which the latter by obvious history had become fitted to be at once part-parent and cradle of life.[1]

It was inevitable, however, that with advance in understanding of the characteristics of the essential elements in the environment of living things, the degree of the capacity of these elements to serve in this respect should come into clearer light, while the rise of biochemistry made it impossible any longer to treat as of secondary importance their rôle when incorporated in the organism. But, in particular, the immense elongation of the environmental history as the results of modern spectroscopy and astronomical physics—the realization that the

[1] There have been of course many notable exceptions to this statement, as, e.g. A. R. Wallace, Man's Place in the Universe.

elements so essential to life had themselves undergone a long process of evolution—has gradually forced into the foreground the suggestion of the mutually unique fitness of environment and organism. Urged with keen logic and supported by a wealth of original research, this is the thesis of a recent brilliant study by Professor L. J. Henderson of Harvard.[2] "Darwinian fitness is compounded of a mutual relationship between the organism and the environment. Of this, fitness of environment is quite as essential a component as the fitness which arises in the process of organic evolution; and in fundamental characteristics the actual environment is the fittest possible abode of life."[3]

So daring a proposition could only be based on a restricted sense of the term "environment" as ordinarily understood, and it is at once made clear in the volume in question that this superlative fitness is only asserted of those physico-chemical elements that are ordinarily associated with life, and, further, this fitness is considered only with reference to a certain restricted series of organic characteristics. In fact the investigation is narrowed down to this specific inquiry: "To what extent do the characteristics of matter and energy and the cosmic processes favor the existence of mechanisms which must be complex, highly regulated, and provided with suitable matter and energy as food?"[4]

It may be at once admitted that the detailed answer to this question as based on modern chemistry is singularly impressive. The progress of science has served only to accentuate what was already known and to bring out even more profound correspondences and mutual relations between the organism and its environment. Further, the realization of the import of these data tends to the reconsideration of cognate problems, such as the

[2] The Fitness of the Environment, an Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter (The Macmillan Company, 1913).

[3] P. v. [4] P. 37.

origin of life, while the whole series of phenomena calls for an interpretation. None of these topics has been overlooked in Professor Henderson's treatise.

Let us first consider the nature of the evidence. Of substances necessary to life, water perhaps holds the first place. In some instances the bodies of organisms are composed of it to the extent of ninety per cent, and as an actual organic medium it occupies about three-quarters of the surface of the earth. Because of its very high specific heat, all bodies of water have a tendency to maintain a nearly constant temperature, while the comparative moderation of summer and winter temperatures, and the promotion of marine currents and winds are directly and indirectly in part connected with the same fact—effects which go to make the earth peculiarly habitable. The same property is of extreme importance, further, in regulating the heat of the human body, of which water is the chief constituent; because of the high heat-capacity of water, man's exertions do not raise the temperature of his body as they would if it were otherwise composed. And in all these respects water has a fitness shared only by ammonia, which in other vital relations is far inferior.

Again, the freezing point of water, although low to the human organism, is really very high compared with that of similar substances; ammonia, for example, freezes at 75° Centigrade, a point at which most of the chemical activity known to us would cease. On the other hand, water cannot get colder than 0° Centigrade, however much heat is abstracted; that is, the cooling of oceans and lesser bodies of water is limited by its freezing point. In connection with the extraordinary evaporation going on over the surfaces of water, "no other liquid could . . . bind so much (latent) heat; no other vapor could yield so much heat upon condensation."[5] In these last two characteristics, as in certain meteoro-

[5] P. 102.

logical relations, water produces maximum beneficent effects as compared with all other substances. Further, its unique quality of expanding when cooled at temperatures near the freezing point brings a whole train of benefits in its wake. As a solvent nothing can compare with water, and, gases apart, practically all the food of plants and animals is water-borne. Water has also the greatest surface tension of all liquids with the exception of mercury, a fact of peculiar importance in connection with the functioning of the colloidal structures in living matter.

Massed, as the ocean, it is further significant. Practically constant today in temperature, alkalinity, and concentration, this character of constancy is even more important biologically in relation to the chemical composition of sea-water. Of all balanced solutions of salts, "sea-water is by far the best." The constancy of the osmotic pressure of sea-water is another biological factor of primary importance, while the size, the mobility, the richness and varied nature of its constituents, all make the ocean uniquely adapted to life. In connection with the question of origin it is important to note, as Professor Macallum of Toronto first pointed out, that there is a quantitative correspondence between the various saline constituents of sea-water and mammalian blood which is more than accidental, while the regulatory processes of ocean and of organism, although differing greatly in degree, are not dissimilar in one or two respects, e.g. temperature-regulation by evaporation, and regulation of alkalinity. "Is it not possible," asks Professor Henderson, hinting at a point of view developed at a later stage of his study, "that in the case of the organic processes some have now and then been regarded as adaptations which in reality arose automatically and quite inevitably?"[6] Waiving the question for the moment, we are confronted with the basal fact that in practically

[6] P. 189.

every particular no other known substance could take the place of water in its various massed arrangements and meteorological phases without grave restriction of vital possibilities as we know them. Nothing can even approach it in fitness as an environmental factor.

Yet water is not alone in possessing a marked fitness for the life-cycle. Carbonic acid gas,[7] because of its unusual solubility, is "the one substance which in considerable quantities relative to its total amount everywhere accompanies water;" indeed the two together make up "the real environment." Extraordinarily useful as a food with its maximum mobility and all-pervasiveness, carbon dioxide, because of the precise degree of its weakness as an acid, further has the remarkable and unique property "of preserving a neutral reaction whenever it exists in solution with its salts, provided there be an excess of acid." To this is due the characteristic chemical inactivity of water, which is all the more wonderful, since "acidity and alkalinity surpass all other conditions, even temperature and concentration of reacting substances, in the influence which they exert upon many chemical processes." Almost entirely as the result of this mechanism the oceans are always nearly neutral, and protoplasm and blood possess an unvarying reaction. In connection with the last circumstance an interesting theoretical point emerges. The equilibrium between carbon dioxide and bicarbonates has a first place in the regulation of the reactions both of blood and of protoplasm. Now this significance of carbon dioxide is not an adaptation, for "natural selection can have nothing to do with the occurrence of CO_2 in the living organism, or, presumably, with the nature of the original living things upon the earth." In the day of few things, carbon dioxide was there and simply had to be a constituent of primeval life.

[7] Now usually known as carbon dioxide.

Very naturally, out of the interactions between water and carbon dioxide arises the study of the infinity of compounds into which their elements—carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen—can be transformed. Here the demonstration of fitness for life becomes more technical, but none the less impressive. Carbon compounds are unique not merely because they are numerous; "they are uniquely numerous because they are compounds of carbon with hydrogen, oxygen, and in some cases certain other elements,"—compounds unique and peculiar in their chemical relationship, resulting, for example, in the stability of complex organic substances. No other elements apparently can readily form compounds comparable in number, variety, complexity, and capacity for chemical change, with those of the elements under consideration. That the very elements which make up water and carbon dioxide, and apparently they alone, should possess these wonderful properties, is, to say the least, very remarkable. Without the burden of detail it may be stated that there is a basal transformation which underlies the life of plant and animal alike; whereby in the laboratory of the leaf-cell by means of solar energy, the carbon dioxide of the atmosphere and water are reduced, so that a carbohydrate, sugar—in reality a system comprising some two hundred substances of great chemical activity—is formed with liberation of the oxygen and storage of energy. "This is the one chemical process which is open, if any transformations whatever are to be accomplished with carbon dioxide and water; and this leads directly and to all appearances necessarily to the greatest chemical complexity that has been found in any one chemical process." It leads, in short, to the full intricacy of organic chemistry, and that, so far as can be seen, as the result of the native properties of the three elements. Finally, in connection with the reductions and oxidation that go to constitute the vital transfor-

mations of energy, it appears that carbon and hydrogen make good reservoirs of energy to be liberated by oxidation; that oxidations are the best chemical source of energy (reactions with fluorine excepted); that reductions are the best means of storing energy by chemical processes; and that amongst possible oxidations and reductions, those of hydrogen especially, and then those of carbon, are associated with the largest transformation of energy. In other words, "the very chemical changes which for so many other reasons seem to be best fitted to become the processes of physiology, turn out to be the very ones which can divert the greatest flood of energy into the stream of life; and these are the reactions automatically provided for by the cosmic process."[8]

Water and carbon dioxide, occurring in vast quantities outside the crust of the earth, have then both in themselves and in compounds formed from rearrangements of atoms of their component elements a maximal number of qualities, many of them unique, for coöperation in the complexity, regulation, and metabolism of life. What reflections, rather than conclusions, may be suggested by this and the cognate data that have been outlined above?

To begin with, they certainly bring the inorganic and the organic into the closest of relationships. The former is shown to consist initially of a nebula composed of a comparatively small number of "proto-elements," which increase in number and gradually evolve into the elements of modern chemistry. At a certain stage in the history of the planet into which this primal nebular condition cools and concentrates, life draws into being, at first, let us suppose, in specific colloidal molecules. The material connection appears to be so direct that the differentia must be energetic. This is not, however, the view taken by Professor Henderson. "There is certainly no reason to ascribe greater importance to energy than

[8] P. 248.

to matter in the vital processes."[9] On the contrary, we believe there is every reason. The sole difference between a living cat and the same creature a moment after death is an energetic one—not quantitative, but in the control and direction of its stock of energy. The energy of the dead cat is dissipated by heat-radiation and slow combustion of the tissues; that is, it flows along paths which are determined by external agency, and in time a state of equilibrium is reached. The energy of the living cat flows along paths which are only indirectly determined by outside conditions. Fling it up alive, and it will always land on its feet; fling it up dead, and it will come down "any old way." Further, the organism is a centre at which the ordinary tendency to degradation of energy is resisted, while the phenomena of reproduction and of consciousness, of which no energetic explanation is at present possible, are left entirely out of consideration.

"Energy, like matter, is in general well known to us. Its manifestations are few, and they are universal."[10] Again, we would, on the contrary, maintain that in the light of present knowledge we know much more about matter, and the knowledge is different from that in regard to energy. Of the latter there is no thoroughgoing theory available. The older teaching laid down a division into energy of motion (kinetic energy) and energy of position (potential energy). Some of the stock examples of the latter are not, however, forms of energy at all, but only, as Professor Benjamin Moore says, "potentialities for the development of energy,"[11] as in the case of water stored at a height. Beyond the important fact that measurements of different forms of energy in different units bear a constant relationship to one another, little is known as to what is actually in-

[9] P. 299. [10] P. 18.
[11] The Origin and Nature of Life, p. 36.

volved in the transformation of energy; whether in some cases it is an actual transformation at all or merely an exchange comparable to that which obtains at the merchant's counter. Further, the doctrine of its conservation, while demonstrably true of certain closed systems, can only be extended to the universe by a gigantic act of faith conveying at the same time data inconsistent with the doctrine.[12] It is even probable that in the ultimate analysis matter is electrical, that is, energetic, in origin; that the ether, particulate or non-particulate—more probably the latter—when associated with energy, serves to produce the electron, the initial visible stage in the creation of matter. But the *sine qua non* would appear to be an eternal source of creative energy which, operative as kinetic energy, thus produces matter of lowest atomic weight, into whose units it packs itself as potential energy. In the furnace of a nebula such a process, it may be, is in operation with constancy, and likewise with critical pulses of action that have issued in the distinctive features of cosmic history.

A further reflection connected with this historically evolved environmental fitness concerns itself with the question of the moment of the origin of life. In the masterly address of Sir Edward A. Schäfer, President for 1912 of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, the opinion was hazarded that "the possibility of the production of life—that is, of living material—is not so remote as has been generally assumed"; while the conclusion was held to be "forced upon us" that "the evolution of non-living into living substance has happened more than once, and we can be by no means sure that it may not be happening still." The fact, however, that life even in its simplest manifestations is invariably organized, together with the full understanding of what is

[12] Cf. G. W. de Tunzelmann, God and the Universe, pp. 90–97; Sir Oliver Lodge, Life and Matter, p. 22.

implied in the conception of a history of life, namely, that not merely life itself but the environment of its production and evolution have been correlatively subjects of a broadly progressive change, makes it difficult to believe that life will return upon itself, so to speak, even in the laboratory of the experimenter. A specific moment came when the organic colloid became possible, infinitely more complex than its antecedent inorganic relative, and characterized by marked lability, which means just so much more sensitivity to external stimulation. Even if we assume that inorganic colloids were first capable of formation at the time of the deposition of the sedimentary rocks when the temperature of the crust had already fallen to just under 100° Centigrade, the organic colloids came into existence shortly after that at a definite stage in the history of our earth, when many conditions were very different from the present and absolutely irreproducible. The ocean, for example, has grown colder and more saline since that era; its reaction has changed from faintly acid to faintly alkaline. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has been enormously reduced since those days, and the sun is colder. In short, conditions of temperature, atmosphere, possibly even in some measure of chemical affinity and electricity, were greatly different, and in view of the peculiarly close relation and adaptation of every form of life to its environment it seems unphilosophical to look for the origin of life other than in the precise phase of planetary development under which it first arose. No form of life, once extinct, has, so far as we know, again appeared, and only in the most superficial of senses can it be said that history repeats itself.

There is, finally, a primary quality of environmental fitness, prior to the appearance of life, and therefore not due to the action of natural selection—an antecedent adaptation. Has this merely happened so, or is it in

the nature of a prepared environment? It is an old question, whose complete and final answer in terms of knowledge is unattainable on this stage of existence. There is absolutely no doubt that Professor Henderson is right in asserting that "Science has finally put the old Teleology to death."[13] The question remains whether she has not supplied us in return with a teleology farther-reaching and more profound. Strictly, this may well be a question for the philosopher rather than for the man of science. *Qua* man of science, the latter is perfectly within his rights in holding to a mechanistic interpretation even as an ideal; he is only wrong when he pretends that even an approximation has been reached in the interpretation of life or its environment in terms of mechanism alone. From such assumption the volume in question is scrupulously free. Indeed, it is explicitly stated that there is "not one chance in countless millions of millions" that the many properties of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and their compounds, uniquely favorable to life, should occur simultaneously other than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together.[14] The illuminating conclusion is even drawn that "logically, in some obscure manner, cosmic and biological evolution are one." It is one process yielding results not merely contingent, but "resembling those which in human action we recognize as purposeful." Yet of all this "an explanation is to seek; none is at hand."

It would not be difficult even in this balanced work to point out instances where use of the mechanistic interpretation simply covers a begging of the question at issue.[15] A more important matter is whether "lacking any indication of what such an explanation may be, or how it is to be sought," it is of any practical use dogmati-

[13] P. 311. [14] P. 276 ff.

[15] Cf., for example, the sentence in conclusion of a paragraph, beginning "It is easy to see that, given an enzyme possessing the power to select," etc., p. 231.

cally to insist that even for science the explanation "must be purely mechanistic."

After all, the main question about an interpretation is not whether it is strictly supernatural or metaphysical or mechanistic, but whether it is complete, or even ever likely to be so under the limitations of the method pursued. It is only utility that makes us artificially speak of "the world of science." The world is one. And there is no limitation in the neo-vitalistic hypothesis that may not be matched by a corresponding one in mechanistic explanation, while the latter can never in any case be final when applied to life, since, as Oskar Hertwig long ago pointed out, it takes no account of the activity of the organism itself, the maintenance of which is the creature's object.[16] The mechanical indifference of parts, as in an engine, is replaced by an "organic consensus." On the other hand we consider that it is inexact to say that in vitalistic speculations "the properties of matter and the process of cosmic evolution have no place."[17] They have as much place as in any other explanation. What in any case is chemical affinity? Something that, intangible by ordinary methods yet demonstrable in its results, is to that extent akin to the directive tendency which the neo-vitalist finds necessary to supplement his explanation of certain massed results in the realm of life.

As already stated, Professor Henderson definitely realizes the limitations of mechanistic views. "Mechanism can never explain, cannot even face the problem of the existence of matter and energy."[18] He even thinks it may be necessary to postulate "a bent, a direction of flow or development," in inorganic nature as in organic. But this philosophical excursion seems risky, and towards the close of the book he retires again within the scientific

[16] Cf. J. S. Haldane, Mechanism, Life, and Personality, Chapter II.
[17] P. 296. [18] P. 309.

compound, and puts his mind at rest by turning his back, to use his own phrase, on ultimate problems. "It is certain that physical science needs no teleology to explain its phenomena and processes." This may be true of any stage considered in isolation, with its prepared matter leading on to another stage; but it is hardly true of the whole, when we consider its character, to what it leads, and the simple fact that it does so lead.

This, however, is to enter "the realm of ends," to ask for a thorough-going exposition and criticism of causality, and to seek for a standard by which the advance or retrogression of various stages may be measured. All this and more will be found in Professor Hobhouse's "Development and Purpose," which, in thesis and treatment at least, makes a profounder appeal; for, while Professor Henderson considers evolution to be biocentric, Professor Hobhouse argues that it is psychocentric. He thinks that it "can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings under control."[19] Or, as it is more conclusively phrased on another page: "There is a spiritual element integral to the structure and movement of Reality; and evolution is the process by which this principle makes itself master of the residual conditions which at first dominate its life and thwart its efforts."

Thus to seize on the most distinctive feature or product of a process and endeavor through its aid to arrive at some interpretation of the whole, gives greater promise of success than a method which, mechanism-bound, must continually work backwards rather than forwards for the limited explanation that in the end it can afford. Such a view alone has any prospect of being able to relate the empirical order to the underlying conditions of reality. It will further furnish us with at least some palpably plausible explanation of the environmental fitness for which on terms of strict mechanism "existing knowl-

[19] P. xxvi f.

edge provides no clew." For it is nothing less than the insistence that a purpose is at the core of the world-process, conditioned it may be, at least to begin with, yet ever coming into fuller and completer expression of that Reason which is the ultimate cause of the various correlations and concomitances disclosed by the process. In its revelation of increasing values as characterizing the graded stages of evolution, as well as in its recognition that the future equally with the past may truly be said to be determining the actual present, it has an outlook that extends beyond the purely mechanical explanation with its naïve, linear conception of causation, indifferent to concomitants, to values, to ends. Not merely does the mechanical view fail to meet the demands of science; it does not satisfy the spiritual cravings of man.

A reconstruction both conceptual and experiential accordingly is called for, whose final secret Professor Hobhouse considers to lie "in the consciousness of development itself. . . . The essence of this reconstruction is the entry into the sphere of consciousness, previously concerned only with results, of the data and the processes by which results are obtained." This in turn, we believe, must inevitably lead to a spiritual interpretation of nature, based upon the environmental fitnesses detailed above and upon the gradual awakening and uprising of consciousness till it becomes not merely conscious of its life as a unity, but of the conditions under which it has come into being, and, controlling these, moves with a straighter course to the as yet dimly appreciated goal. Natural selection, which represents the play of physical forces and of life itself upon its own advance, gradually loses its force as the methods of that play are better understood and so controlled. That which was implicit in the process becomes more and more explicit, and more important and determinative; that which was operating

on consciousness increasingly becomes an object of consciousness, as the ultimate Reason, the basis of the persistent law and order of the universe, shows forth more and more of itself in human personalities and society, thus bringing their lives into ever-increasing harmony with one another and with itself. The individual's highest response to this transcendent influence and appeal lies in becoming like that which thus influences and appeals. So to think is to recognize in the words of the ancient seer no rush of rhetoric but a profound glimpse into the heart of things: "For thus saith the Lord that created the heavens; he is God; that formed the earth and made it; he established it, he created it not a waste, he formed it to be inhabited."[20] It is also to acknowledge the essential fitness of the apostolic injunction: "Work out your own salvation. . . . It is God that worketh in you."[21]

[20] Isa. 45 18. [21] Phil. 2 12, 13.

THE MODERN MAN'S RELIGION: A SOCIAL QUESTION

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The religious question of an earlier day was, "Are *you* saved, my brother?" Matters have changed since then. Religion at this moment is but slightly a matter for individual concern or query, while it is very decidedly of serious importance to social thinkers and sociological conferences. As matter of fact, a consideration of the "state of religion" in our present day is no longer a mere courtesy to constituted religion but is a necessary logical preliminary to sociological reconstruction as such. For consider the significance of religion from the social idealist's point of view. One may calculate to the nicest exactitude every needed remedy for our glaring maladjustments, yet that result all by itself will be of no worth until the crucial question is answered whether, after all this information and wisdom has been gained, people of the average sort are going to pay any attention to it, let alone act accordingly. It is or should be plain that in social betterment as in life in general, though men by the grace of science know all mysteries and all knowledge, yet if they have not love, all social panaceas are condemned to be but effervescent dreams and much-whipped syllabub. The perception of values is nothing, except there be a fundamental and innate recognition of values as absolutely and beyond argument binding. The many imposing models of desirable social machinery being prepared by skilled draughtsmen within and without

our universities and social settlements and the like, can never be made to *go*, despite all their glistening cogs and cams and innumerable clever devices, without a certain minimum of that spontaneous energy which we call religion. You may prove never so clearly how wages might be raised and taxes be more equalized and how at last, far off, poverty may be abolished. For those in the saddle there is easy reply, "Why give up our advantage? Why not 'let us alone'? What are our servants and tribute-givers to us? Why are we our brothers' keepers?" To such blustering self-regarding inertia as this, there could be no answer save the appeal to deep realities, which because they *are* cannot by any "why" be shouldered aside.

Still further let it be remarked that in discussing this available energy in the modern man which we call his religion, we are especially, and as sociologists necessarily, interested not in the high potentials of certain individuals or organized bodies of them, but rather in the average gauge-readings, so to speak, of the common run of men upon which—and particularly in a democracy—so much depends. Our concern here, that is to say—and this point should be borne in mind throughout—is not in the least with our modern idealists or our modern saints or our modern churchmen as such. The "modern man" includes saint and sinner, the university graduate and the man on the street, the church-goer and the non-church-goer; not only the idealistic philosopher but also the realistic and the pragmatic and even, if we can find him, the materialistic philosopher. We are inquiring here not into the religion of the conventionally and temperamentally religious, but precisely into the religion of the modern man in all his varieties at once.

To begin with the negative and less creditable aspects of the religion of today, it is to be remembered that the men and women of the present are near-sighted, unable

to grasp that which is less than obvious; to sum it up in a labelling phrase, they are decidedly and unquestionably lacking in religious imagination.

1. There is the current indifference to the fact of immortality. People dislike of course the thought of losing permanently their relatives and close friends; they care that much about immortality. As regards themselves however, the life after death is too far-away to be thought about. Mr. Lowes Dickinson could entitle his Ingersoll Lecture of a few years ago, very significantly in this connection, "Is Immortality Desirable?" To the same purpose is the fact that modern discussions of religion of the non-technical sort practically never include this question at all. Mr. Winston Churchill's recently published novel, *The Inside of the Cup*, for example, ranges over most social and theological matters under heaven. It even drags in by the hair of its head and in the closing chapter, a discussion of the religious view of marriage. It is loudly silent however as to immortality, for the reason that the modern man is not interested. In the very recent discussions bearing upon this matter from M. Maeterlinck[1] and Sir Oliver Lodge[2] and the considerable public attention excited by them, we have only an apparent refutation of the assertion that people nowadays do not care for immortality. For, I submit, the concern of these writers chiefly, and of their readers wholly, is in the validity of certain alleged messages from the dead. In so far, the modern man's interest is here not in the future nor religious, but present and scientific.

2. Modern lack of imagination in religion appears also no less in the present impatience of authority of every kind. The average man of today is restive under any dogmatic assertion; and this is especially true of

[1] "Life after Death," Century Magazine, September, 1913.

[2] Presidential Address (1913) before the British Association for the Advancement of Science.

religious assertions. Our instinctive reply to any downright dictum is, "Why is it so? Who says so?" And usually we add, "What of it if he does say so!" We have none of that deferring to the powers that be, which made life in general and religious life pre-eminently so ordered and so regular in the older days. We have lawlessness indeed everywhere. Who should know that better than the social thinker? It appears not only in lynchings, but in lawyers who specialize upon how to drive coaches and fours through the law of which they should be the guardians. It stalks among us in disobedient children and—the complement of them—careless parents; in easily loosened marriages, and what is called in general the "new ethics," especially the new ethics of sex, which is championed outright by Ellen Key, and less directly but no less really for American readers by Robert Herrick and Albert Edwards and Edith Wharton —not to speak of others much less able. All this chaotic confusion of our times crops out also and naturally in our religion. Self-expression here too is for us more important than loyalty to any authority or even to any consistent course of thought and action. The right to liberty, meaning the right to do as one pleases, is a right everybody thoroughly believes in and more or less universally exercises.

This lawlessness is yet, we must remember, no outbreak of desperate wickedness. It is only a result of the modern man's near-sightedness. He does not despise dignities and authorities as such; his difficulty is that he cannot in any of them discern any real right to command. Statutes are to him not hateful, but impalpable; abstract duty is not detestable but simply non-existent; while that value of a law-abiding attitude which was for Kant so clear and sure is not so much denied as utterly invisible and incomprehensible to him. Only actual force, so it seems, can keep these times in bounds,

and where, as is the case in religion, the old force, fear, has largely vanished, there authority may assert itself as it will; nobody really pays any attention to it whatever.

3. But the modern man's lack of imagination is best summed up and realized in the familiar and characteristic neglect at present of religion in its ecclesiastical forms. This neglect is not due, as in the eighteenth century, to any hostility to clerics and churches. Aside from Spain and Portugal and the countries under their influence, where conditions are peculiar, church leaders are not despised or distrusted. They are on the contrary approved and in financial ways often most generously supported. Yet despite this absence of bitterness the modern man has little to do with the church. The conventional thing, in our United States at least, is to ignore the church altogether. We may like this or not; it is the truth of the matter.

It is the old fault in a new guise. The trouble with the church for the average man today is primarily that it has too many ties uniting it with the past in its phrases and ideas and methods. It keeps open a line of communication in many directions between that which has been and that which is. It repeats creeds of centuries ago, with modern interpretations, to be sure, but with a vital interest in what it calls "the unity of the faith." It has symbols such as Baptism and the Lord's Supper, which are no new inventions but came into existence long before this twentieth century dawned, and as to which indeed many even of the church's own members have an interest which, to be frank, is but tepid. The church's services do not for the every-day man appear to be of any immediate practical value; they are, that is, neither lectures nor singing-schools nor entertainments. They have some of the traits of these—I am quoting the average standpoint—but in addition they are pervaded

and even drenched with the historic and the symbolic. The dead hand is upon the church, every church, as well as the living hand. Dead voices are heard there as a constant undertone. And all this which the modern man finds so repellent is not in the least accidental. The church as church rejoices in this solidarity of its present with its past. We church people want such a solidarity and believe that humanity will in the long run be the better for it. But the modern man decidedly does not want it. He is puzzled by all this interest in the remote. The value of the symbolic eludes him. He cares nothing and less than nothing for the historic as such. It is inevitable consequently that he should regard much that goes on in the church as a waste of time and energy. He cannot comprehend the fact that a church may be up-to-date while yet it is glad and proud to thrust its roots back into the immemorial centuries. He cannot realize how a dead-and-gone past may be of value to a living present. He has not sufficient imagination to realize it; that is the sum of his offending. It is again lack of imagination and nothing more sinister which is responsible at bottom for the present temporary ebb of interest in the church as church.

In a word then, to sum up our discussion thus far, one would not be far wrong in dubbing the religion of the modern man prosaic and still under the spell of him whom Dickens so detested—Mr. Gradgrind. Pragmatism, which may fairly be called the current philosophy of this generation, scarcely allows even being to that which is not immediately and rather obviously effective. Christian Science and what calls itself "New Thought," this modern day's contribution to religious thinking, are strong most of all in their suppression of those vain imaginings, as they regard them, which crop out in fear and sickness. Modern comforts lull the modern mind to forget its dreams and outreachings. Modern research

has cowed our imagination and clipped the wings of fancy for all but the infinitesimal few who are themselves engaged in research. The modern man is circumscribed of vision in every realm. How natural therefore that in religion too he should be a man of this world, eschewing all else; proud of his freedom from all taint of other-worldliness when he should rather be ashamed of his narrowness!

Enough has been said of what the religion of the modern man lacks. A much pleasanter task is the attempt to discern what is positive and virile in modern religion.

At the outset, it must be said and with emphasis that these very negative aspects which we have been considering are held true and believed not negatively and for themselves but as the obverse of other positive religious certainties. These obverses are often fallaciously inferred, but they are asserted as deductions and not arrived at in the first place as original fundamental convictions. That is to say, the religion of the modern man, though in certain respects negatively oriented, is not a scepticism; and this is in itself a significant and positive-facing description of the state of affairs. The modern man, for example, justifies his indifference to immortality by insisting upon his concern with present tasks and opportunities. He rejects authorities and dignities, both good and evil, because he is so filled with a sense of the value of the individual. He neglects church-religion because he prefers to be busied in what is to his mind more vitally practical. In a word, these negative aspects of modern religion which have been here enumerated—and they contain, be it remarked, the worst that can be said against present-day religion—do after all show this much that is encouraging, that the modern man even in his religious shortcomings is rather intel-

lectually unenlightened than either morally or religiously culpable.

But the positive reality of the modern man's religion is not merely a fact to be surmised and arrived at in this fashion from negatives. The emphatic and glowing religious spirit of the modern man is there in him as a fact in itself and immediately observable for those that have eyes to see and ears to hear.

1. There is what may be termed the creative energy of these days, an energy which always partakes, wherever found, of the divine. To speak in language which is perhaps more intelligible, I mean that the modern man intensely believes in doing what is practically possible for the increase of order and happiness in the world. This is a trait of our time so frequently met with that we regard it for the most part as a matter of course. But it is no commonplace. It is a religious attitude peculiar to these days and to our Western civilization. The average person in the Orient and even the pundit has none of this eager willingness for improvement, either in himself or in others or in the general life-conditions about him. He starves without complaint. He is wholly submissive; what is, is for him the measure of what must be. All he asks of life is escape in the form of release from the wheel of rebirth. There are of course historic and economic reasons for Eastern fatalism and quietism; but whatever the reasons, this is at all events the situation with him; while on the other hand Occidentals as a whole and Americans in particular take the opposite creative active attitude—not submitting to their environment, but altering it tirelessly; not waiting for things to happen, but going forth and making them happen; not yearning dumbly to elude existence, but improving existence with all their might in every possible respect. Pragmatism's note, here to the point, is downright noble and truly religious; insisting

that it depends upon each individual's sturdy loyalty whether or no the values of life increase or decrease; emphasizing robustly that God is a striving God who must be helped if he is to conquer. That note of practical self-reliance is not only one of the finest doctrines in pragmatism; it is deeply representative of these days, wakening as it does an answering chord in all the modern world. For the modern man is not only sure at the heart of him that improvements in things can be brought about; he looks upon himself as a partner in the project and desires nothing so much as to be up and at the business. He is religious in that he feels the task of bringing order out of chaos definitely and peculiarly laid upon him. The duty of accomplishing something tangible, the call to effect something worth while, does not in him find deaf ears, but on the contrary sets him at once into a high state of tension and action. Is not this a positive and splendid quality of present-day religion? If Jesus exalted the publicans and harlots above the Pharisees because the publicans and harlots were living up to what they knew, while the Pharisees were not,—in so far putting practical obedience above theoretical insight—may we not appeal to his authority for believing of the average man, wofully blind though he often is, that his religion is yet real, since he too is energetic and downright in his pursuit of the charity and usefulness and righteousness which he does see?

So far as our social thinkers and plan-makers are concerned, let them be well assured that the modern man will undertake at their behest any social helpfulness which promises sure returns of enhanced social justice. Our social experts must make their proposals and the reasons for them very, very plain. They must not scold if the average man cannot at once take their point of view. Only let them still be patient and persistent,

since, when they do convince him at length, they will have gained an immediate partisan and an enthusiastic co-worker.

2. Then for another religious quality of the modern man, there is his pity for the needy, his fellow-feeling for the under-dog, his many points of resemblance to the good Samaritan whenever he meets one who has fallen by the wayside. One is not in these days obliged to prove by syllogisms or Biblical citations the brotherhood of man. Everybody knows its reality, for everybody lives by it. A woman taken ill in the railway coach always finds a coachful of friends immediately busied in ministering to her. A child lost is safe in appealing to practically any passer-by. A great tornado or flood will scarcely bring misery faster than express and telegraph bring clothing and money and sympathy. A clear case of injustice to any—as to Miss Ellen Stone or in the Dreyfus case—will put men by the thousands up in arms until the wrong is righted. The modern man cannot pass by suffering unmoved. The ancients could easily do so; heathen countries, most of them at least, still can; but the modern man cannot. The rise of pity, individual and social, is a characteristic religious trait of the modern Christian world. Our very temptation in these days to sentimentality in our sympathy, undeniably indicates a deep-lying sentiment of sympathy which must be there in order to be counterfeited and torn into tatters. The brotherhood of man is not a religious theory but a religious faith; it is not an assertion but a never-failing spring of action. Even our theologians appreciate this. At all events, most theologians in these days, if they will observe their mental processes, will find themselves tacitly, if not overtly, inferring the fatherhood of God from the brotherhood of man, and not *vice-versa*, as it used to be and as it is in the New Testament. This does not disprove in any sense the father-

hood of God, but it does show how basal and sure is our consciousness of human kinship.

It may be objected when one asserts roundly the sympathy of the present generation: "How about the social problems of this very day? What of the miseries of the poor which exist largely because somebody 'higher up' has sold them for a pair of shoes? Are there no black examples, blacker today than ever before, of man's inhumanity to man? Is this the sympathy of the modern man?" No, it is not sympathy, far from it! But let us bear in mind that these and other ugly forms of modern injustice are very largely the results of the immense enlarging and consequent depersonalizing of industry and commerce at present. If Northern capitalists could see in their own suburb the little children whose wholesome development is forfeited for the sake of their dividends, they would not allow child-labor in the factories whose stock they control. If the bargain-hunter had as her next-door neighbor the sweat-shop toiler whose loss is her gain, she would not need to be converted to the idea of the "consumer's label." If the waterers of stock and upholders of high tariff could realize the multitudes of poor who for years must go without many necessities of life to make up the tale of overabundant luxury which they, the privileged, enjoy, how soon would they sicken of their dollars, the emblem of success in their predatory businesses! Much, that is, which looks like an absence of sympathy is in reality a failure to perceive any need for sympathy. The distance is so great between such malefactors and their victims that many malefactors nowadays never dream that there is a victim at all! It is, then, not the modern man's religion but again his insight which is at fault. His old lack of imagination it is which vitiates, in such terrible fashion sometimes, a fellow-feeling for men which is yet in itself deep-rooted and exuberant.

3. Again, the religion of the modern man appears in the way in which life is for him skied over with an optimism which can scarcely be called anything but typical of these times. Our men of today are sure in general that things are "very good." In Germany Nietzsche the optimist has succeeded to the vogue of Schopenhauer the pessimist. In France Bergson is singing the praises of the "*élan vital*" and "creative evolution," that is to say, of life if we will but live. In Russia Artzibashev is as actual as Andreev and far, far more influential, as the Ssaninist movement, regrettable as it is, plainly shows. England has its Robert Louis Stevenson and the author of *The Road Mender;* America has its James and Royce and Christian Science. Each of these and many others are illustrations of the fact that there is among the men of thought today an undying growing confidence that "God's in his heaven, all's right with the world!"

Or there are the doers of the present, the Napoleons of business, the inventors and scientific discoverers, the travellers in Africa or Thibet or to North or South Pole, the missionaries toiling unweariedly in and upon alien civilizations. All these phenomena of human activity in this time are even more clearly expressions of the modern irrepressibility of energy and spirits. Our explorers and pioneers are, as such, forever again and again removing mountains by their faith and hopefulness. This is a developing expansive age such as has not been since the days of the Renaissance. Pessimisms, even though now and then broached among us, cannot live. They pale and fade away for lack of suitable air and soil in our all-encompassing flamboyant optimism.

All this has, it is admitted, its dangers. Men are sadly forgetting the reality of evil and sin, and that often in highly hazardous degenerations. We are just now having to do without that antiseptic of dread which older

days had in their ghosts and banshees and were-wolves and, beneath all, a hell which burned real and sulphurous fire. There is, as everybody knows, all too much of a fatuous smugness in the optimism now met with. We have certainly some of the faults of this virtue of ours, but the virtue is here and we may confidently expect that optimism, broadened and sobered, cleansed and in its right mind, will yet do its part in bringing new victories to this age which is already in so many directions doing things.

4. Finally, it should be remarked that the modern man's religion is social in its ways of expressing itself. I mean by that not alone that we are attacking social evils socially, by dissemination of facts, discussion, legislation, but that in our deeper religious feelings we tend to draw together with those who, in any particular details, are like-minded with ourselves. The upshot is that today's religion is, probably with a thoroughness few of us realize, an organized matter. It is interesting and often even amusing to mark how closely bred to type in this regard modern humanity is. Religion today does not, it is true, much organize about the church, but it is, for all that, not an individualistic affair. Men find organization for their religious ideas by taking the daily or weekly organ of their hobby of reform; by putting their names down on a subscription list for a dollar or five dollars each; by forming a committee or bureau or conference in view of this or that intolerable situation; above all by frantically joining, joining, joining in every direction various organizations of any and every conceivable kind. Do any of us grasp the great number of these which have arisen and are now in actual existence to express and make practical a common faith which is only to be termed, if we will be accurate, a religious faith? Not to speak of the church in its various denominations, nor of its more or less affiliated societies,

as the Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, the Young Men's or the Young Women's Christian Association, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and the like; not to dwell upon the Socialists or the "Single-taxers" or the Labor Unions or the Woman's Suffrage attempts,—not to speak of any of these which are so well known as to occur to one on the spur of the moment, let me set down the names of a few out of many bodies which are so live and concretely prosperous that their names are to be found upon the list of national or international conventions for the year 1913,—the American Conference on Social Insurance, the American Prison Association, the Public Health Association, the International Conference on Infant Mortality, the International Congress against Alcoholism, the National Congress of Mothers, the International Sunshine Society, the World's Citizenship Conference; and all culminating duly in the American Peace Congress and the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration. Beside these taken at random—every reader will think of yet others—are the many clubs and "movements" and "agitations" which are frequently entirely spontaneous and, what is more important, are supported by voluntary and often by nation-wide contributions. It ought to be realized, as it has not yet been realized, that these various organizations for broadly religious ends are parallel to the conventicles and ecclesiasticisms of the more conventional and historic religious bodies. These are the churches of the religion of the modern man, so far as that religion has as yet gone. They are organized, as every church should be, not from above or by any hierarchy, but from below, from the midst of democracy, by the people for the people. This spontaneous democratic socialization of modern religion augurs well, does it not? for the steadiness of progress in the solution of the pressing social problems of the present and future.

This will suffice to suggest, in outline and broadly, what from a social standpoint the religion of the modern man is. It is devoid of that intellectual clarity which the Greeks at their best possessed, but it is strong in that active practical effectiveness of which the Greek knew little. We of today, taken as a whole, do not dream, but we live; we do not worship, but we clothe the naked; we do not pray, but we labor; we have but slight sense of the historic, but we have a virile sense of the present; we have no interest in the other life, but we have a decided interest in the "other fellow." If, as is certain, the two legs of human progress are represented by the seers and the doers, then there can be no doubt that the world is now on the "doing tack," filled to overflowing, as Kipling exults, with sons of Martha. We lack horizon as few ages have lacked it; but, despite all, the religion of men was never so free from selfish motives, never so vital and sincere, as at this moment.

Already that which is wanting in the religion of the modern man bids fair to be added to it. The Church of the present in its ablest and most influential thinkers and preachers is bending every energy, on the one hand, for the enlightening of men and, on the other, for the deepening of its own tolerance and its inclusiveness of every truth of modern thinking. And there are those, apart from the Church and quite indifferent to it, who are no less forces making for horizon and insight. Mr. H. G. Wells, contemptible as are some of his moral ideas, yet in *Marriage* and *A Modern Utopia* gives his readers the wise and peculiarly unmodern advice to think things over. Even more significant in this direction is Maeterlinck in his cloud-like poetizings and beautiful incitements to brooding upon life as a whole. These outcroppings are an indication that the modern man's religion may yet reach a stage where it will gain some sense of remoter realities. There is coming, there

is bound to come, in the average man an adequacy of insight that shall make possible in him an interest not only in the future—that is already dawning in our growing enthusiasm for conservation projects—but in the past, in the historic, in the symbolic, and even at length in the supernatural.

Only let us hope that, as these so desirable extensions of modern religion begin to appear, the modern man may not again let slip that immediacy of practical idealism which is so pervasively the glory of the present.

A CORRECTION

J. E. LeBOSQUET

There were, it is certain, many who traced with delight the intellectual and religious personality of Troeltsch the lecturer, immanent in Professor Miller's article in the October (1913) number of *The Harvard Theological Review*. That article contained however one misstatement which should be corrected as speedily as may be. It said,[1] "Theodor Kaftan, in his misleading brochure on Troeltsch, accuses him of being a pantheist," adding the probable reason why Kaftan does so. As matter of fact, in the book referred to—*Ernst Tröltsch* with the sub-title *Eine kritische Zeitstudie*—Dr. Kaftan accuses Troeltsch of nothing of the sort. He refers indeed to Troeltsch as holding a doctrine of transmigration which is brought to an end by each soul's ultimate return to and absorption in God. Undoubtedly, this might easily appear to a vague recollection of the book as pantheism. Kaftan however mentions this very idea of Troeltsch, later in the critical portion of his study, as being not so Buddhistic as at first it seems, and as being in any case not an expression of the essential Troeltsch; and he concludes as follows: "I call this a turning aside (*Entgleisung*) the more confidently because otherwise there would appear here an outcropping of pantheism which Tröltsch elsewhere *so energetically attacks*."[2] Indeed, far from accusing Troeltsch of pantheism Kaftan categorically in two other passages defends him from the charge. For example: "*Tröltsch ist zweifellos Theist. Aller pantheistischen Verflüchtigung des Gottesbegriffes tritt er je und je entgegen*";[3] and again "*Tröltsch* (*ist*) *ein entschiedener Theist, der Front macht gegen alle pantheistische Verschwommenheit.*"[4]

Speaking in general, Kaftan's pamphlet may be mistaken, as most of the readers of this *Review* will think, but it is scarcely misleading. For one reader at least, though that reader did not agree with it, this critique of Troeltsch was not only extremely interesting, but highly profitable, presenting as it did briefly and energetically the case of orthodox "positive" theology against modern scientific theology. The book is from its point of view a "Tract for the Times." Its vigorous polemic is not so much against Troeltsch as

[1] Page 431. [2] Page 66; italics mine. [3] Page 32. [4] Page 62.

against what Troeltsch represents—the modern *Weltanschauung* and in particular its "*Antisupranaturalismus.*"

Troeltsch, the man, is for Dr. Kaftan a person of deep and warm religious feeling, "moved at bottom by Christian and not Neo-platonic interests"; but Troeltsch's basal points of view are and can be for Kaftan but anathema. Aside from certain inconsistencies of which Troeltsch is accused, and apart from certain abhorrent details, such as Troeltsch's rejection of conversion and his suggestion that the church should confine itself to cultus, giving over religious education to the state—its teachers being trained by the university theological faculties—the argument is, summarily: Troeltsch lacks certainty, being condemned to relativism and subjectivism. He has no absolute, no revelation, no authority by which norms are "given"; instead, he depends upon the increasing approximation of values ("*Annäherungswerte*"), with which he operates as an absolute. He accepts in history that only which can be arrived at by strict historic method. He studies Christianity not as *the* religion but as a religion, and so, summing up all and most damnable of all, he is a philosopher of religion and not a theologian.

Kaftan for his part admits the value of science, but asserts in loud italics that science can never grasp the supernatural. He has developed his own program as to how science and revelation are to live together in regard to history. It is contained in his distinction between "*historisch*"—that which is established by historic method—and the equally valid "*geschichtlich*"—all that ever happened, including what revelation tells us of, as well as the "*historisch.*" This amounts obviously to denying science all right of veto—the very service of science and especially of historical science, which has been most salutary to religion.

In fact Kaftan's book is for its readers itself a "*Zeitstudie,*" giving valuable assistance to the liberal religious thinker who is earnest in his desire to understand the conservative's theological position. The main contentions of the book are an indication how far a passion for security and solidity will carry thought which yields itself up to it. Its condemnation is that it puts the feeling of certainty above the august austere truth. Clearly, Kaftan, like Cardinal Newman in a similar situation, had no actual certainty at the moment when he first decided to swallow this bolus of revelation, which is, from that moment on, his guarantee of assurance. Having made his initial induction, how has he the effrontery to object to Troeltsch's own inductive procedure when he assumes norms to be true without apodictic proof, because he sees them increasingly

approximating truth? Has Kaftan never heard of faith? And surely the faith of Troeltsch and the modern man is not less precious and sublime for being wise and open-eyed and mindful of the forbiddings of science! As for Kaftan's declaration that Troeltsch is not a theologian, that charge can be borne with equanimity. It reminds one of a recent contention of Stephan[5]—though for different reasons—that the word Protestantism should be limited to the visible and so-called "church"; here also as against Troeltsch's broad conception of a "modern Protestantism" which includes all the spiritual forces and currents of the present. There is still prevalent something of the old prejudice of "*extra ecclesiam nulla salus.*" It cannot however long survive among the educated unless as they wax fat they ignore all cults of religion, as there are some signs of their doing. If that happens, conservative religious inanities will persist and ought to persist. For it is better to err intellectually in a two-compartment theology such as Kaftan's than to err spiritually because of the lack of historic religion. But best of all it is to have many scientific *and* religious men in our universities—men like Ernst Troeltsch!

[5] Die heutigen Auffassungen vom Neuprotestantismus. Giessen, 1911.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE PROBLEM OF CHRISTIANITY. JOSIAH ROYCE. 2 vols. The Macmillan Company. 1913.

Vol. I: The Christian Doctrine of Life; pp. xlvi, 426.
Vol. II: The Real World and the Christian Ideas; pp. vi, 442.

Lectures on the Hibbert Foundation, read at Manchester College, Oxford, January to March, 1913. The first series was previously delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston.

The encounter of the powerful current of Royce's thought with the Christian tradition is an event of the first importance. It was inevitable, in the steady growth of views first announced in *The Philosophy of Loyalty* in 1908, that Royce should come to terms with Christianity simply as the most conspicuous germane fact in contemporary life. It was characteristic of him that he should meet this fact honorably and objectively, "not as the one true faith to be taught, and not as an outworn tradition to be treated with enlightened indifference, but as a central, as an intensely interesting, life-problem of humanity." It could have been foreseen that Christian thought would receive at his hands a radical sifting and restatement—a restatement for which we were partly prepared by the address, "What is vital in Christianity?" printed in this journal in October, 1909. But there is here a freshness of treatment, a vigor and clarity, an accurate sympathy, and a breadth of interpretative power, which has outrun anticipation. Whether or not we agree that Christianity is best conceived as "the religion of loyalty," of loyalty to a "beloved community" which is the invisible Church, Christianity must henceforth mean something greater to all interpreters; and what is more, it must mean something nearer, more vital, and more acceptable to the modern man, "for the strengthening of whose heart" this book, in large measure, was written.

The appeal of the work to the modern mind will be due in part to the angle from which Royce approaches his subject; namely, from experience rather than from metaphysics, and from universal human experience rather than from the peculiar experiences of

individuals here and there. Three ideas he distinguishes as essential in Christianity: that of sin, both original and deliberate, from which the individual is powerless to free himself, and whose penalty is endless; that of atonement for sin; and that of the divine community, through which the atonement comes, and in which man must win his salvation. Each of these ideas, Royce insists, is a product of human nature in its moral capacity, quite apart from Christian or other theology. "If there were no Christianity and no Christians in the world, the idea of atonement would have to be invented before the higher levels of our moral existence could be fairly understood. . . . The problem of atonement daily arises, . . . is daily faced, . . . and in principle and in ideal, daily solved." And as for salvation in the community, "these considerations are based upon human nature. They have to do with interests which all reasonable men, whether Christian or non-Christian, more or less clearly recognize, in proportion as men advance to the higher stages of the art of life." This method has the immense advantage of giving verifiable substance and actuality to these religious conceptions, which the contemporary mind in its joy of recovery from an overstrained inwardness is prone to regard as alien and outworn. On the other hand, the method is apt to carry with it a foregone conclusion which is critical for the problem in hand; for the only content of Christianity that could be reached through such a general appeal to human nature is a content which has no necessary connection with Christianity, and our interpreted Christianity is in some likelihood of becoming a purely "natural" or philosophical religion. The historically unique elements of the religion, if any such are essential, are likely to be excluded by the conditions of the inquiry. I shall recur to this matter later.

As to the actual origin of these ideas in our own tradition, Royce is not inclined to attribute any of them to Jesus. "All three appear to be due to interpretations of the mind of the Master which came into existence only after the earthly period of teaching had ceased." The reflective teaching about Christ, as the spirit of the Church, seems to Royce more definitively Christian than the teachings of the man Jesus; and while it is clearly the Pauline formulation which chiefly impresses him, the true founder of Christianity, in his view, is no one person, but the early Christian community itself. Only through the transformation of the object of devotion in this community from the particular person to the living spirit of the community did the motive of religion find its true centre; which is not in the "love" of the synoptic gospels, undeveloped as this is

in its social bearings, but in the "charity" of the epistles—a motive founded in the conception of the community, wherein Christianity becomes the religion of loyalty.

Especially illuminating, in the first volume, are the treatments of moral evil and its penalties. It is not the "sick soul" but the clearly self-judging soul that finds sin and damnation to be its portion on the natural level of moral events. Original guilt is no invention of an artificial theology; it is an expression of the truth that the individual, endowed with self-consciousness by the human community with its laws and standards, is in this process necessarily also endowed with a self-will estranged from the community which has called it forth. Individualism is a by-product of communality, on the human level; so that our "very consciences are tainted by the original sin of social contentiousness." Powerless to deliver himself from the body of this death, salvation must come to the natural man through union with a non-legal community on another level, an essentially lovable community, divine in its spirit; loyalty to such a community, if it can be found, is the "only cure for the natural warfare of the collective and the individual will." But there is a deeper stage of guilt. It is the sin of the man who has known the meaning of adoption, who has received the grace and assumed the obligation of loyalty, and who has become traitor to the cause which was his. This is the sin against the Holy Ghost; unpardonable; not in the sense that an alien Deity has set an arbitrary limit here to his indulgence, but in the sense that the traitorous person cannot forgive himself, and that whatever his further attitude, his deed remains irrevocable, he remains forever one who has been a traitor. The view that such treason is possible and actual is the free, the non-Platonic element in the moral vista of Christianity. It is precisely the man who knows the good who is able to play the traitor; and on this tragic possibility depends the entire worth of our world, as a world of continuous freedom in the reaffirmation of our loyalty. And it is, furthermore, the opportunity for an atoning act, which must come from the spirit of the wronged community itself, an act which apart from the particular deed of treason would not be possible, but which, when it comes, makes the world better than without this treason it could have been.

Atonement, in this view, must be a repeated or continuous process, meeting sin as sin arises. The idea of a single atoning deed which at one stroke anticipates all possible future treasons, can mean no more to this philosophy than a type or symbol. Atonement is,

for Royce, a temporal process; but it is not, in the strict sense, historical.

Salvation then depends upon the continuous work of the divine community; and the practical issues of religion turn upon the metaphysical issues, Is there such a divine community? and Where shall it be found? This inquiry is the burden of the second series of lectures; and the argument here is of extreme logical interest, both intrinsically and as a development of Royce's own metaphysical position. With characteristic skill, he singles out an aspect of cognition, which proves in the end to involve certain decisive judgments as to the nature of reality.

This aspect of cognition is interpretation; and Royce, following out suggestions made by Charles Peirce, wishes to set interpretation beside perception and conception, or rather above them, as a third fundamental process of knowledge. Empiricism has sought to know reality primarily by perception, rationalism by conception; Bergson, basing himself upon a Kantian dream, attempts to define a third species of knowledge which he calls intuition, but this Royce regards as merely a species of perception. Interpretation stands in sharp contrast to these operations. Both perception and conception are solitary, implying a simply dyadic relation between the thinker and his object; interpretation is a social cognition, triadic in structure, as when A interprets B to C. The objects of perception are things; the objects of conception are abstractions, universals; the objects of interpretation are minds, or expressions of mind, signs which the mind offers for the reading of an interpreter. And minds can be known only by interpretation; they cannot be perceived, nor can they be known by conception, for they are not abstractions. Perception and conception terminate upon their objects and give rise to no further processes; but an interpretation is itself a mental expression, and so offers material for further interpretation, defining a never-ending task. Thus the life of an individual is a continual reinterpretation of his own past, a perpetual inner conversation in which the present self interprets the past self to the future self.

The self is thus an object of interpretation, no mere datum of perception; and time itself has no other existence than as the object of this interpretative process. Whether within the mind or between minds, the motive of interpretation is to bring about a unity among differing elements, accomplishing mutual understanding without abolishing their distinctions. It creates a social structure which is as different from the indiscriminate merging or Bergsonian "in-

terpenetration" of elements on the one hand as it is from pluralistic independence on the other. It creates, in brief, a community, in which the problem of the one and the many is solved.

Now the real universe is such a community of interpretation—this is Royce's argument. For by "reality" I mean simply the true interpretation of the conflicts and antitheses which experience presents, an interpretation not in my possession, but which I must believe to exist as I believe in reality at all. "Unless both the interpreter and the community are real, there is no real world."

This universal community, a necessary object of my loyal interpretation of life, though not at all of my perception, whether now or at any future time, is the divine community; it is the City whose maker and builder is God. As the ultimate object of devotion and hope on the part of all loyal souls, this community is the invisible Church. The world is the perpetual process of its spirit; and the salvation of the world is the progressive victory over evil through the reconciling and atoning deeds which this spirit makes possible. This is also the supreme object of the Christian faith: I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.

Of this conception of Christianity as a whole, it is inadequate to say that it is true; one must say that like every great interpretation it enlarges that which it interprets; and if I add that it is not the whole of essential Christianity, I am not forgetting that it must be received primarily as an enhancement of what Christianity may mean to us. I shall not dwell upon the tempting metaphysical discussions, though I must question in passing whether interpretation is a primary cognitive process. Interpretation is concerned with predicates, with the "what" of things; it has no original power over existential propositions. Further, as every interpretation, including a theoretical first one, presumes the existence of the minds addressed by the interpreter, the belief in the existence of minds beyond my present self cannot be a *product* of interpretation. The knowledge of other mind which, as Royce truly shows, cannot be completed without an infinite process of interpretation, must be present in some simpler and more immediate fashion before the interpretative process can begin; the goal in some diminished form must be present from the beginning. I mention this because it is entirely characteristic of Royce's thought; the infinite deferring of the goal is to him incompatible with its realization at any point in time. For this reason the essential can never become the historical, atonement can never be an accomplished fact, and the true Church can

never be found as an existent institution. Historical Christianity, for Royce, is the bearer of a true doctrine; it is not the continuator of any final historic deed. The memories of the Church, as an actual human community, go back to definite points of time, and constitute the Church what Royce calls a "community of memory"; these memories animate the particular historic statements of the creed as well as the commemorative acts of the Lord's Supper. But these particular elements disappear from the creed of the modern man who accepts our author's view; nor would he find in that creed a reason for identifying himself with the hopes and labors of any visible Church.

Neither the atoning deed nor the divine community is brought to earth by this doctrine in historically identifiable form, valid for all men as a common object. Christianity is left in the region of the universal; and thereby the foundation for a truly universal community, an historic unity of all particular spirits and their loyal endeavors, is not laid. If this is true, it may be because that one of all the characteristic ideas of Christianity which to many thinkers is most central has retreated into the background and at last eluded our author's grasp—the doctrine of the Incarnation.

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Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought. By Seven Oxford Men. The Macmillan Co. 1913. Pp. xi, 538. $3.50.

It is sometimes supposed that the attempt to interpret the religion of a former day in terms of current thought is a modern endeavor. Yet this supposedly Broad Church aim produced one of the earliest documents of Christianity—the Epistle to the Hebrews. For that Epistle takes the doctrines and ritual of Judaism, and aims to show in them a deeper meaning than had been perceived. It declares they were originally figures for the time then present, and points out their "fulfilment" in Christ. In every age indeed, standing a step above the prosaic souls who make no distinction between the form of their belief and its spirit, are those who insist that faith must continually dress itself anew in order to be recognizable.

The last half-century has witnessed three such notable attempts. In 1860 *Essays and Reviews* created a storm of opposition through its affirmation that religious truth needed restatement. To many this seemed equivalent to the overthrow of Christianity. But

when after a quarter of a century the necessity of restatement had been grudgingly acknowledged, the attempt was made to recast its results more fully in their old unreformed form. To produce for the old a dress just new enough to be in fashion, was the aim in 1889 of *Lux Mundi*. And now again the same endeavor, though in a different spirit, to combine continuity and progress, to show a living and permanent meaning in doctrines which the present day is inclined to regard as outworn, has given rise to *Foundations*.

Seven Oxford men, clergymen of the Church of England, convinced that "Christianity is no mere survival of a romantic past but a real religion with a real message for the present and future," have set themselves "to a careful re-examination and re-statement of the foundations of their belief in the light of the knowledge and thought of the day." In theology, they say, the task of making experiments "must always be the special duty of the younger generation. The men whose position in the Church is such that they cannot speak at all except with authority can rarely venture on experiments outside the sphere of practice. It is otherwise with us. We fully recognize the obligations of loyalty to the traditions of the Church to which we belong; we make no claim to irresponsibility. But we are young men, and our responsibility is of a different kind. It is the responsibility of making experiments."[1]

The authors and their subjects are as follows: the Modern Situation, by Rev. N. S. Talbot, Chaplain of Balliol College; the Bible, by Rev. R. Brook, Lecturer in theology at Merton and Oriel Colleges and Chaplain to the Bishop of Wakefield; the Historic Christ, by Rev. B. H. Streeter, Dean of Queen's College and Chaplain to the Bishop of St. Alban's; the Interpretation of the Christ in the New Testament, by Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson, Tutor of Keble College, and Rev. R. G. Parsons, Principal of Wells Theological College and Chaplain to the Bishop of Winchester; (1) the Divinity of Christ, and (2) the Church, by Rev. W. Temple, Headmaster of Repton and Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury; (1) the Atonement, and (2) God and the Absolute, by Rev. W. H. Moberly, Lecturer in philosophy at Lincoln College; and the Principle of Authority, by Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson.

Together with the differences of view and style which are inevitable, the authors have an attitude of mind in common. They all preserve a dispassionate calmness of tone, and their appeal is to intelligence and reasonableness. While holding to dogma they are not dogmatic. This is especially the case with the Essay on the Divinity of Christ, which is perhaps the ablest in the book. Here

[1] P. x.

the author, after exhibiting the progress made in the classical attempts to solve the problem of who and what is Jesus Christ, wisely starts from a different side. "If we are to form a right conception of God, we must look at Christ. The wise question is not 'Is Christ Divine?' but 'What is God like?' And the answer to that is 'Christ.'"[2] "Jesus of Nazareth was born at a certain time and place; but in him there was active in the world the Eternal Spirit of God, and in him we touch the divine humanity which was always in the Godhead but only then was made fully manifest."[3] The author traces Jesus' unity with God to that centre of personality, the will. "Christ's will, as a subjective function, is of course not the Father's will; but the content of the wills—the purpose—is the same. Christ is not the Father; but Christ and the Father are one. What we see Christ doing and desiring, that we thereby know the Father does and desires. . . . He is the perfect expression of the Divine in terms of human life. There are not two Gods, but in Christ we see God. Christ is identically God; the whole content of his being—his thought, feeling, and purpose—is also that of God. This is the only 'substance' of a spiritual being, for it is all there is of him at all."[4] The author's whole position is an exposition of Christ's own words, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father."

Mr. Rawlinson, in discussing the Principle of Authority, has had a less profound insight into the necessities of thought. He is still hampered by the obligation which he feels to provide an external embodiment for authority; though he recognizes that its function in religion is "neither to compel assent nor to override reason, but to testify to spiritual experience." He is perhaps compelled to this obligation because his chief aim is to justify to opposing Protestants the "catholic" position. He shows an appreciation of what Protestantism has stood for; but what is really dear to him is that institutionalism which needs for its adequate expression the "catholic" —not necessarily the Roman Catholic—system. He sums up with much candor the contributions of each: "Catholicism stands in an especial sense for institutional religion; for the use and value, that is to say, of rites and sacraments as being neither dead forms nor illogical excrescences upon a religion otherwise wholly spiritual, but as being themselves spirit and life. . . . [It] witnesses to the glory of Churchmanship, the sense of spiritual kinship and unity, not with a section of Christendom but with the whole; to the idea of worship, as prior in religion to that of edification; . . . to the possibility of a

[2] P. 259. [3] P. 251. [4] P. 248.

science of the soul and a specific type of Christian sanctity, most characteristically mediated by the confessional and the Mass. . . . Protestantism at its best stands for the power of personal religion; for the spiritual freedom of the individual answerable in the last resort to his Maker alone; for the prophetic word as the dynamic which alone can vitalize the ritual of the priest. . . . It has warned us impressively, and not always unnecessarily, of the deadness of the letter except as expressing and mediating the spirit. The Catholicism of the future certainly cannot afford to disregard the truths of the Protestant witness, and must to a certain extent reinterpret and revalue (without abandoning) its institutionalism in the light of them."

The other seven Essays vary of course in the ability with which they accomplish their excellent endeavor. But one rises from the volume with the sense of standing before men of reality, most of whom have seen deep and found living truth where others have noticed only dead formulae or deadening ritual. The reading of *Foundations* tends to make the Bible a more living book than before, Christ more intelligible and precious, personality more mysterious and comprehensible, sin deeper yet more eradicable, the church more necessary, and God more wonderful and approachable.

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Cambridge.

Revelation and the Ideal. George A. Gordon. Houghton Mifflin Co. 1913. Pp. x, 427. $1.50.

When Dr. Gordon's book was announced, one looked for a reasoned exposition similar to his *Religion and Miracle*. This anticipation was strengthened by the dedication, "To those who believe that the ideal is the shadow of God in the mind of man." In the preface one reads that for many years he "cherished the audacious dream of writing a book on the philosophy of revelation," but was reluctantly compelled to surrender it. Regret at this necessity becomes more poignant when he adds, "I have long felt that the secret of Revelation is in the keeping of the Ideal. . . . The greater introductions of God to the mind of man are through man's greater ideals. Moral idealism and revelation are but the concave and the convex of the same figure." Our regret is however qualified by his saying that "what could not be discussed in the form of a treatise might be presented in a series of visions close to life and warm with serious concern for the high possibilities of man." Accordingly,

he attempts an answer to two questions: Does the Eternal God speak to men? If so, how? After the first chapter on "What is Revelation?" each of the remaining chapters considers some aspect of the ideal as suggested by various texts from the Scriptures.

Certain great convictions underlie Dr. Gordon's thinking in this book. One is that of the living God. God is to him a reality with infinite moral purpose and moral deeds for men, at home in his world, Life of our life, Light of our light, Love of our love. Another conviction is that the ideal is the one omnipresent, omnipotent, transforming reality in our world. In this light he shows us one great person after another in the Bible and makes it clear how character, deeds, message, temptations and sins, struggles and conquests, indeed every single experience gets its significance from the divine ideal. His idealism is through and through ethical. He is a brave optimist but never at the expense of truth and virtue. Moreover, he conceives of each life as environed by inescapable responsibility, not for deeds only but most of all for character and ideals. Within every man's control lies the shaping of his destiny, and each day brings to him a more commanding task, the deep import of which is matched only by its joyousness. Finally, his belief in immortality sweeps away the barriers which hem in earthly existence and makes the soul at home in the eternal world.

It would be hard to judge whether thought or emotion or will is uppermost in his message. Now it is the truth of his ideal, now the goodness and beauty of it, and now the irresistibleness of its imperative appeal. The sermons let us into the secret not alone of God's purpose and of the characters portrayed, but also self-unconsciously of himself. Here we are in touch with a mind enriched by familiarity with the greatest thinkers, valuing their vast treasures both for themselves and for their bearing on life, to whom the Christian ministry is the ministry of God to men in terms of human speech. History, philosophy, poetry, art, social science, the homely interests of human life, all bring their choicest gifts to enforce his meaning. Dr. Gordon is a lover of the sky with its stars, the sea tumultuous and awful, mountains with their majestic strength, and natural beauty in a thousand forms; these are the living garment of God, the vehicle of his revelation. Not once only but many times we are impressed by the extreme felicity in the statement of the theme, the choice of the text, the natural development of the thought, and the richness and beauty of the treatment. No one sermon in the book is as great perhaps as several sermons in his *Through Man to God;* but they are all of the same

texture of belief in God, of ideals and loyalty to them, of the high and serious privilege of living, and of immortal hope. Some readers may wish there were a more pronounced emphasis upon the social ideal.

One after another the chapters read like successive cantos in an epic of human life; they have the human interest, the imaginative splendor, insight into and use of natural beauty, power to lift the single event into world-wide and permanent significance, and the discovery of its secret in the dramatic unfolding of the purpose of God, which belong to great poetry. That he has chosen the prose instead of the poetic form for his message affects in no way its essential content.

Clarence Augustine Beckwith.

Chicago Theological Seminary.

The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ. H. P. Mackintosh, Ph.D., Professor of Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Scribners, 1912. Pp. 540. $2.50.

The object of the author in this book is to provide the student with a manual which will serve him to take his bearings in the world of Christological thought, and to acquaint him with recent discussions. He divides his book into three parts. In the first he gives the Christology of the New Testament, and expounds all the more significant passages in a conservative spirit and with the tendency to emphasize their metaphysical import. In the second part he rapidly sketches the history of Christological doctrine from the sub-apostolic period to our own day. Here he is much freer in his treatment of the material than in the first part. He passes judgment on the creed of Chalcedon and holds that the doctrine of two natures is untenable on any true psychology. The third part contains his constructive statement. It treats of the immediate utterances of faith and their transcendent implicates. He makes a strong plea for thorough-going thinking on these matters. He girds against current theological positivism and disparagement of reason. He maintains that the utterances of faith regarding Christ as the Object rather than the Subject of faith, his absolute sovereignty as exalted Lord in all the affairs of the universe, and his perfect manhood and full divinity as Godhead, are essential elements of the Gospel. Their transcendent implicates, he contends, involve a real pre-existence and an incarnation, which means a self-reduction of God. Christ was not only God *incognito* to men on earth, but even to himself, except in

rare moments at the close of his life, when he became aware of his Godhead. This kenotic position is expounded and defended at length and accepted whole-heartedly. The author has taken his task seriously, and succeeded in making his book a serviceable manual for the student. For this purpose, however, it loses much of its value by its failure to give greater weight to the sifted conclusions of New Testament critical study, and to recognize the pressing problems raised by the new emphasis on the eschatological element in the Gospels; still more, by the author's acceptance as immediate utterances of faith of ideas and expressions of experience which were real enough for the early Christians but no longer have the same reality for us. He takes New Testament theology as if it were not only the immediate utterance of faith, but its final utterance. He has recourse to psychology in his criticism of traditional constructions of Christology. Why not do the same in dealing with the thought of the apostles? The same question arises in the discussion of kenosis. His treatment of Christ's omnipresence shows to what hard straits the author is pushed in carrying through his interpretation, when he makes omnipresence to consist not in the ubiquity of the person but in the universality of the work of Christ.

DANIEL EVANS.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE MYSTIC WAY. A Psychological Study in Christian Origins. EVELYN UNDERHILL. J. M. Dent & Sons. 1913. Pp. xi, 395.

The author attempts to show that the mystic way, with its familiar three stages of purification, illumination, and union, stands for a perfectly natural process of growth into reality (natural, that is, for those who have been regenerated into the spiritual order), which is exemplified in the history of Jesus and Paul, represented in the experience underlying the Fourth Gospel, and perpetuated in the ritual of the Mass.

The book may be regarded as an essay in history or in philosophy. Considered historically, as a psychological interpretation of the New Testament, it has no appreciable value. The writer takes an occasional fling at the "higher critics," but the missiles have a boomerang flight, for historical criticism was never so capricious as this which aspires to be psychological. The treatment of the eschatological element in the life and teaching of Jesus, for example, is so utterly unhistorical as to be psychologically foolish. To interpret the baptism

of Jesus as the stage of purgation, the transfiguration as the second stage of illumination, and the passion as the dark night of the soul in which there is a purgation of the will immediately preceding the final ascent into unity, and to find the same three stages in the life-history of Paul and the successive groups of his Epistles, is simply whimsical. However edifying it may be spiritually, historically it is fantastic.

Philosophically, however, the book is of interest because it differentiates sharply two types of mysticism: the one purely contemplative, reaching a transcendent Absolute of pure Being by the *via negativa;* the other both active and contemplative in rhythmic swing, attaining union with God considered as both immanent and transcendent, both Being and Becoming, through living participation in the rhythm of reality. The former type of mysticism is Neo-Platonic; the latter is "true" Christian mysticism, which, however, was speedily contaminated by its Greek neighbor. Thus the Christian life was corrupted by Greek mysticism, as Christian thought by Greek philosophy. Hence the writer contends, and this is an interesting point, that the line of Christian mysticism should be traced historically through Macarius of Egypt rather than Dionysius the Areopagite, although one may well doubt whether the actual influence of the former upon later Christian mystics was at all comparable with that of the latter.

The book was manifestly written under the spell of Bergson and Eucken, particularly Bergson, but there is no serious attempt to grapple with the philosophical problems involved. To take but a single instance: that mysticism is a way of life rather than of thought is undoubtedly true; but life pertains to thought as well as to feeling and conduct, and the defender of mysticism must consider whether the mystical experience contributes to knowledge, and also whether the reality which it apprehends is reality in its wholeness or, at best, but a single aspect of it. Although it is frequently urged that "true" mysticism consists in the apprehension of the full-orbed reality by the unified whole of man, there is a quite inconsistent leaning towards anti-intellectualism. The book is mysticism-up-to-date, but the date is the flourishing of Bergson.

W. W. Fenn.

Cambridge.

THE CONCEPT OF SIN. F. R. TENNANT. Cambridge University Press. 1912. Pp. 284.

When one compares current theological literature with that which was issued a century ago in New England, nothing is more striking than the difference in respect to the prominence of the doctrine of sin. Then both preachers and theologians were concerned mainly with original sin, its origin, transmission, and guilt, and with the cognate doctrines of atonement, future punishment, and salvation. Now we seldom hear even in revivals of deep conviction of sin; men no longer grovel at the altar, but "rise for prayers" with the air of doing something handsome for the preacher and the Lord. Who knows what is meant by the "law-work" once so firmly insisted upon as the prelude to gracious regeneration? The anxious seat and the mourners' bench are no longer in fashion.

It is noteworthy that Dr. Tennant had given us two valuable treatises on sin before attempting to define precisely what the term means. This is characteristic of current theological procedure. In his latest book, however, the concept is defined with a thoroughness which leaves little to be desired. Sin is defined as "moral imperfection for which an agent is in God's sight accountable," or, more accurately, as "imperfect compliance (in single volitional activity or in character resulting from such activities) with the moral ideal in so far as this is, in the sight of God, capable of apprehension by an agent at the moment of the activity in question, both as to its content and its claim upon him; this imperfect compliance being consequent upon choice of ends of lower ethical worth when the adoption of ends of higher worth is possible, and being regarded in its religious aspect (which may in some cases be wanting)" (p. 245).

Plainly this definition emphasizes the volitional and intentional character of sin. Sins of ignorance are not sins at all. Imperfection is not sin, for in boyhood Jesus had not attained the perfection of mature years, yet he was without sin, and besides perfection includes elements like emotional warmth and soundness of judgment, which are non-ethical. In addition, to regard sin as imperfection flies in the face of evolution.

One may ask what justifies such an elaborate effort to define the concept of sin. The result is of little practical value, for the very inwardness of sin makes it impossible for us to pronounce any particular act a sin or any particular man a sinner. Over and over again it is affirmed that only to the omniscience of God is sin certainly known. This indeed teaches charity of judgment, but it

is of little practical benefit to define a concept of sin in such a way as never to be able to tell where it applies. Nor is it possible for the sinner to pronounce judgment on himself; for (to adopt the author's terminology) he may have psychically a consciousness of sin although psychologically and in the sight of God he is no sinner. Here again, the concept may give relief to over-sensitive consciences; but if neither the man himself nor another can surely apply the concept, it might seem better to drop the term altogether instead of taking such pains to define it. But here we come to the heart of the matter. Dr. Tennant holds that there must be such a thing as sin because church doctrine and the Bible speak of it, and hence it is necessary to define the term accurately that we may understand both it and the context of revealed truth in which it is contained. This indicates a radical squint in the book, of which the author seems quite unaware. It would seem that the concept should be derived from the use of the term in the context of revelation, defined, that is, mainly by exegesis applied to the Scriptures and the Symbols of the Church; but the author grants that Paul has two inconsistent ideas as to sin, and admits that usually Christian thinkers have worked on a false theory. Hence the meaning of sin in its context of revelation is to be corrected by ethical reflection governed by our present moral standards and ideals. The dilemma is this: if a doctrine of sin is part of revealed truth, the definition of the term should be sought only in the revelation; if not, then in view of the many different meanings which the term carries and the resulting difficulties of comprehension, perhaps it would be well to describe accurately the moral experience with which one proposes to deal, instead of trying to define a concept, especially as there is little hope that the definition will be unanimously adopted and consistently employed even by theologians.

W. W. Fenn.

Cambridge.

The Early Persecutions of the Christians. Leon Hardy Canfield, Ph.D. Columbia University Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law. LV, 2. 1913. Pp. 215. $1.50.

In this interesting study Dr. Canfield reviews with care and thoroughness the whole material for the history of the so-called Christian persecutions down to the close of the reign of Hadrian. He accepts as true what has long been the general conclusion of scholars, that the attitude of the Roman government towards alleged Christians was not definitely determined until a fairly late

date. He inclines to set this date at the time of Trajan, and to attach great and decisive importance to that emperor's famous rescript in reply to Pliny's inquiries. Down to this time he thinks that what appear as "persecutions" were measures of ordinary police administration, taken to meet popular demands and implying that Christians were on many accounts objects of general dislike, but were not, as a religious body, subject to any specific legal penalty. After Trajan, however, there was at least a precedent, and the mere name of "Christian" sufficed as a basis for action in a specific case. This furnishes a workable hypothesis from which to proceed to a study of the more notable reported cases of procedure against Christians, from Nero to Hadrian's letter to the provincial official Minucius Fundanus, the genuineness of which Dr. Canfield accepts after a careful examination of the arguments for and against it.

It was distinctly worth while, in view of all that has been written in recent years, to bring together in brief compass the original material and to summarize the opinions based upon it, if only to show once again how meagre and fragmentary this material is, and how impossible it is, therefore, to reach any very solid conclusions as to the exact relation of the parties concerned. Dr. Canfield leaves us in no doubt as to his opinion on every point of controversy, but we could wish that he had seen fit to examine also the motives which have determined the attitude of modern writers on these points. It is not quite enough to say of M. Allard that he is "very conservative" and of M. Aubé that he is "very radical." It is important to know what these terms mean. It is essential to any real understanding of a writer's opinion to know, not merely his formal arguments on specific questions of text criticism, but the underlying motive which may have determined his opinion in advance. Throughout these discussions about the persecutions there runs the thread of an ardent and sincere desire, on the one side, to view all the evidence as bearing upon the glory of the martyred saints, and, on the other, to counteract this tendency by neglecting or minimizing the importance of any such consideration. Dr. Canfield seems intentionally to avoid all allusion to this line of demarcation. Perhaps he regarded it as lying outside the object of his study; but in any case this omission leaves his problem hanging in the air quite as hopelessly as ever. It still remains a puzzle to the modern student, as it was to Tertullian himself, why, if the "Name" implied crimes, the Christians were not to be punished for these crimes, and if it did not, why they were to be punished at all.

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND LIFE OF GEORGE TYRRELL. Edited or written by M. D. PETRE. Longmans, Green & Co. 1912. Vol. I, pp. xvi, 280. Vol. II, pp. xii, 512. $5.40.

This life of George Tyrrell contains a record of an extraordinary religious experience within the soul of a great man, and the most interesting chapter yet written of the Modernist revolution, or at least insurrection, within the church of Rome. Of this insurrection indeed we doubt if we shall ever have a more fascinating or more pathetic description. For Loisy, the one other figure of any size or moment in the movement, has not only given us in *Choses Passées* a comparatively pale and disappointing account of it, but has completely abandoned Modernism for a position which can be called in no sense Christian, if even theistic. Modernists, it is true, are still active, appealing now for democracy within the church, again for liberty of study and research, and still again for disciplinary reforms, such as a mitigation of clerical celibacy, or a removal of devotional abuses; but cohesion, system, or a clear programme they have none. The promise of that died with Tyrrell. In him Modernism had a leader, religious to his last fibre, and a thinker not incapable of formulating a philosophical reconstruction of Catholic dogma, if such a reconstruction be possible. Two principles he left behind him as a propaedeutic to this reconstruction, principles on the elaboration of which his claim to a place among philosophic theologians will rest. The first is, that revelation is a felt experience of the divine, whereas theology is the stammering speech of the reflective intellect striving to articulate this experience. In Jesus and the apostles this experience is supreme and normative; and the commission to keep it so and to check theology from using such language as would injure either its supremacy or its normativeness is the sole justification of the church's authority, papal, hierarchical, or sacerdotal. And the second principle, central and essential in Tyrrell's apologetic for Catholicism, is that social unity and solidarity are necessary for the full conservation of the religious experiences derived by Christians from Christ, and learned in their search for Christ. Hence schism is the unpardonable sin. To depart from the one church is to impoverish religious life in general; it is to forfeit the massive corporate power and grace of the Christian Commonwealth for a specious individualist liberty which can end in but shallowness and anarchy. Popes and prelates, therefore, Tyrrell admonishes to abandon their despotic pretensions, their infallibilities, their condemnations, since their office exists only to safeguard the integrity, not of theology, but of revelation. And

those who are either tempted to leave or have left the Roman Communion, he warns of the danger of deserting Christ in deserting the historic body of Christ. In the development of both ideas he permits and commits a latitudinarianism in interpreting doctrinal formulas which the authorities of his church hold to be deadly heresy, and those outside his church consider an impossible and objectively dishonest compromise. By neither party was his voice heard, and great as his attempt was, brilliant as it was, earnest as it was, it has ended in what we cannot but think a final failure. It is essentially an attempt not sprung spontaneously from an original and creative conception, but a manoeuvre of defence, a desperate effort to save the citadel of a city whose walls are taken and whose streets are thronged by the foe. And never has a mere defensive tactic either produced a new religious movement or renovated an old religious system. But if one reads Tyrrell, the Modernist theologian, with misgivings, one follows the story of Tyrrell, the man, with fascination. Never was there a man more honest, nor more detached and severe in self-analysis, nor more shrewdly on guard against delusion. He pictures himself, and when his record fails Miss Petre pictures him with quite extraordinary competence, in the very garb and gesture of naturalness. He tells us his failings merrily, his merits humbly, his follies whimsically.

He was a Celt, and the gods gave him his race's full measure of humor; gave him too the Celt's indestructible passion for the unseen. A lovable and great soul was George Tyrrell; and those who read in the pure and swiftly moving English of these volumes the account of his few joys and many griefs, of his ardent hopes and dreary disappointments, of his hunger for peace, and of his fate to be a leader in the most heart-breaking of warfares, of his long spiritual exile as an excommunicate, and of his sorrowful death, will feel the whole heart moved to reverence for so true a man. His pen was forever reminding us to look from contending theology to the inward-abiding God—but had he never written this in words, his life would teach it.

William Sullivan.

New York.

The Birth of the English Church. Saint Augustine of Canterbury. Sir Henry H. Howorth. E. P. Dutton and Co. Pp. 451.

We have here an amount of authoritative and exact information with regard to the missionary relations of Pope Gregory the Great, to Pagan England, and also to the Celtic Church in that country,

which it would be difficult to find in any other single volume. There is no drawing on the imagination, either for edification or for any other purpose. Sir Henry Howorth has preferred to set down the facts of the case. Having searched widely and dug deep among the authorities, near and remote, the President of the Royal Archaeological Institute, after the scientific manner of his kind, makes the present work a sifting place for his collected findings, and does so not only with absolute freedom from bias but with scrupulous scholarship, as if to justify the title of his book. Here is the actual truth of things as to the "birth of the English Church." The greatest figure was Pope Gregory. St. Augustine was not great. A sincerely self-denying monk, yet as head of the British Mission he was a small man in a great place; who planted along with the wheat he knew, unchristian tares which he did not know to be such, but which gave trouble later and are giving it to this day.

The author deserves our gratitude for having gathered together and focalized in this volume a large amount of trustworthy information, which except for technical scholars is difficult of access.

C. G. Currie.

Philadelphia.

A Dictionary of English Church History. Edited by Canon S. L. Ollard, M.A., assisted by Gordon Grosse, M.A., and nearly seventy Contributors. London: A. R. Mowbray & Co. Milwaukee, Wis.: The Young Churchman Co. Pp. 673.

The preface emphasizes the somewhat remarkable fact that while English ecclesiastical literature has never so abounded in biographies, in extensive series, and in isolated monographs, as during the last thirty years, nevertheless the present "Dictionary" is the only attempt that has been made, either in English or in German, to gather together the results of those diffusely scattered labors and embody them in a single volume.

The dictionary form is an important point. Busy people in an age like ours need to have their knowledge easily within reach. They have not the time to ransack many books or to spend hours in libraries. Hence the multiplication in the last few years of encyclopaedias. These however cannot be of a convenient size, and at the same time be specialized enough, to go into the details of church history. As a rule, the points in church history that one wants to get at, either to turn a phrase or to enforce an idea or a doctrine, are the details of events rather than their main outline. It is surprising to what an extent English ecclesiastical history is to

be found flowing in the depths of the springs of modern affairs and controversies. Questions of politics, questions of social reform, drive one back to it continually.

The trustworthiness of this book, so far as leading facts are concerned, is approximately guaranteed by the large number of contributors—no less than seventy. As one reads over the list, their university rank and high ecclesiastical position are a hostage for their honesty. The fact too that these writers are recognized High Churchmen and express themselves from the High Church party point of view, is not necessarily as disastrous to the interest of truth as other people might naturally think it to be; by other people we mean other schools of Episcopalians and the scholars of other Christian Churches. Given, as to any subject discussed, the contributors' distinct honesty of purpose, given too their very distinctly limiting personal equation, as High Churchmen, as followers of Archbishop Laud, Dr. Pusey, and Mr. Keble, and it is always interestingly easy to calculate their eclipses. The legality and rigidity of High Churchmanship, fatal as it is in some ways, is not without its advantages in others. It is tolerably easy to prophesy that this Dictionary of English Church History will become in a short time a standard authority in the school of thought to which its editors and contributors belong.

C. G. Currie.

Philadelphia.

The Early History of the Liturgy. J. H. Srawley, D.D. Cambridge University Press. 1913. (The Cambridge Liturgical Handbook Series.) Pp. xx, 251. 6*s*.

How did the service of the modern liturgical churches develop from that of the Apostolic age? This book aims to give an answer by collecting the illustrative data which exist down to about the fifth century. All the services centre about the Eucharist; which, some may be surprised to learn, was not always a commemoration of the Last Supper. The details of the development of eucharistic services in different localities and centuries make the book useful to the student and dry for general reading.

Manual of Early Ecclesiastical History to 476 a.d. By Charles L. Wells, Ph.D. The University Press at the University of the South, Sewanee, Tennessee. Pp. xxxv, 259. $1.50.

The book is published for people of the Episcopal Church, especially for students preparing for canonical examinations. The

general reader therefore may look at it with prejudice. Although the writer has thoroughly studied the origin of institutions, he is rather final on such tentative points as the origin of infant baptism and of the episcopate. The volume is arranged on the cross-section plan; it deals clearly with important episodes; it has excellent suggestions for advanced reading; it is interesting.

HENRY B. WASHBURN.
CAMBRIDGE.

THE MAKING OF THE NEW TESTAMENT. B. W. BACON. (The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge.) Henry Holt & Co. 1912. Pp. 256. 50 cents.

By *The Making of the New Testament* Dr. Bacon means the process not of combining and canonizing the New Testament writings but of their rise and growth in the formative period of the Christian religion. Viewing the literature from the standpoint of the historian of religion, the author discerns therein two leading types of thought: (1) Pauline, which is characterized as the Greek-Christian gospel *about* Jesus and as the religion of the spirit; (2) Petrine or Apostolic, which is called the Jewish-Christian gospel *of* Jesus and the religion of authority. Both types of thought start from the common confession that Jesus is Lord. But the Petrine gospel, which is broadly characteristic of the Synoptic writings, rests upon the authority of the historical Jesus and regards christology as an "apotheosis doctrine." The Pauline gospel, on the other hand, is a doctrine of incarnation, appealing to the eternal manifestation of God in man, while the story of Jesus is a drama of the supernal regions, his earthly career being only a humiliating episode in the cosmic process. Furthermore, it should seem, though the distinction between christology and soteriology is not carried out in detail, that each type of thought has its own conception of salvation. In the Petrine type the stress is laid on the social ideal of the Law and the Prophets, the messianic hope of a world-wide kingdom of God; but in the Pauline type, salvation is individualistic and personal, union with the divine, as in the Hellenistic religions of the period. At the same time the kingdom of God remains as a social organism, permeated and vitalized by Christ's spirit of service, but freed from Jewish particularism in virtue of its transcendental and cosmic character.

Apart from what Dr. Bacon calls the "Matthaean" or "Dominical" Precepts wherein the gospel *of* Jesus appears free from admixture, and apart from the ten letters of Paul in which the gospel *about* Jesus is likewise pure (at least, no stress is put on Paul's indebted-

ness to the ethical utterances of the Old Testament, the sayings of Jesus, or the traditions of primitive Christianity), the writings of the New Testament present the Petrine and the Pauline types of thought in various degrees of combination, mixture, or blending. Mark, for example, is broadly assimilated to the Pauline gospel and "displays an attitude toward the growing claims of apostolic authority and neo-legalism which in contrast with Matthew and Luke is altogether refreshing" (p. 164). On the other hand, the pseudo-apostolic Epistles such as the Pastorals, Jude, the Epistles of John, and Second Peter, which reflect the docetic heresies of a later period than Paul, and such as First Peter (a Petro-Pauline product like Mark), Hebrews (written from Ephesus to Rome by a disciple of Paul), and James (written from Rome or Syria), which come out of persecution, are all characterized more or less by the note of appeal to apostolic authority.

"Both types of gospel," the author believes, "are justified in claiming to emanate from Jesus of Nazareth; but neither without the other can claim to represent fully the significance of his spirit and life" (p. 148). The synthesis of these two types is the creative work of the unknown divine who, in the "spiritual" (i.e. symbolical) Gospel of John, applies to the story of Jesus as tradition repeated it the Pauline doctrine formulated under the Stoic Logos theories, seeking thereby to rescue the Christians who were exposed to the dangers of both Gnostics and reactionaries.

Such in brief and mainly in the words of the author is Dr. Bacon's theory of the origin and growth of the literature of the New Testament. With the general contention that the Fourth Gospel contains a striking synthesis of distinctive Paulinism, both in its idea of Christ and its idea of salvation, and of Palestinian neo-legalism, there should be wide-spread agreement; but with regard to the details difference of opinion is inevitable because of the paucity of the sources. For example, it is at least an open question whether the tradition of Papias, to which Dr. Bacon clings, that Mark is *ab initio* a Roman gospel, is so good a working hypothesis as that which conceives Mark to be originally an Aramaic gospel reflecting the opinion about Jesus in the early church at Jerusalem. We may likewise question whether there is a trace of distinctive Paulinism in the soteriology or the christology of Mark. Indeed the mind that conceived the original sources of the early chapters of Acts may be precisely the mind of Mark.

Were we to venture one word of criticism, it would be that the author makes too great demands on the previous knowledge of the

readers of the "Home University Library." On the other hand, the volume reveals an intimate and long-standing acquaintance not only with the New Testament itself but also with the complex traditions about the same in the Fathers; it manifests alertness in literary criticism and fertility of resource in combining detached data; it is replete with incidental suggestions, as, for example, that in Philemon Paul requests that Onesimus be manumitted (p. 89), or that, when Paul went to Jerusalem to visit Peter, "the story he was interested to hear had even then more to do with that common apostolic witness of the resurrection appearances reproduced in 1 Cor. xv, 3–11, than with the sayings and doings of the ministry" (p. 154); and finally it displays a pioneer robustness in constructive work which is stimulating to American scholarship.

J. E. Frame.

Union Theological Seminary,
New York.

Jesus. George Holley Gilbert. The Macmillan Co. 1912. Pp. xii, 321. $1.35.

Dr. Gilbert has undertaken to write a life of Jesus which shall be at once critical and popular; which shall commend itself by the use of a sound historical method and by lucidity of presentation. That he was qualified by ripe scholarship and literary skill to perform this difficult task, his earlier works gave evidence. The present book surpasses them in grasp and in completeness, and is an important addition to the literature of the subject. It is likely to do valuable service in extending the knowledge of gospel criticism and its results among educated laymen. The introductory part dealing with the sources is of especial merit in this regard.

Dr. Gilbert's criticism and historical construction concern themselves simply with the Gospels. Their scope may be indicated by the following questions: What are the most trustworthy elements of these composite documents? and what may we learn from these elements about Jesus?

He assumes the validity of the criticism which has given the "two source" theory of the synoptics general acceptance among scholars. These older documents—the "Logia" (as, differing from most recent New Testament critics, he calls the collection of sayings used by Matthew and Luke) and Mark, he takes as the gospel in the Gospels. His supreme source is the Logia, which he calls "the fundamental Christian document," and the distinctive feature of his construction is the support found for his views in this document. The Jesus of whom the Logia informs us is the real Jesus.

The task which Dr. Gilbert set himself had rigid limits. It did not include historical questions underlying the oldest written sources of our Gospels and affecting their value. Such inquiries as Wellhausen and Harnack have made with regard to the genesis of the Logia (or Q), its relative age as compared with that of Mark, the evidences it gives of a modification of the words of Jesus—these were excluded by the author's aim.

In presenting the thoughts of Jesus he felt only at liberty to use the material given by the Gospels; and this he has done with admirable candor and great clearness. A broader presentation, giving Jesus' teaching in its connection with current Jewish thought, would have been more interesting; it was not called for by the important object for which the book was written.

The closing part of the book examines the statements made by the Gospels as to Jesus' birth, as to certain miraculous acts and events of his ministry, and his resurrection. The result reached is indicated by the title given to the section, "The Legendary Jesus."

One who admitted the soundness of Dr. Gilbert's criticism and accepted its result, might object, that regarding these stories as legends had not given him a different conception of Jesus. What was essential in his thought of Christ was not derived from accepting them as literally true, and was not lost when such acceptance became impossible.

Edward Y. Hincks.

Andover.

History of Religions. I. China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia, Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, Rome. George Foot Moore. International Theological Library. Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. xiv, 637. $2.50.

The International Theological Library, which has hitherto confined itself to Christianity, has made an advance into a wider field with its issue of the *History of Religions* by George Foot Moore; the first volume of which, excluding Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, embraces the religions of China, Japan, Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, India, Persia, Greece, and Rome. A second volume will treat the three omitted here, and we may be permitted to hope that a later volume will take up the religions of uncivilized peoples, the historical *prius*, from the point of view of comparative religion, of the subject-matter here considered.

But for the present we may be thankful for what we have already received. Professor Moore's work is a marvel of condensation and lucid exposition. He appears to be at home in each of the many

fields he here describes so well, and we regret only that so many fields had to be represented within the compass of a volume of six hundred pages. It would have been profitable as well as pleasant to hear the author more at length on various points which in this book could only be mentioned briefly. It is probably owing to limitation of space that one promise made in the preface, for example, seems to be barely met; namely, to show the relation of religions to race and physical environment. Thus the suggestion of Oldenberg that India's mental decay was due to the enervating climate of the Gangetic plain is not noticed. Greece in this regard receives much fuller treatment than Rome, Egypt than Babylonia.

Just what determined the order of treatment in this presentation of the religions of nine races is not obvious. But the author had to begin somewhere, and apparently thought that it would be well to start with the extreme Orient and work westward, doubtless strengthened in this course by the possibility of an approximate parallelism in chronology; which, however, holds only for the last links in his chain, except as Assyria may be regarded as an appanage of Babylon, and Japan of China, with part of India (Buddhism) introduced under the head of Japan. This last arrangement is the only really disturbing feature in the otherwise unobjectionable treatment of the nine religions as racial phenomena; for it forces the student into a study of the religion of Buddha from its later end, and presents Buddhism first of all in the phases of its most foreign development. But happily it is only Buddhism that has to be treated in this peculiar manner. The other religions, bounded as they are by racial and national limits, are presented as homogeneous wholes, or at least as products of one national or racial entity. The space devoted to each of the nine religions is reasonably allotted; seventy-eight pages to China alone, or one hundred and forty-three to China and Japan together (including Buddhism); about fifty-five pages to Egypt, forty-two to Babylonia and Assyria, one hundred and ten to India, one hundred and thirty to Greece, sixty to Rome.

Professor Moore remarks in the preface on the simultaneity of the appearance of the great religions; comparing the period from the eighth to the fifth centuries B.C. to a geological epoch, as if it represented a phase of periodicity. In other words, we are to expect another epoch, and such epochs may have come in the remoter past. But this is a doubtful doctrine; and, after all, three centuries do not comprise the limits of the great religions, nor is there any conformity in the rise of the great religious teachers. If

a wave of religious intensity rose in the mental world, it must have skipped about a good deal. Pythagoras came some time before Confucius, Confucius before Buddha, Zoroaster before either. The wave must have traveled from Persia to Greece and then back to China and then again to India. It is perhaps better to give up altogether this idea of a power sweeping over earth as a rising wave, and treat each religion as the outgrowth of its own precedent conditions. All these religions grew up independently (except for contiguous borrowing), and were severally based on the common human elements of each race. They represent, if anything, a wave of civilization or emergence from savagery, of which religion makes only a part, not a spiritual upheaval simultaneously felt in various places.

In the first section, which really includes China and Japan, Professor Moore draws a careful and legitimate distinction between the early gods of Shinto and the Chinese deities. He shows how the state organization conditioned the conception of the latter, and points out the difference in mythological development. As between the interpretation of the first Japanese gods as spirits and that interpreting them as nature-powers, he inclines to the latter, though without discussion of this mooted point. A considerable part of Japanese religion is devoted to Buddhistic sects, where brevity is an unfortunate factor in the demonstration, though what is said is excellently clear. Thus the Hosso sect is well described historically; but to say that a sect which today numbers its quota of adherents and is represented by several temples, was "supplanted or absorbed" in the Middle Ages is a little misleading. The Jodo and Shin sects (the latter the largest at present in Japan) are theistic, in distinction from the Zen, which is practically atheistic. These popular but real differences between the sects, as atheistic, theistic, and polytheistic, have value at least for the general reader, who may not be versed in the vocabulary of Buddhist metaphysics. The Tendai sect is thus described—"pantheistic realism"—but the other sects remain explained in rather too technical language.

It is impossible here to examine in detail the admirable exposition of all the religions treated in this volume. Professor Moore is quite right in saying that however much a handbook loses by not being written by specialists, it gains more through being composed as a whole by one scholar; we may add, by a scholar of Professor Moore's wide information and keen discrimination. The religions of India, for example, seem to have been written by one versed in the literature at first hand, and it is safe to say that few Sanskrit scholars

could have improved upon the presentation here given. Perhaps a specialist would not have passed the subject of the Atman without touching upon the question whether the All-soul included the material world or implicitly excluded it (as certain passages suggest); and he probably would not have left the subject of Buddhism without touching on the practical question of meat-eating, interesting as a typical case of growth in the pious usage of the church. But these minute points have little weight in comparison with the excellent discussion of the fundamental principle of the faith. Buddhism, the later stages of which were discussed under China and Japan, is here depicted historically, the dates being those usually accepted. The second council seems to be recorded as a fact, though in truth it is doubtful whether it ever existed. The date of the introduction of Buddhism into China is given as the second century A.D. on page 302, and as the first century on page 313. Neither date is certain.

Of the remaining religions it may be said that they are all treated conservatively, fully, and from a modern point of view. We hear nothing of the intellectual greatness displayed in Babylonian liturgies; rather we are warned not to believe in it. Zoroastrian "duality" is fitly analyzed. In Egyptian religion full account is taken of the work done of late by Professor Breasted. Greek and Roman religions are well summarized. A good bibliography and an analytical index are appended to the book, which is by far the best general handbook for the study of advanced religions that has yet appeared.

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Cuneiform Parallels to the Old Testament. Translated and edited by Robert W. Rogers. Eaton & Mains. 1912. $4.50.

The phase of Assyriology which from the beginning of the study has attracted most readers is the relation of the subject to the Bible.

In *Cuneiform Parallels* Professor Rogers gathers a great mass of scattered material into a single volume, at once temperate, readable, comprehensive, and scholarly. The transliterations will be welcome to Assyriologists and to Hebrew students, and are so placed on the page as not to disturb the general reader. The bibliography, the introductions to many of the passages translated, the references to other publications and translations of the texts, and the forty-eight photographic reproductions, add greatly to the usefulness of the volume.

For the production of a work of this kind Professor Rogers is well equipped, and he has had the benefit of suggestions from some of his Assyriological brethren. He shows an admirable spirit toward his fellow-workers, is modest in asserting his own claims, and keeps to the straight road through a country in which many Assyriologists have lost themselves in by-paths.

The name of the book is attractive, but not quite accurate. Some of the selections are not taken from cuneiform sources, as those on pp. 76–78, 109–112, 239, 346–348, and 370–371. Nor does the word "Parallels" properly describe the contents of the work. There are cuneiform parallels to the Old Testament, such as the deluge story, the exposure of Sargon, and Sennacherib's invasion of Palestine. There is much other cuneiform material which illustrates the Old Testament, but is in no sense parallel. This is the case with a very large part of the present volume. We should hardly expect, for instance, to find the Babylonian Chronicle or the Eponym List in a book of parallels to the Old Testament. The Hammurabi Code contains a few laws very similar to Hebrew laws, but the great bulk of the code scarcely suggests Hebrew parallels. Yet this code fills seventy pages of the book, or about one-seventh of the whole. It must be admitted that it would be difficult to find a title, at once brief and adequate, for this book, which is a storehouse of material, mainly cuneiform, for the illustration and elucidation of the Old Testament, and perhaps we ought not to cavil at an author who gives so much more than he promises.

Cuneiform Parallels is not a discussion of the relations of Assyriology to the Bible, but restricts itself largely to a presentation of the cuneiform material, leaving it to the reader to make the application for himself. It thus enables a layman in the subject to become a semi-independent worker in this fascinating field.

The selections are grouped under six heads: mythological texts, hymns and prayers, liturgical and doctrinal texts, chronological materials, historical texts, and legal texts. The first and fifth heads naturally comprise about three-fifths of the whole. Under the first head are nine divisions, including the creation, the Gilgamesh Epic and the deluge story, the Descent of Ishtar, and other less familiar selections. The section on hymns and prayers contains twelve selections, but the author points out the necessity of caution in drawing parallels between these and the Hebrew Psalter. "The supposed Babylonian Sabbath" is the title of a selection under another head. The title suggests a negative attitude on the question, Did the Babylonians have a day similar to the Hebrew Sab-

bath? Under the title "The Pantheon" the selections are given on which some scholars base a belief that the Babylonians knew the doctrine of monotheism. The historical texts presented begin with Hammurabi (ca. 2000 B.C.), include some of the El-Amarna letters (ca. 1400 B.C.), and close with numerous extracts, mostly brief, from the records of the later kings of Assyria and Babylon (885–538 B.C.).

One need hardly say that a book like this, belonging to a young and growing science, has its imperfections. Such smaller slips as "sets" for "sits" (p. 88), the repetition of the word "due" (p. 325, top), i-ra-*ni* for i-ra-*mi* (p. 135, bottom), and *ma-še*-e for *na-še*-e (p. 328, l. 90), may be the result of accident. This explanation would hardly apply to the inconsistency in giving the names of the leading characters in the Gilgamesh Epic (see pp. 81, n. 1; 82, n. 1; 85, l. 5; 86, l. 8 from bottom; 87, l. 2; and 103, l. 17). The statement (p. 396) that the reader of the Hammurabi Code found it necessary to turn his head down sidewise in order to read the inscription at all, cannot be correct. The feat would be too difficult. The lines were read from above downward, as written. The stele containing the code was not set up at Sippar (p. 396), but at Babylon, as is expressly stated in a passage of column 40.[1] For "cast me into the river" (p. 136, l. 7) read "laid" or "placed me in the river." On pages 326, 329, and 331, the same phrase is rendered, "my men I set over them," "I set my officers over them," "I put my governors over them." The word thus variously given is in the singular, and should be rendered "general" or "officer." After recording the capture of certain Philistine cities, Sargon uses a word commonly rendered "I took" (p. 329, l. 7). While this is the usual meaning of the word, it seems in the present passage to mean "rebuild," as in a passage of the prism of Tiglath-pileser I. Sargon rebuilds the Philistine cities, and settles therein captives from other countries. There is confusion in the translation of the middle paragraph on page 459, though our author was not the first to make the confusion. In the correct translation a new sentence begins with the words, "That the strong might not injure the weak," and continues to the end of the paragraph. "Hammurabi . . . whom Shamash has endowed with justice am I" (p. 461) should be "Hammurabi . . . to whom Shamash has communicated the laws am I."[2]

In spite of such small defects as these, it is a pleasure to bear witness to the conscientiousness and general excellence of this work.

[1] See Journal of the American Oriental Society, xxvii, 128.
[2] Ibid., xxv, 271–275.

The selections are all of interest to the student of the Old Testament, and the translations are on a level with the best standards of today. The book deserves a large circulation. Indeed, there is no other book on the subject which is so full, so thorough, and so sane.

DAVID G. LYON.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE SERMON: ITS CONSTRUCTION AND DELIVERY. By DAVID JAMES BURRELL. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 329.

The value of Dr. Burrell's book is in its frank disclosure of the methods of his own effective preaching. It is filled with concrete advice, very practical and useful, and enforced with homely and amusing illustration. It deals with texts and topics, the making of outlines, the "exordium," the "argument," the "peroration," and the delivery of the sermon, with counsels on getting attention and on sermon-power. The writer has little patience with manuscript in the pulpit, and no patience with liberal theology. The book is a prescription for a sturdily orthodox sermon, spoken without notes, scriptural, evangelistic, intended mainly to convert sinners, full of anecdote and apt quotation, admirably ordered, and punctually terminated at the end. Sermons grow like trees by processes mysterious and indefinable; but they need correctives and assistances such as are given to the trees by fertilizing and spraying and pruning. For such care of sermons Dr. Burrell gives plain and profitable directions.

GEORGE HODGES.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE PULPIT AND THE PEW. CHARLES H. PARKHURST, D.D. Lyman Beecher Lectures delivered, 1913, before the Divinity School of Yale University. Yale University Press. 1913. Pp. 195. $1.50.

These eight lectures are not long, and they certainly are not dull. When spoken, they must have been effective, and the force is not lost in the reading. Colloquial language and illustrations abound, and some of these are apt to linger in the mind.

The lecturer is clear that the church has a work to do which no other institution is prepared to perform. He has not an exalted idea of the educational value of either the press or the stage. But the church of the twentieth century has for its duty the task of Elijah and Jeremiah: "To take eternal principle, and to measure existing conditions and institutions against that principle as stand-

ard." The aim of the pulpit is to emancipate men from sin. Its business is not to entertain or to instruct, but to resuscitate the conscience and to re-create the heart.

The author's well-known devotion to the cause of civic righteousness makes his discussion of the attitude of the church and the work of the minister toward social betterment, of special importance. He voices the well-known protest against an other-worldly individualism which "baptizes children over a font, but is dumb as an oyster to conditions that ruin children and youth faster than we can baptize them." But, on the other hand, he is wise enough to see that a ministry that exhausts itself in seeking simply to better conditions outwardly, never gets to the heart of the matter. "The policy of individualized work indicates the proper and peculiar function of the church. I know very well what the other kind means, and that for permanence and depth of result it is utterly inadequate. I have tried it, and I know its worth and its worthlessness. The business of the church is to bring people into the Kingdom of Heaven, one by one. The unit method is the only method."

Neither pulpit nor pew is flattered by the lecturer. If people do not go to church, we are told, "it is not the fault of the masses. People will fill the churches as fast as God fills the ministers." But, on the other hand, the young theologue is told that he needs to learn thoroughly before ordination that "while people have convictions, they are not very much given to making use of them, and treat them—especially moral and religious ones—very much as they do bric-à-brac, which is designed rather for decoration than for consumption."

Perhaps the most original and valuable lecture is the one on the Pulpit's estimate of the Pew, which every preacher would do well to read and to remember. But the lectures are all wholesome reading, and are calculated to carry out admirably the purpose of the lectureship.

RAYMOND CALKINS.

CAMBRIDGE.

THE MODERN CALL TO MISSIONS. JAMES S. DENNIS, D.D. Fleming H. Revell Co. 1913. Pp. 341. $1.50 net.

Dr. Dennis has brought together in book form a series of papers written for various publications on the History and Scope of Missionary Enterprise. These articles have been largely rewritten in the light of current events and have been so correlated in the book as to make a connected history of missionary activities from colonial times to the present.

His discussion of the appeal of missions to the modern church is particularly timely and full of suggestion. His chapter on union movements and unity of spirit in missionary work touches on what many people regard as the crucial problem of Christianity in foreign lands. The foreign non-Christian must often be at a loss to know what Christianity is, since it is presented from so many view-points and under so many names. On this important point—the necessity of ultimate unity and agreement on the fundamentals of Christianity —many will consider Dr. Dennis rather non-committal.

One is rather inclined to resent the note of apology which now and then appears throughout the book. The Christian missionary fails to recognize the significance of his work if he is tempted to make any concessions as to its value in comparison with diplomacy and the ordinary adjustments between nations. The only apology that need be made for missionary enterprise is an apology for its failure to recognize the comprehensiveness and all-embracing character of its purpose. Christ is in the world to found a civilization. This is a fundamental proposition. Missionaries are simply his co-laborers in this work. When once the church is fully awake to the great fact that Christ's meaning for the world is not a call for any department of life, not a call to help this or that movement, but a challenge to restore to life itself its birthright as the dynamic source of government and diplomacy, of law and order, of grace and peace—when this is understood, then shall we advance with dignity, and without fear or apology, to make the kingdoms of this world the kingdom of Christ.

The emphasis on the church and on religion in the conventional sense must give place to an emphasis on Christ as he lived, and as he *practised* life. The subtleties of a theology shot through with unexplained and unexplainable mysteries, must be eliminated from missionary effort, and an emphasis placed upon Christ, the Brother and Master of Men, the Healer and Announcer of liberty to the peoples of the earth.

Jesus, let it be repeated, gave no distinct emphasis to the parts of life. He is the spirit of government, of diplomacy, and of world-advancement. He was a world-man, living a life of dynamic inspiration, destined to renew not only individual men, but all the agencies of men, and to make this world the kingdom of peace and good-will —the kingdom of God.

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